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# INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS



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# INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

BY

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*and*

DANIEL C. O'GRADY, PH.D.

NEW YORK

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1930

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
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## FOREWORD

BOTH the nature and the value of any work are determined by the purpose it is intended to serve. The writers of this manual have accordingly been constantly guided by that which from their common teaching experience they felt convinced would best suit the capacities and satisfy the more immediate needs of the average undergraduate in this difficult field of study. This is the only justification they advance both for the unusual brevity with which certain of the more abstruse and speculative questions are treated and for omitting some of them altogether. It was believed that the extended discussions and refined distinctions—that are inevitable when such problems as the character of the distinction between essence and existence, or of the many views concerning the ultimate nature of personality and subsistence are exhaustively studied—would at this stage of the student's mental development tend rather to bewilder his mind and give him a disgust for abstract philosophy than to arouse in him an enthusiasm for it.

On the other hand, care has been taken to disclose as clearly as possible both the real nature of the problems involved and to suggest the practical implications of the general conclusions drawn. It has been said that in a broad sense Metaphysics constitutes the dictionary of philosophical literature. An effort has therefore been made to provide suitable definitions of all the important terms employed.

To each chapter is appended a list of problems or topics for class discussion. This is followed by such references as will be found in any well-stocked college library. It is suggested that the problems be made the basis for both oral and written discussion. In this way the principal topics in each chapter will not only be brought under review, but a stimulus will be provided for outside reading.

In the preparation of the text naturally many authors have been consulted. Among these, the writers here acknowledge a special indebtedness to the very scholarly work of Doctor Peter Coffey. His *Ontology or Theory of Being* is unquestionably the best single work of reference on this subject in the English language, though in our judgment it is not suitable for a brief course in the undergraduate school. Finally, grateful acknowledgment is here made to the Rev. Leo R. Ward, C.S.C., Ph.D., for



his careful reading and helpful criticism of the manuscript.

C. C. M.

D. C. O'G.

Notre Dame, Indiana,  
May 5, 1930.



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## INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS





## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION \*

FOR many people a knowledge of metaphysics is not necessary. One can, for instance, be a successful plumber or bricklayer without ever having heard even so much as a rumor of the possibility of metaphysics. Such a person simply takes reality for granted. He neither has nor can have any doubt about its being the primary fact. For him, tools are but tools, bricks but bricks. He knows their use, their value, their concrete relationships. He can recognize them, describe them, possibly even make them. The intellectual qualifications of his craft—as indeed of any other craft—fortunately do not include a more profound insight into the nature of the realities with which he deals.

To those students, therefore, who insist on putting the utilitarian question, “What is the use of metaphysics?” I say there is no use at all—no use, that is, if in your educational work

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you are seeking nothing but a wider and more varied knowledge of particular facts. Metaphysics will not give you that. Neither will it equip you with greater technical skill whereby you may command high salaries or positions of trust in the economic order. If you have only these things in mind, then you may reasonably pass metaphysics by. You will not miss it—unless perchance there comes a day when that wonder or serious curiosity which Aristotle called the beginning of philosophy stirs your mind.

The need for metaphysics arises when a certain dissatisfaction is felt with the scope and the quality of one's mental apprehensions, when reflective moods assert themselves and the mind quickens to a keener realization of its own inherent powers of knowing, when it dares to aspire to a more comprehensive grasp of and a more penetrating insight into the objects of its attention. Metaphysics as a philosophical discipline owes its existence to the natural and spontaneous tendency of cultivated minds to push their inquiries beyond mere observation of sense phenomena and the determination of the proximate relationships of things, and to attempt to give an answer to the questions that still remain after all the particular attributes of things have been singled out and all their physical qualities investigated.

Facts and their classification have been accumulating at such a rate, that nobody seems to have leisure to recognize the relations of sub-groups to the whole. It is as if individual workers in both Europe and America were bringing their stones to one great building and piling them on and cementing them together without regard to any general plan or to their individual neighbor's work. . . .<sup>1</sup>

There comes a time in the expansion and refinement of knowledge when the mind becomes aware of its ability to gather up into ever larger and simpler unities the highly diversified products of its successive experiences. And when that realization comes, its habitual outlook changes. Though it does not lose its interest in the manifold of sense, the point of that interest is shifted.<sup>2</sup>

In the earlier efforts to acquire knowledge the mind busies itself with reality as manifold. Its progress is marked by a gradually larger and more varied accumulation of sense data, and at the same time, by an increasing power of discrimination among the particular objects which come to its notice. Reflection upon the history of our mental life reveals the fact that

<sup>1</sup> K. Pearson, *The Scope of Science*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Francis Bacon, *Collected Works* (Ellis & Spedding), p. 94ff.

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our ideas of things were at first far more vague and confused than at a later date. Many things were jumbled together in the mind under nebulous general notions that with more mature reflection have become separate and distinct. All knowledge must, in a loose sense at least, first be inductive, concerned with particulars, surface qualities, variables. The beginning of knowledge is found in the senses. The powers of concentrated attention, reflection, comparison, discrimination, mature judgment, intellectual insight develop later. Out of this development springs that new point of interest mentioned above. Henceforward it is the possibility of discovering the grounds of unity in the manifold rather than the manifold itself that becomes the focus of attention and the goal of endeavor. The vision of the partial unities of thought and of reality revealed in generic and specific concepts, the existence of the order and design, of the beauty and harmony, of the law and intelligence which they reflect, and the valuable economies of thought which they introduce, lead the serious thinker on with the hope of reaching a still higher level of unity, a view of some all-pervading oneness in the complexity of the whole.<sup>2</sup>

Such is the history of the human mind, and such also in the main has been the history of

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Newman, *Idea of a University*, Discourse VI.

philosophy itself. So far as authentic records go, the chief characteristic of speculative thought prior to the Greeks was a puerile indefiniteness and credulity. Myth and allegory, works of the imagination, entertained and perhaps lulled to rest normal curiosity, but did nothing to elucidate the mysteries of existence. Even when, as with certain of the earlier Ionians, an explanation of relatively simple phenomena was attempted, the results were crude in the extreme. The doctrine, for example, of the four elements, or of the emanation of particles from physical bodies and their entrance into the pores of the senses as an explanation of sensation, are scarcely more than rough guesses at the truth, guesses based on quite superficial observation. During the childhood of philosophy, as of the individual man, the senses reign supreme. Maturity brings reflection, and reflection the hunger for a certain stability of thought in which the mind may anchor itself and work out its problems with some hope of reaching final certitude.\*

Philosophic thinking may be said to have entered upon a period of maturity with Socrates' doctrine of the concept. The youngsters, so to say, had had their fling, and the climax of their efforts, speaking generally, was an empirical sensism whose destructive and dismal doctrines

\* Hoernle, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, Ch. I.

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are known by the name of Sophism. The doctrine of the concept not only rescued serious thought from the chaos into which sophistic relativism had plunged it, but also provided such a firm foundation for it that succeeding thinkers were able to raise the superstructure with a feeling of security. Henceforward the test of every school and system of philosophy—even till the present day—has been its theory of knowledge and its theory of being, that is to say, its metaphysics. Small wonder, therefore, that Aristotle called this branch of thought “first philosophy.” It is first, subjectively, in the sense of being the real beginning of philosophical thinking, and objectively, in the sense of dealing with those questions which must be presupposed by every other science.

It treats of ultimates, of irreducibles, of reality as such, and of reality in its most general modes and aspects—of all realities, infinite and finite, substantial and accidental, but in the abstract, or apart from their particular concrete setting.<sup>5</sup> Things perceptible to the senses are individuals. Each is as it were a fraction of the sum total of reality. As fractions, each differs from all the others. The vast array is bewildering to anyone who attempts to study and understand it. Metaphysics reduces these fractions

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, Lectures I, II, and VII.



to several common denominators (the categories), and then by a supreme act of abstraction reduces even these, analogously of course, to one common denominator (the concept of Being). Thus the manifold of the real is converted into and understood in the unity of the ideal. Analysis finds its full fruitage in synthesis.

It would not be true to say that there have been no objections raised to metaphysical thinking. But it is a fact that in every attempt to discredit metaphysics, metaphysical concepts have themselves been smuggled in to accomplish the attempted refutation. Surely, to be able to disprove the validity of abstract thought would require some understanding of its nature. No one could seriously pretend to criticize that of which he is ignorant. But mentally to grasp the nature or essence of anything is itself a feat of abstract thought or metaphysics. Thus the possibility of metaphysics is established by the very attempt to establish its impossibility. Moreover, the very fact of the validity of formal proof itself can be ascertained in no other way than by a process of abstract thought. The ultimate criterion of certitude, inasmuch as any is needed at all, is the reduction of propositions to the first principles or laws of thought, and the most basic of these, the principle of contradiction, is an inference drawn immediately from



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the perception of the relation of the abstract concepts of Being and of non-Being. Again, formal proof rests upon the validity of the principle of causality, a principle established nowhere else than in metaphysics.

The objection of the Nominalists, from Roscelin to Locke and certain contemporary writers, that universal ideas, abstract concepts, are only empty names, finds perhaps its best, though by no means its only, refutation in the very concept of nominalism itself. For the term is evidently generic and abstract. It can be predicated in the same sense about the teaching of every concrete Nominalist (Positivist, Sensist), in so far as such teaching involves the denial of any extra-mental potentially universal correlative of the general idea and the power of the intellect to reduce this potential universal to an actual formal one in the ideal order. In this respect therefore, when the Nominalist says, "I cannot," his words really mean, "I can." His denial presupposes a necessary affirmation, and thus ceases to have any negative meaning. But, as this subject will be taken up in the course of the present work, nothing further need here be said of it.\*

But the most common, if not the most serious, difficulty proposed to the metaphysician is

\* Cf. Peter Coffey, *Epistemology*, Vol. I, Ch. IX; Vol. II, p. 344ff.

that he is not able to reach any certainty in his reasoning processes, and that therefore his labors are futile. It is urged, upon historical grounds, that so long as philosophers continued to occupy themselves with questions of the ultimate, with, that is to say, metaphysical speculations about the essences of things, the way to practical knowledge was neglected and thought ceased to be progressive. Instances cited are those of psychology with its long-drawn-out inquiries as to the nature of the human soul, and of cosmology with its interminable discussions concerning the ultimate component elements of material substance. Attention is called to the astounding progress made in both spheres of inquiry as soon as such attempts were respectively given up and empirical methods substituted for the deductive. It was this change of attitude, we are told, that ushered in the extremely useful and highly valuable sciences of chemistry and physics, and the many serviceable departments of the New Psychology.

The charge of vagueness and uncertainty grows perhaps out of the rabid anti-intellectualism of the times. It is evident that if intellect itself be reduced to the level of sense and all scientific method be grounded on the gratuitous assumption of a mechanistic universe, then the conclusions of thought are incapable of being expressed in any but mathematical terms,

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and mathematical certitude is the only genuine certitude. But, fortunately, mechanism has not yet become universal. Not all the world has run to that extreme. There still are those—and in the field of psychology their number is increasing—who have either all along clung to or who are beginning to proclaim anew the necessity from a biological viewpoint of vitalism,<sup>7</sup> and from a logical viewpoint of an immaterial agency for thought. One may, therefore, legitimately distinguish a second form of certitude, that namely which results from the conscious and clear perception by the intellect of the essences of things, together with its firm and fearless assent to that perception as necessarily true. Thus, just as physical certitude is grounded on the physical laws which govern the corporeal world, so metaphysical certitude is based upon the essences of corporeal things and the unchangeable relations obtaining among them.<sup>8</sup>

It is true that such certitude has not the same neatness and cogency as has physical or mathematical certitude. It lacks much of the luster and the *éclat* of the latter. The evidence which can be gathered for the establishment of physical certitude is perhaps always more abundant and more tangible than for metaphysical

<sup>7</sup> Driesch, *The Crisis in Psychology*.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World*, Ch. IX.

truths, but that fact is far from a proof that no such truth can be discovered and perfectly possessed.

It is not in the least necessary—even were it desirable—to attempt to minimize the usefulness of modern scientific researches. Their services to the comfort and physical well-being of mankind are commonplaces of knowledge. But that is far from admitting the contention of the discreditors of metaphysics that speculative inquiries, the seeking of knowledge for its own sake, are both empty of value and an obstacle to thought itself. Even though in certain instances speculation was carried to extremes and ended up in a confusion of nullities, I fail to see in that fact any grounds for a sweeping condemnation of the process itself. If modern science has given us railroads and radios, aëroplanes and spectroscopes, aseptic surgery and psychoanalysis, automobiles and automatic rifles, I see no reason why metaphysicians should be subjected to ridicule because, following a spontaneous bent of the mind, they try to think of these things in the abstract in order to define, understand and classify them. Because science has taught us how to make an armchair, I see no harm in sitting in it and philosophizing either about science or about the chair itself. “It is the duty and virtue of all knowledge,” as Bacon says, “to abridge the infinity of indi-

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vidual experience as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint of *vita brevis, ars longa*; which is performed by uniting the notions and conceptions of science." •

What is the use? Again, I say, no use at all in the narrow meaning of dollars and cents; no use either perhaps in the sense of advancing the material welfare of individuals or of nations. But surely it is of some use in the sense of refining and increasing the power of thought, in the sense of unifying and systematizing knowledge, in the sense of true broadmindedness and that personal culture which makes for a higher level of intellectual life and a sounder basis for moral living.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Olgiati-Zybura, *The Key to the Study of Saint Thomas*, Ch. IX.

## CHAPTER II

### THE CONCEPT OF BEING OR REALITY

FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT. One is introduced to the world of concrete, individual things by his senses. Through them he comes to know it as extended, colored, resonant, resistant, odorous, and so on. Through the senses the things appear, and truly appear, to be infinitely multiplied and bewilderingly variegated. There are not only many things, but no two of these existing things externally are quite alike. Each is an individual and has its own marks upon it. Similarities there are, to be sure, but for each instance of similarity there is also an instance of dissimilarity. There are not only colors, but an almost endless series of shades of color. There are sounds, but these are so differentiated by varying vibration rates as to multiply their tones even beyond the power of recognition. And so of tastes and odors and temperatures—everywhere, both within the same class of things and beyond it, endless variation. The world of experience, of sense perception, is a manifold defying enumeration.



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But does it also defy classification, reduction to the unities which the logicians call groups, classes, genera, species? The obvious answer to this question is to point to the physical sciences and to other particular studies. For these owe their existence and their worth to the fact that such classification or unification is possible. They certify to the fact of unity in reality as well as variety, to inclusiveness as well as exclusiveness, to universality as well as individuality, to Thing as well as to things, to Being as well as to beings.

Nor is this unification merely arbitrary or nominal. It is real, real in the sense that what is represented by a general or universal concept, what is subsumed under a general or universal term, has existence independently of the mind so conceiving and expressing it. A definition, by which the nature of a thing is recognized, and by which the whole class to which the thing belongs is accurately set off from all other classes, is not merely the fruit either of a certain play of fancy or of affixing a tag to a group of things of like complexion, but it is the result of the *mind's* perception of real attributes common to all the individuals of the class in question. Not every man is wise or tall or an American. These are attributes which do not enter into the concept of man as such, or even necessarily into the description of many men. They

are not principles of unity but merely manifestations of individuality. But every man does possess the attributes of animality (he has a sentient organism) and rationality (he has a rational soul). His body and soul really do exist. But in spite of their differences, which on the surface are always present, beneath those differences, they are the same. They are all human bodies, all human souls. True, my body and my soul neither is nor can ever be your body and your soul. Yet neither is my body and soul, my person or ego, constituted merely of the quality-group that marks it off from other individuals. It is clear that they are numerically distinct. But it is also just as clear that they are specifically the same, and that therefore, on account of this objectively similar nature, they may be represented in the mind as ideally one. And what is thus true of man is likewise true of other things which in an intellectual way we come to know.

The specific and generic terms in which our language, and all languages abound, and which we daily use, are the result of a process of intellectual abstraction from the material conditions and individuating characteristics of our sense data. Before we come to know *what* a thing is, we must know *what sort of* a thing it is. We first recognize men of various sorts, and only subsequently do we apprehend man as man, or



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man as such. And we do so because we abstract from, that is, mentally ignore in our reflective analysis of a given reality, all the *qualia*, or attributes which manifest a thing as a particular individual of a class, and focus our thought on those attributes which differentiate all the individuals of that class from all other classes—attributes, therefore, apprehended as being common to all those individuals. This will be clear to anyone who takes the trouble to analyze his mental processes in working out a definition of anything. In other words, the mind by means of this process of abstraction distinguishes the *essential* from the non-essential attributes, and thus arrives at an understanding of what is common to all the individuals of a class. Thus the manifold of sense yields to the unifying power of intellect; a real principle of unity is discovered in multiplicity, science itself becomes possible.

But in this unifying process there is yet another step possible. For just as the mind by acts of attention, reflection, abstraction, comparison, analysis and synthesis is able to pass from the multiplicity of individual perceptions to the unity of generic and specific concepts, so also it is able—as again both language and introspection show—to reach a still higher level of unification by abstracting from the attributes which differentiate these concepts themselves.

And in this way it arrives at a concept of reality whose sole comprehensive note is Being.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THIS CONCEPT. Since in the very process of its formation the mind busies itself with abstracting from the differences, first individual and then specific, of things, it is evident that the concept of Being must be the simplest of all concepts. In other words, it has the narrowest intention or comprehension and the widest possible extension. In contrast with it, all other concepts may be said to be composite, for they represent to the mind not merely Being, but *a* being, that is, some reality conceived as existing according to some definite mode. Though God is absolutely simple in Himself, He is conceived by the mind as the *necessary* Being. The mode of His existence is necessary, just as the mode of being of all created things is contingent.

The concept of Being is thus also seen to be the most indefinite of all concepts. It is the least precise, because in order to arrive at it all of the attributes which make for preciseness have mentally been set aside. It cannot be confined to any group or class of things. It transcends all genera and species. There is nothing of which it cannot be predicated. For whatever exists or can exist is Being. *To be* is common to all things, the exclusive property of none. As

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soon as limitations are set upon any concept, as, *e.g.*, generic concepts, their extension is limited, they become applicable to none but a definite group. From the concept of Being all restrictions have been removed. Hence its indefiniteness.

If we take stock of our ideas and try to reduce them to their most fundamental meaning we shall find always that the concept of Being supplies the groundwork of all of them. In the logical order surely the idea of Being is prior to the idea of this or that sort of being. Just as the concept of "Frenchman" presupposes the concept of "man," or the concept of "blackbird" the concept of "bird," so also the concept of "man" or "bird" presupposes the concept of "Being" or "thing." Every idea is then ultimately reducible to the idea of Being. It is first in the logical order. Whether or not it is also first in the chronological order is perhaps a disputable point. For what goes on in the mind of a child is at best only conjectural. But if the child's language may be taken as an index to his mental content, then it would seem certain that his first idea is an idea of being, that is, a very general and confused conception of all other-than-self reality as things, beings, or simply, Being.

BEING NOT PREDICABLE AS GENUS. If whatever is, whatever exists or can exist, may be

called Being, or if Being may be predicated of whatever can become an object of thought, it will be important to inquire whether Being, thus unreservedly predicable, always carries with it the same connotation. If so, then the concept would be generic or univocal. For it is characteristic of such terms to retain the same meaning when predicated about any of the individuals of the class or genus for which they mentally stand. The term "true," *e.g.*, has the same meaning when affirmed of any proposition belonging to that class of propositions. This is so because things belonging to the same genus have a nature that is common, a nature multiplied or individualized in many concrete instances.

It should be noted, however, that the mode of predication must in such cases be specific. For if one should predicate the generic term "animal" of a man and of a dog, it would be verifiable of the two in an analogous, not in a univocal, sense, *i.e.*, partly in the same and partly in a different sense. As the term man is verifiable in exactly the same sense of all men, so the term animal of all animals. Which only shows that generic terms may be used in an analogous sense. Such, moreover, is the use of terms in all similes and metaphors.

Terms may be used also in an equivocal sense, *i.e.*, with a totally different meaning

when applied to different objects. Examples of such are the term "horse" in the following propositions: Dan Patch is a famous race horse, That is a "horse" on you; and of the term "train" thus: I came by train, He stepped on the lady's train.

Now if the term Being were generic it would retain the same sense regardless of the subject of which it was predicated. Obviously this is not the case. For though God is a being, and man is a being, their mode of being is not the same. Likewise the substantial mode of being cannot be identified with the accidental, nor the actual with the potential, nor the real with the logical. In all of these instances the term Being connotes something the same in all, that is, existence, and something different, the mode of existence. God exists, but necessarily; creatures exist, but contingently; substance exists, but *per se*; accidents exist, but in another; real being exists, but independently of the mind; logical being exists, but dependently upon the mind. It is evident then that the term "Being" is neither equivocal, nor generic or univocal, but analogous.

KINDS OF ANALOGY. Analogy is of two kinds, analogy of attribution and analogy of proportion. The former exists when some quality or attribute really possessed by the primary ana-

logue (*e.g.*, health by an animal), is attributed to or predicated of secondary analogues (*e.g.*, food, medicine, the complexion) on account of some connection (causal or signatory, etc.) which they may have with it. Properly speaking, only sentient organisms are healthy. But the term healthy is also attributed analogously to food, medicine, complexion, pulses, because they either cause or manifest a healthy state.

Analogy of proportion exists when on account of similarity of relations, a term is attributed to something in a meaning different from its usual and exact one. In Holy Scripture, for example, Our Lord is called the Light of the World. Here the term "light" is used analogously. The analogy is said to be one of proportion because of the similarity of the relations between Christ's person and teachings and the minds of men, and a real light and the objects in the adjacent territory. As the one illuminates the mind of man so that all things appear to it in their proper place and according to their proper value, so the other illuminates and brings into clear view the material objects upon which it falls.

The term Being is analogous by analogy of attribution, not of proportion.<sup>1</sup> When predicated of God and creatures, substance and acci-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Rother, *Being*, p. 90ff.



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dents, it has partly the same and partly a different meaning; the same, inasmuch as all are beings; different, inasmuch as each division of reality has a different mode of being. There is here no question of a mere resemblance of relations.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANALOGOUS PREDICATION OF BEING. Dualistic philosophers insist much upon the analogous character of the concept of Being. And rightly so. For if it were treated as generic or univocal, Being would be predicated of all things in exactly the same sense. To say then, God is a being, and, Man is a being, would necessarily identify the uncreated and necessary with the created and contingent mode of being. It would mean either reducing God to the status of creature or raising creature to the status of divinity. The confusion would be similar if Being were predicated univocally of substance and of accident. Briefly, it would introduce either Pantheism, or the possibly still greater absurdity of an eternal but contingent and changeable universe. It would identify thought with object of thought, mind with matter, God with creature, substance with accident, so that the result would be either a monism of mind or a monism of matter. Plurality and change would be illusions. All would be one, and one would be all. Sane

thought could scarcely be given a more disastrous blow.

### SOME FUNDAMENTAL DIVISIONS OF BEING.

There can be no question here of divisions in the sense of genera or species. Genera are constituted by specific differences which are outside the generic concept, as, *e.g.*, the specific difference, "rational," is outside the genus, "animal." But here any differentiating attribute would itself be being and hence already included in the concept to be differentiated. The primary divisions of Being are derived by a process of contracting or narrowing down of the concept according to the various modes in which Being manifests itself.

An examination of Being in its concrete created forms, and especially as it is subject to change, or becoming, reveals the most fundamental of all modes of Being, the potential and the actual. This distinction arises from the non-necessary character of the created world. Though things now actually exist, there was a time when they did not exist. Yet they were things that could be produced by way of the transformation of something else. This transformation or *changé* implies a transition from a state of relative non-being to a state of actual being, from raw material to finished product. Now Being under both these modes is said to



be real, in contradistinction to logical or ideal Being, *i.e.*, such reality as has existence in the mind only or which exists only as an object of thought. Real Being is thus opposed on the one hand to non-real or nothing, and on the other to the Being which is totally mind-dependent in its existence, such, *e.g.*, as privations, negations, and the relations which the mind sets up among its ideas. Finally, the created universe everywhere manifests limitations, composition, dependence. It is finite, the correlative and necessary implication of which is unlimited, simple, independent or infinite Being.

SUMMARY. Metaphysics is the science of Being as such. It attempts to answer the question, What is the ultimate nature of reality? It studies reality apart from any determinations which make it particular and concrete. It analyzes the concept of Being, and finds that it connotes whatever exists or can exist; that it is the simplest of all ideas, first in both the logical and the chronological orders, the most indeterminate and abstract of all ideas. It finds that Being cannot be strictly defined, that it is not generic, nor equivocal, but analogous and transcendental. Considering Being according to its various modes we saw that it can be divided into potential and actual, real and logi-

cal, finite and infinite, necessary and contingent, absolute and relative. Such are the findings resulting from the consideration of Being as static. We pass on now to the study of Being as dynamic.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The problem of the one and the many.
2. All Science, including philosophy, is a process of unification.
3. Whatever exists is singular and concrete; whatever is intellectually known is universal and abstract.
4. The distinguishing elements of any system of philosophy are its theory of Being and its theory of Knowledge.
5. Monism results from the use of the term, Being, in a generic sense.
6. Analogical predication is grounded upon similarities with differences.
7. Any analogy carried too far results in error.
8. A primary function of the intellect is to note distinctions and to understand them.
9. Explain the Socratic method of clarifying concepts.

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## CHAPTER III

### REALITY AND CHANGE

To speak of Being in the abstract and Being in the concrete is not to refer to two different Beings, but merely to reality in two different states or on two different levels of perfection. In conceptual knowledge, though the known object is in the mind, it is there without those individuating traits and material conditions which characterize its extra-mental existence. In other words, it is there in its metaphysical, but not in its physical, essence. Now since it is precisely the metaphysical essence, or essential attributes, that make up the permanent, universal, irreducible elements in things, Being in the abstract presents itself to the mind as necessarily static. When, however, things are considered in their respective individual existences, they manifest universally a dynamic aspect, the phenomenon of change. This aspect which, as we shall see, is rich in significance must also enter into our analysis of Being.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF CHANGE. What first impresses the careful observer of the world in which he lives is the universality of change. The phenomenon is in fact so commonplace that it is ordinarily taken for granted, like the conscious fact of one's existence or the existence of other people and other things. Here to-day, away to-morrow; youth and old age, day and night, spring and summer; rusting, ripening, growing, dying, building, shifting, ebbing, flowing, fading, developing, molding—and a thousand other terms and expressions pour in upon the mind once one begins to reflect on the attributes that characterize the world of his experience. Each of them indicates some aspect of the phenomenon of change. Within the social order as within individual organisms and apparently quiescent substances, brief examination reveals constant restlessness, continuous change. So impressed have some thinkers been with this phenomenon that they concluded that the only invariable in the created universe was the invariability of change itself.<sup>1</sup> Change for them is the one constant and universal fact; the only changeless fact is the law of change. But this is an indefensible exaggeration. For if it were conceded,

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.*, Heraclitus among the ancient Greeks, and Bergson in more modern times.

change itself would become inexplicable. At least the law of change would remain constant.

ANALYSIS OF CHANGE. Why many things undergo change is well known. The proximate causes thereof have been determined. What change itself involves is not so clearly understood. Probably the simplest instance of change is change of place or position, the result of local motion or movement through space. What is most immediately evident about such a phenomenon is the movement of the body itself, together with the new set of spatial relationships acquired by the body moved. It is the transition from one location to another that first impresses the observer. But the transition is merely the link between two stages, the status of the body before the movement begins and the status it assumes after the movement has ceased. Now upon analysis, the former status is seen to be a body at rest, having a definite set of spatial relations to other bodies, but, inasmuch as movable, capable of gradually receding from its locality and of moving toward some other. It should be noted that though the relations are extrinsic to the movement, the capacity or potentiality for movement is an integral part of the process. It enters into and partially explains the movement. For to witness a body moving from one place

to another is to witness a gradual realization of that latent potentiality. The completion of the realization coincides with the body at the terminal end of the movement.

If now it be asked, What is the difference between the body in this stage and in the initial state? the answer obviously would be, It is the same body plus the attributes acquired by reason of the actualized potentialities. It would seem then that the elements of local change are: a body *capable* of undergoing modification, the *process* of modification, and the resultant *modified* body. These elements, it will be found, are not proper merely to local change, but enter into all manner of change. And while it must be admitted that at first sight they do not seem to reveal very much concerning the nature of change, still reflection upon them brings out implications of great importance to the metaphysician. These implications will be discussed in a subsequent paragraph. If our analysis has been correct, change may here be described as a transformation, a modification of reality; it is a transition of some composite thing from one state of being to another. It is a process whereby latent capacities, native powers, dormant energies pass into actual or more perfect states.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE. The fact of



change reveals the essential duality of created substance. From every monistic conception of reality change must be excluded, ascribed to erroneous perception, set down as a delusion of uncritical observation. This duality, first correctly analyzed by Aristotle, divides all finite reality into the potential and actual. Potential Being, or Being in the state of potentiality, and actual Being, or Being in the state of actuality, must not, however, be regarded as separate and mutually exclusive entities, but rather as two complementary states of all contingent composite things. Nothing within the whole range of our external experience is immune from change. Nothing finite, therefore, in the real order is necessarily what it is, in the sense that it cannot become something else, that is, undergo transformation. It follows, therefore, that since all actual things are subject to change there is in them capability of change, of becoming, of passing from one state to another, or in other words, potentiality. Final analysis will reveal a passive, determinable, relatively imperfect element in things, which is called potential Being or potency, and an active, determining, relatively more perfect element, which is called actual Being or simply act. Thus, *e.g.*, an actual piece of beefsteak is capable, or has the potentiality of becoming, through the digestive and assimilative proc-

esses, human flesh and bone, muscle and tissue; an acorn can become an oak tree; children can become adults, and so on. But it should be noted that once any given process of change has been completed, there still remains in the changed object potentialities to further change. As the potential, under the influence of something actual, passes into the actual, so also may the actual pass back again into the potential. The two are therefore complementary elements of one and the same thing. They belong to the same, not to different, genera of reality. Potential Being is Being which does not yet exist, but which may exist, as the oak in the acorn, while actual Being is Being which has already been brought into existence, as the mature oak.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF POTENTIAL AND ACTUAL BEING. The phenomenon of change, or process of becoming, gives birth in our minds to the concept of possibility. The terms possible and impossible are frequently upon our lips. We say, *e.g.*, that it is impossible to construct a perpetual motion machine, or to bridge the Atlantic, or to prove that a lie is morally good. In the first and last instances we recognize what we call absurdities, contradictions in terms. For in the terms "machine" and "perpetual motion," "lie" and "moral good," we recognize attributes that are mutually exclu-



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sive, things involving a relation whose terms are mutually destructive, or, in other words, we recognize the absence of any potentiality of becoming. Such impossibility we call intrinsic or absolute or metaphysical. As to the second instance, we should not dare to call it intrinsically impossible. The terms "bridge" and "Atlantic," or the expression, to bridge over the Atlantic, do not present the mind with anything inconceivable or inherently absurd. Since we do not know of any natural agent capable of discovering either adequate materials or an adequate plan for such a structure, the most that can be said is that such a bridge is physically impossible. Where there exists the physical power capable of overcoming potentiality we have a case of the physically possible. If this can be done without unreasonable inconvenience or extraordinary exertion it is called morally possible. Hence the morally impossible would be the extraordinarily difficult. The intrinsically possible may or may not be physically possible. The physically possible may or may not be morally possible. But the morally possible must always be both intrinsically and physically possible. The intrinsically impossible amounts to the incapacity for becoming or being. That is physically possible which lies within the power of actual causes. That is morally possible which by cus-

tom or common sense does not impose too heavy a burden upon a moral agent.

God alone can create, that is, produce instantaneously the totality of finite Being. No other production is more than the transformation of preëxisting materials. In all creatures there exists both the power to act and to be acted upon. The former is known as active, the latter as passive, potency. Both, in contradistinction to mere objective possibility—or the compatibility of ideas as thought-objects—go by the name of subjective potency.

The complement of potency is act. As the potential implies something incomplete, imperfect, undeveloped, so the actual implies something complete, perfect, developed. The phrase "in act" means, therefore, not an agent doing something, but an agent or thing having that completeness of Being which its nature here and now requires. Shakespeare's plays are dramas in act, actual dramas. The great American Epic is still a potential poem. Before Shakespeare's time his plays were still in the realm of potentiality.

God is called pure act, that is, Being in which there is no potentiality, and consequently no composition nor limitation nor imperfection of any kind. All creatures are mixtures of the potential and the actual. None therefore is perfect except in a relative sense. According as

they approach perfection their inherent powers become gradually more and more actualized. Hence it is said that the actual is more perfect than the potential. A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. Action reveals the nature of a thing. Conduct, *e.g.*, is the key to nature. Nothing can be simultaneously and under the same aspect potential and actual, nor can the potential render itself actual, nor can there be any medium between the two.

KINDS OF CHANGE. All changes can be reduced to two kinds. For in the process of transformation the subject changing either takes on a new nature, as in all strictly chemical changes that give rise to new compounds, or the subject merely takes on certain qualities or dispositions it did not previously possess, as change of color, and physical changes generally. The former is essential or substantial, the latter is qualitative or quantitative, that is, accidental change. It need scarcely be said that in the natural order there can be no substantial change without an accompanying accidental change.

SUMMARY. Concrete reality is dynamic. Change in the physical order is universal. It involves a process of transition or of transformation from one state of Being to another, a successive actualization of potentialities, the

loss or acquisition of qualities, dispositions or even of nature by the changing subject. It implies potentiality, possibility, movement, a duality of Being. Potential Being is not non-Being, but imperfect Being. Actual Being is relatively more complete and perfect Being. Potency is objective and subjective. The latter is either operative (active) or passive. Things are intrinsically, physically and morally possible or impossible. As potentiality spells imperfection, so act spells perfection. No potency can actualize itself. Potency and act are complementary, and in the same genus. Change is either substantial or accidental. Reality cannot be explained in terms of change alone.

### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Knowledge of Being in the abstract.
2. Change is universal. Therefore nothing is static. All is variable, hence nothing is necessary.
3. Either a thing is or it is not. If it is, then at each instant it is itself and is not becoming anything else. If it is not, then it is incapable of anything. In either case, therefore, change is impossible.
4. Change is not mere transformation of the old. It results in novelties.
5. Potential Being is Being which does not yet exist, but which may exist. But non-existent Being is non-Being. Therefore, potency is non-Being or nothing.

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6. Change is a fact. Hence Monism is a delusion.
7. The electronic theory of the constitution of matter seems to be true. If so, then there is no change but quantitative change.
8. Creation is not an instance of change.

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## CHAPTER IV

### BEING AS ESSENCE AND AS EXISTENCE

THE PROBLEM. Our study of reality as subject to change made necessary the distinctions of actual and possible, necessary and contingent, finite and infinite Being. Before a created thing is actual, it must be possible. If it is finite, and now actual, there was a time at which it did not exist, and there will be a time when it will cease to exist. It does not and cannot exist necessarily. The attribute, therefore, of existence does not pertain to its essence. One can say what a thing is, define it, without either affirming or denying the actual existence of it. Its intrinsic possibility does not depend upon its actual existence. As an intrinsically possible Being, it may or may not be brought into or given existence. It may be conceived as a reality, a something, an essence, involving no absurdity or contradiction, as something which, given the requisite causes, may become an actual individual existing thing. Whether it ever does or not, leaves its possibility unaffected. Since contingent things are, in an admissible sense of the term, infinitely variable,



one may say that there are an infinite, that is, an indefinite, number of possible things that in a temporal world will never become actual, will never receive existence. There is, therefore, a clear-cut logical distinction between Being as essence and Being as existence. And as there is obviously a real distinction between any reality in the abstract and that same reality in the concrete order, one may affirm not only a logical but a real distinction between an abstract essence, or a merely possible thing, and a concrete essence, or that possible essence endowed with existence.

But there is a further question to be considered: Between my real, physical and concrete essence, here and now, and my actual individual existence, is there a real or only a logical distinction? Do my present essence and existence differ as two concepts of one and the same thing differ, or is the difference between them such as must be predicated of two distinct realities? This is one of the problems to which reflection on the attributes of reality gives rise.

It is not difficult to realize its philosophical importance. For does it not seem that if any real distinction between the two be denied, if one's essence be really identified with his existence, he could not even be conceived as ever being without existence? Does it not seem that



one would be predicating of the creature a perfection which belongs exclusively to the Creator? God surely may be defined as He Who is, as He Whose essence is to be. In Him, beyond doubt, essence and existence are one. He necessarily is, for He is existence. Would it not, therefore, savor somewhat of Pantheism to say that human (or any creature) essence could be really one with its existence? At any rate, in the pantheistic conception of things there is no place for any but logical distinctions among what existences are allowed. If my existence is "me," and not something possessed by me (and hence something really distinct, though not separated from me) why then, since to exist means to be, may I not define myself as: "I am who am"? Or, if that is a definition of me as man, then, since evidently it would not define any other man, would not each man be *sui generis*, definable only in terms of his particular existence? And of course, if each man, then too every other finite Being. How, if all this be true, can one in his theory of Being escape the conclusions of the Nominalists or the Neo-Realists, for whom definition consists merely of description in terms of the existent?

On the other hand, if the real distinction be admitted, how can one satisfactorily explain the status of an essence considered as formally distinct from existence, before such existence

is communicated to it? For in this case, it must be viewed either as already existing or not existing. But if it does not exist, how can it receive existence? And if it does exist, in what possible sense can it be said to receive existence?

The history of the question displays a long-drawn-out controversy, and one never definitely settled, though it is probably true that at the present time, among Scholastic philosophers at least, a larger number favor the real distinction. Before presenting the arguments for either side, it will be well to explain certain terms and to discuss the general problem of the knowableness of essences.

EXPLANATION OF SOME TERMS INVOLVED. The term essence involves such a simple notion that it is not capable of genuine definition. It can, however, be variously described. Ask a geometrician, What is a circle? and he will reply by giving you the definition of circle. The definition will be characterized by two things: it will include, first, just those attributes without which no mathematical figure could be classified as circle, attributes which taken together make up the irreducible minimum of reality involved in the thing called circle, *e.g.*, mathematical figure and center ever equidistant from any point on the circumfer-

ence; and secondly, and as a consequence of the former, that by which the circle is distinguished from every other class of things. These attributes, therefore, abstracted from or mentally held apart from the individual and non-necessary attributes of any particular circle, are what is meant by the essence of circle. The best, and indeed the only, way of discovering the essence of anything is to attempt to formulate a logical definition of it. Logicians tell us that such definition consists of the proximate genus to which the thing to be defined belongs, together with its specific difference. Hence essence (abstract) may be described as proximate genus plus specific difference (man = animal + rational), or, in the concrete, as matter plus form, or, again, as that which is first conceived (not perceived) in a thing and is the source of all the properties found in it. Essence is *What* a Being is, minus the *That's* of "the existential flow." Considered as the source or cause of the properties in a thing, it is called substance; as the radical source of activities in an agent, nature; as the object of the act of understanding what a thing is, reason; as that by which a thing is put into a definite class, species. Much needless confusion of thought results from the failure to understand that these terms, essence, substance, nature, reason and species, all refer to the same

reality, one term being preferred to the others merely because the speaker considers it under one or another of the above-mentioned special aspects or relationships.

Care must be taken not to confuse abstract with concrete essence. Abstract essence, or essence in the abstract, is nothing but the sum of the intelligible attributes which the mind has acquired by its abstractive process in its effort to reach a definition of anything. The abstract or metaphysical essence of man, *e.g.*, consists of the two formalities or concepts, animality and rationality. The concrete or physical essence is the physical, substantial whole, made up of parts really distinct from one another, as, *e.g.*, in man, body and soul. It is not that man, or anything else, has two essences or natures, but only that his single essence can be—and indeed for the purposes of metaphysics must be—viewed both in its status of individual existence and in its abstract or universal aspects. All the individuals of a given class must have the same metaphysical or abstract essence, for otherwise they could not be said to belong to the same class. But at the same time no two individuals within the same class can possess the same physical or concrete essence, for then their individuality would be denied. This seeming paradox becomes intelligible when one understands that though no two es-

sences or natures can be identified in the real order, the mind, considering this nature or essence embodied as it were in many individuals, can and does represent it by one concept, which is predicable of all these individuals in the same sense. This—as will later be shown in some detail—is what is meant by saying that the universal exists *potentially* in the concrete individual, but becomes formally such by the reflective and unitive processes of thought. The full discussion of this question constitutes one of the major problems in Epistemology. Here it will suffice to point out certain of the attributes of abstract essences.

For the very reason that any nature or essence is abstracted from its concrete setting in the individual, it ceases to be subject to change. Change implies in its subject the capacity for becoming by way of transformation something other than it now is. But as anything added to or withdrawn from abstract essences would involve their destruction, it follows that they are immutable, immune alike from transformation and from the conditions and limitations set by place and time. They are and must remain what they are, irrespective of the constant variation in the world of sense. Their truth when predicated of individuals is independent of any period of time. Essential predication yields absolute and necessary, uni-



versal and unchangeable truth. Being immutable, these essences are also indivisible, for division is change. Finally, since the constitutive principles of an abstract essence are so related to one another that no other relation between them can be conceived possible, it possesses the attribute of necessity. These four attributes, timelessness, immutability, indivisibility and necessity, can all be illustrated in the definition of man. If the definition, "Man is a rational animal," expresses the true essence of man, it follows (1) that it will be verifiable about any man that ever lived, now exists, or ever will exist; (2) that neither of these attributes can be subtracted from the definition nor any added without vitiating it; (3) that neither of these attributes can suffer any modification; and (4) that the relation between the two is such as cannot be other than it is. To suppose that our generic and specific concepts, whereby abstract essences are understood by the mind, could be variable and subject to the conditions of place and time would be to make all truth relative, and thus to render science in the proper sense impossible. It would condemn the mind to perpetual doubt, to unceasing uncertainty.

The concept of existence, like that of essence, cannot be strictly defined. It is even less reducible to simpler terms. When we say that a

thing exists, we mean that it has become and is actual. It has, as the Scholastics put it, been placed outside its causes, ushered into the company of things that *are*. Hence existence may be described as the actuality of essence, that by reason of which a possible essence has become an actual thing. But none of these phrases makes the notion more intelligible. To exist means simply to be, as contrasted with to be possible.

Other terms which enter into the discussion of this question are distinction, real and logical. To distinguish is to point out that two things, or two aspects of the same thing, cannot be identified. Distinction, therefore, consists of lack of identity. Fish is not flesh; tinsel is not gold; hot water is not cold water; a healthy man is not a sick man. Where distinction is real, as between a tree and a stone, there is ordinarily separation of, as well as lack of identity between, the things distinguished. But things may be really distinct without being either separated or, at least by natural power, separable. Instances of this are body and soul, substance and property, Creator and creature. Real distinction, then, may be verified between individual and individual, between one incomplete substance and another, between substance and accident, between accident and accident. The point in dispute here is whether there may



be a real distinction between two complementary entities in one and the same thing, *i.e.*, essence and existence, by reason of the fact that existence is predicated of creatures as something which they do not necessarily possess, but in which they may participate.

Logical distinction is a lack of identity between two concepts of one and the same thing. One can, *e.g.*, distinguish between Washington the surveyor, Washington the general, and Washington the president; between six and half a dozen; between the various powers of the human soul, and the various attributes of God. In all these instances, it is the mind which, for purposes of clearness in thinking, introduces the distinction. Sometimes, as in the case of the distinction made among the three-fold vital powers of man, the mind grounds its distinction upon some objective fact. If it cannot do this, as, *e.g.*, between six and half a dozen, the distinction is purely nominal.

In any process of serious thought, the need for making careful distinctions can scarcely be overemphasized. Failure to make necessary distinctions is perhaps the most fruitful source of philosophical error, for it is at bottom nothing but mental confusion. Carried to excess, the result is, of course, not less disastrous. He who divides down to the dust soon becomes lost in the minutiae of his own thought, and thus ob-

scures the very points which he attempts to clear up. To introduce a distinction without a difference often causes as much misunderstanding as to ride over differences that should be respected.

KNOWABLENESS OF ESSENCES. As has already been intimated, the problem of the relation of essence and existence is closely connected with the problem of the universal. In the discussion raised over this latter problem we find a large class of thinkers who deny that abstract essences can even be known. These Nominalists and Conceptualists, as they are called, admit only a physical essence. This they describe variously as a collection of phenomena, a bundle of perceptions, a quality-group, or neutral mosaic. Things are simply what they appear to be, and are definable, that is, describable, only in terms of appearances or sense qualities or functions. Essence in the sense of substance or, as Kant said, noumenon, may be something, but if it is, then, as Locke holds it is a something "we know not what."<sup>1</sup> For the Nominalist an abstract essence is nothing more than a name which the mind attaches to a composite group of concrete images. It is in no sense an immaterial and universal mental representation of concrete reality. It is a mere tag

<sup>1</sup> Calkins, *Locke's Essay*, Bk. II, Ch. 23.

which is affixed to a quality-group existing in the imagination, and thus as concrete and singular as its component elements. The Conceptualists (chiefly Kantians) hold that the mind itself contributes the necessary and universal element to knowledge, but does not and cannot discover any extra-mental correlate for its concepts. In other words, the mind cannot know the noumenon or substance or essence. Here is not the place to enter into a full discussion of the epistemology of this question. It will be sufficient for our present purpose merely to state briefly our reasons for maintaining that essences are not wholly unknowable.

It is a universally acknowledged principle of scientific method that the nature of anything can be determined by its manifestations, that is, by its qualities, properties, activities. Now it is equally widely acknowledged that many of these properties and other accidental attributes of things are not only known but also known to be effects, known to be, not subsisting things, but dependent entities. Unless, however, one is prepared to sacrifice common sense and lapse into subjectivism, these properties cannot be set down as mind-dependent. They must therefore depend upon or be caused by some objective reality. It is this reality, the subject of properties, the agent which has ac-

tivities, the thing which is qualified, that we understand by the term essence or substance. It is, we hold, simply inconceivable that there should be action without an agent, quality without a thing qualified, manifestations without a thing manifesting—in a word, that there should be effects through the knowledge of which the existence and something of the nature of their cause cannot be known. Surely to hold with the Nominalists that all definitions are merely nominal definitions, and that therefore there is, so far as we can know, only a nominal difference between different classes of things is to rob language of genuine meaning and science of any claim to the possession of necessary and immutable truth.

Having cleared up these preliminary questions and concepts, we may now proceed to state the arguments pro and con for the real distinction between concrete individual essence and its existence.

The main reasons for denying a real distinction seem to be these: (1) Existence is defined as the "actuality of essence," *i.e.*, an individual essence is placed in the actual order by its existence. Hence, even to consider it apart from its actual existence would be tantamount to reducing it to non-being. (2) Though individual essences are not separated from existence, they are, if really distinct, intrinsically

separable. But such separation once assumed, essence would exist without existence, and existence would be the actuality of non-being—in either case a patent absurdity. (3) Since created essences do not exist necessarily, they must be the recipients of existence. But if they do not exist prior to this reception, they are incapable of receiving it. Action is subsequent, not prior, to existence. If they do exist, then, since existence is indivisible, they cannot receive more of it.

It may be said in criticism of these arguments that when existence is defined as the "actuality of essence" it is not meant that essence and existence are the same reality. For surely a reality actuated by essence cannot be identified with the reality which actuates it. The thing determined is really distinct from that which determines it. The second argument would be valid were essence and existence really distinct as two subsisting things. But that is not the case. They are distinct only as two complementary principles of *one* subsisting thing. Separation, therefore, even by divine power, would involve the destruction of this single subsistent. It seems rather bizarre to assume that God could make an entity, by itself non-subsistible, to subsist, or an entity, by itself non-existible, to exist. The dilemma raised in the third argument also rests on such



an assumption. Existence cannot properly be called a *thing*. It is rather the act of a thing, and a thing taken together with this act is what we understand as a Being.

Arguments for the real existence are based on the following principles: (1) Existence does not enter into the concept of essence. (2) Unreceived existence is proper to God alone.

As to the first, it cannot be denied that one may define anything, that is, lay bare its essential attributes, without any reference to whether it exists or not. But it is clear that this would not be the case were essence and existence not really distinct from one another. The questions, Does a thing exist? and, What is a thing? are two different questions, and can be answered separately. The concepts of essence and existence being quite distinct from one another, it would seem to follow that the being or object from which they are derived must be a compound being, *i.e.*, an existing being whose essence cannot be identified with its existence.

The second, and in my opinion the better, argument rests on the claim that if existence is really one with essence, and not something received by essence, then it must coincide with the divine existence, and hence be necessary, *i.e.*, unreceived and unproduced. It is granted by both parties in the controversy that created



essences are necessary alike in the real and the ideal order. Hence if existence is really one with essence, it is as necessary as is the essence with which it is identified, and as no essence can be deprived of itself, so it could not be deprived of existence.<sup>2</sup> If it be said that real essences are not immutable since they may lose their individual reality, we reply with Cardinal Zigliara that "either this reality is really quite the same as *essence*—in which case the reality is inseparable from the essence itself—or something distinct from essence (whatever it may be); and that we understand to be the existence *by which* an essence is real."<sup>3</sup>

It may be added that, though the defenders of the real distinction present a better case than their opponents, it would be claiming too much to say that their arguments are apodictic.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The question of the real or logical distinction between essence and existence has no *practical* value.
2. Philosophy should keep itself free from such baffling subtleties.
3. Philosophy should deal with the existent. But abstract essences are non-existent.
4. Sane thought avoids extremes. Exclusively *practical* philosophy is one extreme. Subtle

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Zigliara, *Ontologia*, Lib. II, p. 365.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

speculation about the relation between real essence and existence seems to be the other.

5. Either a thing exists or it does not exist. If it does not exist, it is non-being. If it does exist, it is Being. But "to be" means necessarily to be something. A something is an essence. Therefore, "to be" or existence is identical with essence.

#### SUGGESTED READINGS

Authors cited at end of previous chapter.

## CHAPTER V.

### UNITY IN MULTIPLICITY

To claim that the adequate object of the human intellect is nothing short of the sum total of reality seems on first thought utterly indefensible. For on hearing this, one naturally begins to consider the almost infinite variety of existing things, and then to check off the number of them about which he can really claim to know something. He quickly realizes how pitifully small that number is. He is simply overwhelmed by the thought of trying to know all of them, and decides to restrict his studies to an extremely limited few.

But first thought is rarely philosophical thought, and in this case the meaning given to the principle is, of course, utterly erroneous. To know reality is not to count instances of similar or dissimilar phenomena, but to grasp mentally the unity which exists in the manifold. The deeper questions of philosophy are answered only after many and strenuous efforts. Now industrious investigators have not only observed and classified the manifold dif-

ferences of things, but thinkers with a philosophical viewpoint have also attempted to find the bond of unity running through these differences. It is a fact that our visible world is made up of innumerable individual things. But it is also a fact that there is only one universe. It is a fact that all created things are composite, made up of many parts; but that does not deny the other equally certain fact that each existing thing is an individual, or is one. Can we, without inconsistency or contradiction, predicate both unity and plurality about one and the same reality? Can we make a synthesis of the one and the many? Can a thing with a multiplicity of parts—whether that thing be an individual or the universe—have at the same time the apparently contradictory attribute of unity? And, if this is impossible, is it logical to say that unity excludes plurality altogether, so that if it be predicated of reality, the apparent plurality must be set down as illusion? Is multiplicity only appearance and not real? These are some of the questions to which reflection on the nature of reality brings to mind.

**HISTORY OF THE QUESTION.** The history of philosophy shows no uniformity of opinion on these questions. Some, like the Greek Eleatic School, the medieval Neo-Platonists, and,

among modern philosophers, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Bradley and Royce, have maintained, though not entirely in the same sense, that all reality is one. "All is one, and one is all." Unity, oneness, may be predicated of reality, but not multiplicity, plurality. Where this monism is idealistic and pantheistic, the One, or all-inclusive reality, is held to be divine substance, divine mind, God. Where monism is materialistic, the One is thought of as exclusively material substance with extension, impenetrability and force as essential properties. It is called materialism.

One should not hastily conclude that these theories have been lightly adopted nor that their defenders are men wanting in ordinary power of thought. For it probably requires a keener mind to build up and make plausible a monistic theory of reality than a pluralistic. Moreover, the pluralists themselves encounter difficulties that they cannot clear up to their satisfaction.

**THE CONCEPT OF UNITY.** The curious fact about the concept of unity is that, on account of the nature of the objects that fall within the range of our experience, it is more often than not predicated about a compound, a natural or artificial manifold. We have no direct experience of simple objects. Simple things of course


possess unity, but all of our knowledge of simple things is abstract and inferential. Finite, sensible objects are composites, and yet, since each exists as an individual, as precisely itself, and therefore distinct from—though not necessarily separate from—every other thing; since as a subject of existence and an agent seeking definite ends it excludes from itself all other selves or things; since it cannot be confused with nor predicated of any other, but vindicates to itself a certain completeness and independent existence of its own, it is known and qualified as one being. It possesses the attribute of unity. Unity therefore in composite things implies actual undividedness—but not, as is true of simple things, indivisibility—and, as a consequence of that, distinctness from all other beings. These attributes are present whether we speak of an atom or of the universe, of a living cell or of the whole organism, of a grain of sand or a whole desert. In short, whatever is the subject of existence is, by that fact itself, identical with no other; it is one. The concept, therefore, is not confined to any class of things, but is predicable of all classes and of God Himself. It is transcendental, convertible with the concept of Being. Whatever is is one. The concept of “otherness,” of “another,” is derived by way of contrasting or comparing one unit with whatever it excludes from itself and



then by noting that what is thus excluded, though numerically distinct from the unit, has itself a unity of its own. Repetition of this process gives one the notion of the many or multitude.

KINDS OF UNITY. Now unity, or Being thought of as one, will, as is obvious, differ directly as the modes of Being itself differ. Thus the undividedness of an essence would be essential or substantial unity, as body and soul in man, hydrogen and oxygen in water. In substantial unity the elements entering into the compound lose their individuality and become so merged with one another as to form a new essence or substance, a third thing with attributes different from those of the elements, taken singly, before entering the compound. The contrary, however, is the case with all forms of accidental union. Here no new essence results from the union. There is either merely a certain grouping or juxtaposition of several individuals, as a crowd or stone pile (collective unity); or a house or machine (artificial unity); or a union of things, one of which merely modifies or determines the other in some non-essential manner, as the union of accidents with substance (natural unity). Transcendental unity is called real or abstract according as it affects actually existing things

or our specific and abstract concepts. In addition to transcendental unity, which adds nothing real to a Being, corporeal things possess predicamental unity, which adds to them the attribute of quantity.



APPLICATION TO QUESTIONS RAISED. In the light of these distinctions and definitions some answer may now be essayed to the questions raised at the beginning of this chapter. Things do not and evidently cannot exist *in general*. Existents are necessarily concrete and particular or individual, and an individual means an undivided *unum* or whole. Moreover, finite wholes are all in some degree composite, not simple, but of multiple parts. It is the attribute of simplicity, not unity, which is opposed to a multiplicity of parts, to a manifold. Unity is simply the undividedness of an actual Being, a fact which is in no way contingent upon the fact of that Being's actual composition. For the undividedness would be there were the Being either simple or composite. In ascribing unity either to a composite individual or to the whole universe, we do not say that one is two or ten or a thousand, but only that

any given individual or whole is itself, identical only with itself, distinct in itself and distinct from any and all other selves. There is therefore no contradiction involved in a manifold unified, or in ascribing unity or oneness to a whole that results from the coalescence of many parts, whether that coalescence or union be substantial or accidental. The synthesis of one and many simply means that the many (an accidental or substantial whole) considered as a subject of predication can be understood as an existing undivided whole; and hence an organism, a self, a single thing, while if it is considered as a subject for analysis, its unity can be resolved into a multitude of parts, each of which, however, will possess its own unity, that is—unless it be an accidental quality in the real order—it will be an individual thing, itself the subject of existence and incapable of being identified with any other thing. It will itself be an undivided whole. Unity, therefore, does not exclude plurality, but pervades and comprehends it. Multitude is a collection of units, that is, of things affected by unity, possessing individuality. And the multitude itself has unity; it is a collection *unified*, so that it too can be referred to and understood as one. Thus unity is bound up with the very reality of multitude.

The error of the Eleatics arose, as Aristotle

pointed out,<sup>1</sup> from the fact that they had no adequate understanding of potential being. Hence they could not understand how things could ever come into being or cease to be; they could find no place for change. Their universe was static and eternally one. Neither the whole nor any part of it ever began to be nor underwent the least change. Thus all composition of parts, modification, transformation, production, was excluded and consequently all visible plurality or multiplicity was ascribed to illusion. Eternal, static oneness held all reality under perfect dominion.

Without entering into a detailed criticism of Neo-Platonism or of modern monism, whether pantheistic or materialistic, it may be said by way of indicating a fallacy common to both that, as they predicate the term Being univocally of all reality, so also the term unity. For the idealistic monist *to be* is to be mind (Divine Mind), as for the materialistic monist *to be* is to be material substance. Hence just as they admit only one mode of Being, so also they admit only one kind of unity. All reality therefore becomes *sui generis* or unique. What they fail to grasp is the analogous character of Being and consequently also of unity which is, as we have seen, a transcendental property of Being.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ross, *Aristotle: Selections*, p. 88ff.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE UNIVERSAL. When we hear the term "individual" we customarily think of some particular person who either formerly existed, now is, or who may live at some future date. The term can be predicated in the same sense of Daniel Webster, Pope Pius XI, or of the President of the United States in the year 2050. In each case what we mean is one complete and undivided reality existing or capable of existing by himself, one that cannot be identified with or predicated of any other. We mean too one that cannot be divided into other persons or selves. An individual, therefore, is a complete substance, a thing existing in its own right, independently of the mind and incapable of being identified either in the logical or real order with another existent. But the term individual includes more than human beings. If the individual happens to be a rational being, it is a person. If not, it is distinguished by the term "suppositum." Thus God, angels, and men are persons; other living and non-living individuals are supposita. The latter, in so far as their individuality is concerned, have the same attributes as individual persons, *i.e.*, they are real, complete wholes, undivided and incapable of being subdivided into or identified with other wholes. In the language of metaphysics, whatever subsists, *i.e.*, is capable of existing by itself, is an individual. Accidents,

therefore, such as actions, qualities, quantity, are not individuals, but only entities that pertain to or depend upon some individual for their existence. They exist, but do not subsist.

Now the act of knowing does not change the nature of the thing known. But when known—that is, when it enters the mind, or is united with the mind, in the act of knowing—it takes on in the mind a *different mode* of being. Obviously it cannot enter the mind as a man enters a house. Neither can the mind go out and seize it as a man seizes a shovel. But it is equally clear that knowledge consists in a union of knowing mind with knowable object. How then is the union effected? A complete answer to this question will be found in manuals of epistemology. Here it will suffice to recall briefly the various stages which, according to Scholastic analysis, are distinguishable in the act of knowing:

An object (individual) produces an impression on a sensitive faculty. This results in a sensuous phantasm in the imagination. . . . The presence of the phantasm (image) forms the condition of rational activity, and the intellect abstracts the essence of the object. By a further reflective act it views this abstract concept as capable of representing



any member of the class, and thus constitutes it a formally universal idea.<sup>a</sup>

In other words, every individual is a thing possessing certain properties and qualities exclusively its own, whereby it is marked off as different from other individuals in the same class. These are known as individuating notes or characteristics. They are not the thing itself, but only accidental attributes of it. The thing itself, properly speaking, is the substance or essence or nature which is revealed to experience by these attributes, and which these attributes manifest as an individual subject of existence. It is this essence that the mind abstracts.

Now leaving aside all controversy as to *how* the mind does this, the fact that it does do it is beyond reasonable question. Such a power is revealed to consciousness in the very genesis of the ideas we use, in every process of real definition and classification. In acquiring knowledge of things, scientific and philosophical knowledge, we do find ourselves mentally ignoring the manifold accidental differences among individuals and fixing our attention exclusively upon those attributes that are common to all the individuals of a class. And we

<sup>a</sup> Maher, *Psychology*, p. 311.

do thus come to know something as true of the whole class, that is, we grasp under one concept that irreducible minimum of reality in the individual (the essence) and, by a further act of reflection, come to understand that it is predicable in the same sense of all other individuals belonging to the class. It is in this manner that the manifold of sense experience, the world of numberless individuals, is unified by the mind; and that unity—grounded indeed in extra-mental reality—is what we mean by the universal. It is reality, objectively singular and concrete, but potentially universal, made formally universal in its ideal mode of being. It is, therefore, clear that the universal is neither an extra-mental reality alone, nor merely a mental reality or idea, but an idea truly representative of reality and differing from it only as one mode of being differs from another.

**METAPHYSICAL GRADES OF BEING IN THE INDIVIDUAL.** The essences abstracted by the mind in the process of defining have their own attributes. Some of these are generic, some specific, others individual. The student will already have met these in deductive Logic in the chapter dealing with the predicables and the coördination of the different generic and specific ideas. In the illustration, called the

Porphyrion tree, these were arranged in a scale of ever narrowing comprehension and broadening extension from the concept of an individual man to the concept of substance. They are the simpler ideas connoted by concepts of singulars or one of the lower genera. Thus the term man connotes rational, sentient, living, corporeal and substantial. By means of these logical distinctions the mind sets up a metaphysical manifold in the physical unit, and is thus able to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the object of its thought, and to reduce its ideas to order and system. These attributes, or grades of being, are not the fruit of purely nominal distinction. They result indeed from logical distinction, but they have a foundation or justification in extra-mental reality. They are called metaphysical grades of being because, though the individual is one reality, it furnishes grounds for the mind to introduce the distinction of these several attributes. Though individuals may be numerically and specifically different, there are in them, nevertheless, realities which they possess in common. There is an overlapping of the one on the other. Thus substance is found in all individuals; the corporeal in all material things; life in all sentient things, and so on. Thus, though each individual thing is an undivided whole distinct from all others, the mind can distinguish various

generic and specific attributes which it has in common with many others.

INDIVIDUALITY. Individuality is a blanket term which implies all of those characteristics of an accidental nature by which the individual is manifested to others and distinguished from other individuals of the same class. Every individual person, *e.g.*, has his own form and figure, occupies exclusively some definite place at a definite time, belongs to some race and nation, bears a certain name, and so on. These characteristics, since they involve nothing essential to man, cannot be said to constitute him an individual, but they do reveal him as an individual numerically different from other individuals within his class. They account for the endless variety perceivable among human beings by reason of which we can say that no two are quite alike. And what is true of men is similarly true of all individuals in other classes of beings. To say that the individual is, or is constituted by, this quality-group is the error of the Phenomenalists, among whom must be placed the Neo-Realists. The error consists in the fact that to accidents or qualities is given the perfection of substance or thing qualified, *i.e.*, subsistence. One is asked to believe that though no single quality can ever exist by itself, a group of them may do so. This view obviously denies to the

mind the very ability to know anything beyond sense data.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION. If you call to mind two classes of things, *e.g.*, men and trees, and then ask yourself, Why the differences among these things? your question will at once divide itself into two others: (1) Why does one class, taken as a whole, differ from the other class? and (2) Why does one individual within either class differ from all other individuals within its respective class? The answer to the first question will give you the principle of specification, *i.e.*, indicate those essential attributes by reason of which any class of things is distinguished from all other classes. The answer to the second will indicate the principle of individuation, *i.e.*, those attributes which explain why it is that I, an individual man, differ from you, another individual man. It will tell you what makes a thing *this* thing. Obviously that which makes me to be man must be something different from that which makes me *this* man. For otherwise, since what makes me man differentiates me essentially from other *classes* of beings, I should also differ essentially from other men, which obviously is not the case.

It may be noted that for monistic philosophers this problem of individuation in one

sense does not exist, though in another sense it constitutes their greatest difficulty. If there is but one substance, then there is but one subject of existence. The cosmos itself would be the sole individual. But since such a view runs contrary to the fact of the plurality of beings imposed upon us by sense experience, the monist takes refuge either in some hazy multiple-aspect theory or flatly declares sense experience illusory. But neither offers a satisfactory solution: not the former, because no aspect or manifestation of one thing can possibly be construed as a distinct individual; not the latter, for, if all sense knowledge is to be branded illusory, then either both the origin of knowledge and the criterion of certitude become purely subjective—a situation which renders discussion futile—or we have no guarantee that any of our conceptions are more than illusions, which is the position of utter skepticism.

In discussing this question St. Thomas lays down two propositions: (1) the individual, unless a simple substance, is not individuated by itself; and (2) corporeal individuals are individuated by matter inasmuch as it is affected by quantity. Now the very definition of individuals as undivided wholes, incommunicable or nonpredicable of any other, excludes the possibility of their being individuated by themselves. For in that case each would be specifi-



cally, *i.e.*, essentially, different from all the others. As St. Thomas puts it:

That by which Socrates (*i.e.*, an individual) is a man can be predicated of (*i.e.*, intellectually identified with) many; but that by which he is this man can be predicated of one only. If therefore Socrates were a man for the same reason that he is *this* man, just as there could not be many Socrates, so there could not be many men.<sup>3</sup>

A distinction is drawn between simple beings (*i.e.*, pure spirits) and composite beings, because while in the former the form or nature constitutes their whole essence—a fact which shows that they must be individuated by themselves—this is not true of the latter, or things composed of matter and form. For in them, both their exclusiveness and their actual division from all others is due to the fact that their substantial forms are united with quantified matter. When the human soul, *e.g.*, is united with the body it at once loses its capacity to be the form of anything else. The composite individual, moreover, is divisible only because it is affected by quantity. The principle of individuation therefore, or that which makes each individual distinct from all others in the same class, is neither matter alone nor

<sup>3</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I. P., q. 11, a. 3.

quantity alone, but matter subject to three dimensions, *i.e.*, quantity.

SUMMARY. The general question discussed in this chapter was: Can reality be both one and manifold? History of Philosophy shows that some have despaired of answering the question affirmatively and taken refuge in monism. Unity is the undividedness of a being, plus exclusiveness. What is one is distinct in itself and divided from every other thing. Repetition of units constitutes multitude. Substantial unity is the undividedness of an essence or nature. Accidental unity, the undividedness of a collection of units, or of integral parts or of substance with accidents. Unity is predicated analogously of being. The error of the Eleatics was due to their failure to rightly understand potential being; that of monism, to the univocal predication of unity. The individual is a complete, substantial, undivided and exclusive whole. If rational, it is a person; otherwise, a suppositum. The universal is the essence of a material thing abstracted from its concrete setting and apprehended by the mind as common to all the individuals of a class. Metaphysical grades of being are the attributes of abstract essences, the forms distinguished by the mind when considering the connotation or implications of a given subject. Individuality

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is manifested by the accidental characteristics of a being, while the composite individual is constituted such by matter inasmuch as it is subject to three dimensions. Spiritual entities are individuated by their own essences. The principle of specification is the form.

### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Progress in science and philosophy consists in an increasingly more perfect understanding of the underlying unity of the manifold of experience.
2. Univocal predication of unity issues in monism; analogous predication, in dualism.
3. God is not only one, but unique.
4. Whatever is, is one.
5. The problem of individuality is insoluble either in a monistic or a phenomenalist philosophy.
6. A disembodied human soul is not a person.
7. The problem of universals lies at the heart of philosophy.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

COFFEY—*Ontology*, Ch. IV.

JOYCE—*Principles of Natural Theology*, p. 304ff.

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## CHAPTER VI

### REALITY AND THE TRUE

GENERAL NOTIONS OF TRUTH, ERROR AND FALSITY. "That is not true," or "That is quite true," are expressions frequently heard. Moreover, everyone understands what they mean. Tell me that in this year of grace, 1930, Mr. Herbert Hoover is President of the United States, or that man must eat in order to live, or that twice six is twelve, and immediately I say, you speak truly, your statements are true. To the further question, Why are these statements called true? the obvious answer would be, Because they really represent the facts; they correspond to the things spoken of; they tally with experience. Such undoubtedly is the concept of truth held both by the "plain" man and by most philosophers.

All recognize that truth has to do with knowledge, and since knowledge implies a knowing mind and a knowable reality and a relation between the two, truth is understood to be a certain quality of that relation. Now if the act of knowing were merely a mechanical process, such, *e.g.*, as photographing or impressing a

signet ring on wax, if the senses and the intellect were like passive bodies merely receiving impressions from another body, then the relation would of physical necessity be always an accurate point by point relation of conformity. But such is not the case. For the cognitive powers are not wholly passive instruments. Passive though they undoubtedly are during the first stages of the knowing process, they subsequently react to the stimulus, and that reaction is conditioned by so many subjective conditions and may be modified by so many circumstances both subjective and objective, that this knowing-relation is not a constant but a variable relation. There is not only the element of impression by an object, but there is also the more important element of reaction which, in the case of judgment, implies *interpretation*.

Now this element together with the physiological condition of the knower and the circumstances surrounding the knowable object make it possible for the relation of correspondence between mind and thing to be partial only, or wholly illusory. Moreover, since judgments are under the control of the will, one may express outwardly the opposite of what he has really conceived. In other words, not only truth, but also error and falsehood may finally issue from the knowing process. Nothing is

more familiar to us than the "checking up" process, or critical process, by which we re-examine either our own or another's statements in order to see to what extent they correspond with the facts, whether sensible facts, as in perception, or logical facts and processes, as in discursive thought. The discrepancies found are then set down as error or as falsehood. As commonly understood, therefore, truth consists in a relationship of conformity between mind and object, error in an involuntary lack of such conformity, and falsehood in a voluntary distortion of such conformity.

**THEORIES OF TRUTH.** Scholastic philosophers, or as they are sometimes called, realistic dualists (by which phrase they are distinguished from both Idealists and Monists), teach the correspondence theory of truth which, as we have seen, is in harmony with popular convictions on the subject. This means the rejection of innate ideas on the one hand, and on the other all theories which reduce the object of knowledge to the status of an "idea" or state of mind (Locke), or all reality itself exclusively to the mental level (Idealistic Monists). It holds that in the act of knowing the object known is the thing which is perceived. Contrary to some commentators on the Scholastic



knowledge theory, the sensible species are not that which is known. They are the means *by which* the mind knows, or gets into cognitive relation with, its object. In other words, in the cognitive relation one term is the knowing mind, and the other is the extra-mental object.

To know, therefore, is mentally to apprehend an object, and to know *truly* is mentally to apprehend reality as it is, even though the mind may not apprehend all there is. In point of fact, since the mind is limited in its powers, and since the object, any object, is almost unlimited in mysteriousness, it may be said that no act of knowledge fully exhausts the knowableness of the object. All that the theory claims is that so far as the mind can and does apprehend reality, it truly apprehends it inasmuch as there is a correspondence between it and the object apprehended.

This theory of truth has sometimes been described as a mere "copy-theory." But unjustly. For, as has been suggested, the subjective term of the relation is not a passive but an active term, an apprehending or interpreting term. At this term there is not only impression, perception, intellection, but there is judgment, an affirming or denying by the mind that the content of its apprehension really tallies with the object understood, at least with

regard to the predicates so affirmed or denied. If one were to refuse to admit this he would be doing such violence to conscious facts that knowledge itself, not to mention true knowledge, would become quite inconceivable.

The objection to other theories of truth, such as the coherence<sup>1</sup> or Pragmatic<sup>2</sup> theories, is that it is impossible to say when one is in possession of truth, that is, to distinguish truth from error, without applying a criterion that is purely subjective. Obviously, when a norm or criterion is subjective it cannot serve for any other than the person who use it. It necessarily varies with different persons, and hence ceases to be a norm in the proper sense at all. As applied to the matter under consideration, it would reduce all judgments or propositions to the category of mere probability, or probable opinions. It would force the admission that nothing can be known with such certainty that all would equally be intellectually constrained to accept it. In other words, certainty, or perfect truth, would amount to nothing more than a personal opinion. Such a view, aside from being essentially anti-intellectual, cuts short the hope of all scholarly enterprise, that is, the discovery of objective and hence universal truth.

<sup>1</sup> See Walker, *Theories of Knowledge*.

<sup>2</sup> Coffey, *Epistemology*, Vol. II.

KINDS OF TRUTH. Truth consists of a relationship of correspondence between a mind and its object. Now we assume as demonstrated in cosmology that the world is the product of the Divine creative act. That act was a rational act, that is, the act of a person conceiving what He was to do and acting in accordance with His conceptions. Things therefore are essentially what they are because the Creator has made them so. Between the Divine Mind and creatures there is a relation of conformity that is adequate, absolute, necessary and invariable. This conformity of things with the archetypal ideas in the Divine Mind is what we understand by the terms metaphysical, ontological, or essential truth. The Creator does not and cannot depend upon things for his knowledge of them. He knows them, it is true, but not in themselves. He knows them by knowing His own Mind and Essence. They are what they are because they are the externalized products of His own conceptions. They depend upon Him for their existence, and cannot exist or act otherwise than according to the respective natures that He has given them. As God is the source of all being or existences, so He is the ultimate source of all truth. Between His Mind and all things there is a perfect correspondence. In His Mind is all truth.

Men too can know. But the human intellect

does not produce the object of its knowledge. Rather it is dependent upon things for its knowledge. It is able to penetrate by its abstractive powers to the essences of things and thus to a degree to know them as they are. It is able in many instances to affirm its knowledge without fear of criticism, confident of having avoided error. It is able by a series of reflective acts to determine that its conceptions do tally with reality, and in so far forth it is able to attain true knowledge or truth concerning them. The relation of conformity between its concepts and the reality conceived, between the thinker's mind and the object of his judgment, is known as logical truth.

Finally, we not only know things truly, but we are able to express our knowledge of them to others. This gives rise to a third kind of relation, that between the speaker's thoughts and his speech. If there is any voluntary discrepancy here, we qualify it as a lie; if the speech really reveals what is in the mind, if there is the relationship of correspondence, we accept it as a true statement. Where one involuntarily states something he does not mean he can only be accused of error. If truth consists in the correspondence of mind with reality, then necessary or ontological truth is the conformity of things to the Divine Mind; logical truth, the conformity of human conceptions

or judgments with things; and moral truth, the conformity of speech or language with the mind's conceptions.<sup>3</sup>

**TRUTH A TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTE OF BEING.** It follows from the above that as all things are dependent upon the Divine Mind both for their being and their being known, and, whether known or not, are at least knowable by the human mind, there is nothing which cannot stand as a term in the truth relation, and hence nothing which is not in that sense true. In this sense Aristotle's view that the true is reality as knowable, or that the Being and the true are convertible, is easily understood. The attribute "true" is not anything superadded to reality; it is reality as rightly—though not necessarily adequately—understood. It means that the true is not confined to any genus or class of things, but is an attribute of all classes, *i.e.*, is a transcendental attribute. All realities must conform to archetypal ideas in the Mind of God: they are, at least potentially, all intelligible by the human mind, and language, in order to be language, must be intelligible to the mind which expresses it.

**THE UNITY OF TRUTH.** One often hears the

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Sheen, *God and Intelligence*, Pt. II, Ch. VIII.

expression, "Truth is one," and the conclusion drawn, "Therefore there can be no conflict between Divine or Revealed and human or scientific truth." We are not here interested in the apologetical aspect of this question, but only in the broader question of whether truth is one or manifold. Coffey answers as follows:

Logical truth is manifold—multiplied by the number of created intelligences, and by the number of distinct cognitions in each. The primary ontological truth which consists in the conformity of all reality with the Divine Intellect is one; there is no real plurality of archetype ideas in the Divine Mind; they are manifold only to our imperfect human mode of thinking. The *secondary* ontological truth which consists in the conformity of things with the abstract essences of created intelligences is conditioned by, and multiplied with, the manifoldness of the latter.<sup>4</sup>

Where the terms of the truth relation are unchangeable, as, *e.g.*, the Divine Mind and the essences of created things, there truth is also necessarily unchangeable. Such truth is ontological or necessary truth. But this immunity from change is also present whenever the human mind clearly cognizes the essential attri-

<sup>4</sup> *Op. Cit.*, p. 163.



butes of things. Thus the propositions, "God is good," "twice two are four," are unchangeably true, because we know with certainty that the predicate goodness is of the Divine Essence, and that the relation of equality arises from the very essence of numerical units compared in the proportion of two plus two and four.

The truth of propositions, however, whose predicates are not of the essence of the subject, *i.e.*, are accidents, qualities of being, possesses merely the necessity of fact. "The rose is red," is a proposition which may be true at this particular time and under these particular circumstances, but not at another time and under other circumstances. Logical truth of this character is manifold, essentially changeable.

TRUTH AS RELATIVE, PERFECTIBLE. It must be clear that for those philosophers (Kantians, Sensists, Positivists) who deny that we can know the essences of things or any suprasensible realities, truth can never be necessary, universal and unchangeable, but merely relative, personal, provisional and perfectible. For where certainly knowable predicates are restricted to phenomena or sense qualities the truth-value of propositions will be as reversible, as variable, as non-necessary as these predicates themselves. Again, if change affects our whole

knowable world, then change must also affect our whole system of truths. But the knowableness of essences has already been sufficiently demonstrated. Besides, as has been said, we must admit essences or give up, that is, despair of ever reaching any lasting certitudes at all. We must admit that truth is a phantom ever to be pursued, but never overtaken.

NATURE OF FALSITY. Opposed to truth is falsity, that is, the lack of conformity either between speech and thought, or between thought and thing. Our powers of understanding are limited; hence we may err concerning the real nature of a thing and conceive it otherwise than it really is. This is logical falsity. Or we may deliberately express in speech the contrary of what we have in our minds. This is moral falsity, or a lie. It is evident that there could be no such thing as metaphysical falsity, for, since ontological truth is identical with being, ontological falsity would be identical with non-being. There is nothing then necessarily false, or false by nature, not conformed to the mind of the Creator. Falsity is either logical or moral. Logical falsity is the result of error on the part of the human mind; moral falsity is the result of a perverse human will. Still, just as it cannot be said that man is determined by his nature to fall into error, so it

cannot be said that man is naturally a liar.  
(*Nemo gratis mentitur.*)

The true is always that which presents itself to our mind in the first place; it is our nature to speak it. In order to be true, neither art, nor instruction, nor temptation, nor motive is necessary. On the contrary, to lie is to do violence to our nature, and even among the most depraved of men, it is an act which has need of a motive. One speaks the truth as one eats his bread, because of natural appetite and without any particular design. One lies as he takes a medicine, for some particular end to the attainment of which lying is an indispensable condition.<sup>5</sup>

### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Truth is an interpretation of reality.
2. Knowledge relations are variable.
3. Truth is always incomplete.
4. The senses never err.
5. One should be true to himself.
6. Truth is a transcendental attribute of being.
7. Error is privation of truth; privation is lack of being; error is lack of being.
8. That may be true for you, but not for me.
9. That is true which is conceivable and consistent.
10. A proposition is true if it "works."
11. May one statement be truer than another?

<sup>5</sup> Reid, *Apud Lortie*, Vol. I, p. 311.

12. To lie is to affirm what is not or to deny what is.
13. Truth adds nothing to reality.
14. God is truth.

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ST. THOMAS—*De Veritate*.

HICKEY—*Summula Phil. Schol.*, Vol. I, Pt. 2.

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PERRY—*Present Philosophical Tendencies*, Ch. IX.

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HOLT AND OTHERS—*The New Realism*, pp. 252ff; 286ff; 303ff.

## CHAPTER VII

### REALITY AND THE GOOD

**THE GOOD: GENERAL NOTION.** The term good is used in a variety of senses. It is predicated of God, of men, of animals, of inanimate things, of the products of nature and of art, of accidents as well as of substances, of ideal as well as of real beings, of actions as well as of agents. Of nothing can it truly be said: It is no good. When we do say that, as we sometimes do, we do not really mean it in any absolute or unqualified sense. What we really mean is that it is not good when considered from some specific point of view. Things relegated to the attic or thrown upon the junk pile may be described, by those who cast them aside, as *no good*. But they have a value in the eyes of the collector of antiques, or the rag man or the junk dealer. Similarly, we say of a man: He's no good. But we mean merely that in this particular situation, for this particular kind of work, judged by this particular standard, he is so deficient in certain qualities that he cannot be used, is not wanted. Then too someone may say, That medicine is not good for me; while

at the same time he will be answered by another, Perhaps, but it certainly is good for me. One might go on multiplying instances in which this term is used with varying connotations.

But when we stop to analyze these and similar expressions we find that in spite of the differences in meaning there is also a common signification attached to the term. Aristotle said that the good is what everything desires. (*Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.*) In other words, it is reality inasmuch as it is desirable, which in the case of moral good would mean rationally desirable. The good is being viewed in reference to some desire. Thus food is good because it satisfies a desire, fulfills a need. Knowledge is good because it satisfies an intellectual craving. Likewise friendship is good, work is good. In every instance, as analysis shows, a thing is pronounced good because of its power to satisfy our wants, needs, desires. Whatever exists has a purpose. It exists in order to attain some end. Each thing *naturally* tends toward some definite objective, strives to reach the goal of its existence. Whatever helps it to attain that end then is desirable by that being, good for it, or simply good. When things have qualities that are desirable by some agent, then they are and are called good. Not all of course desire the same things. For, not all have the same needs or wants or desires.



But it would be impossible to find anything that at some time, under certain circumstances, would not be desired by somebody or some thing.

Now things may not only be good for somebody or some thing; they are also good in themselves. Thus, *e.g.*, I want a watch. A watch will fulfill a purpose that I have, satisfy a need that I feel. For that reason I say that it would be a good thing for me to possess a watch, and that the watch is a good thing to possess. But the truth of both of these statements depends upon the watch being so perfect that it will be able constantly to attain the end for which it was made. And this is to say that unless the watch be good in itself, that is, unless it possesses all the perfections that its nature demands, it will not be good for me, nor a good thing to possess. It will cease to be an object of desire, and be branded and rejected as no good. A thing has all the perfections which its nature demands when it is able to achieve the end or purpose for which it was made. In the case of the watch, the obvious purpose was to record time. If it fails in this, it ceases to be a desirable object; it ceases to be good.

This holds true in the moral as well as in the physical order. A good man (morally speaking) is one who so acts as to attain the end, to

achieve the purpose, of human existence. If he succeeds in this, it will be because he has come into the possession of God, man's Supreme Good, and that possession through acts of knowledge and of love will render him perfect. Whenever any being seeks the good which is proper to it, it works toward its own perfection. Hence it is said: "What suits any nature *perfects* that nature, and suits it precisely in so far as it perfects it. But whatever perfects a nature does so only because and in so far as it is a *realization of the end* towards which this nature tends." <sup>1</sup> Knowledge, *e.g.*, is suitable or becoming to man. He seeks spontaneously to acquire it. Its acquisition renders him more perfect. Now since his perfection as a rational being consists primarily in knowing God, whatever tends to increase such knowledge—and it is increased by the knowledge of ourselves and other persons and things—promotes by so much his ultimate perfection as a man. The phrase, nature seeks to perfect itself, means that every natural agent strives for those things which it needs in order to fully unfold the latent powers or potentialities in it. If and when this is completely done, that agent has reached its natural perfection.

THE GOOD AND THE PERFECT. From this it

<sup>1</sup> Coffey, *Ontology*, p. 170.

follows that a thing may be good without necessarily being perfect. The perfect being is wholly good. Of course, God alone can be called absolutely perfect. In Him there are no potentialities, no undeveloped or latent capacities, or, in other words, no limitations or imperfections. In Him there can be no change, no becoming, no transition from a less to a more perfect state of being. Neither in Him can there be, at least in the sense in which we use the term of man, any desires. He is pure actuality, that is, infinite perfection.

But there is a perfection that is relatively absolute, that is, things may be perfect according to their type or kind. Thus a watch would be a very imperfect instrument for driving nails or a man for pulling a plow. But then such is not the natural purpose or end of a watch or a man. Capacity to do these things is not looked for in them. Their absence is in no way derogatory to their type of perfection. What we look for in a watch is determined by the end or purpose for which it is made, *i.e.*, to keep time. If it has such integrity and co-ordination of parts that it is able to do this we pronounce it a perfect watch. It has the perfection due to its kind. If it is lacking in either respect it is pronounced imperfect. The perfection of a being "is the reason of its goodness and both are its very being; for anything is

desirable in so far as it can perfect the being that desires it, and it can do so in as far as it is a being." <sup>a</sup> If a watch has all the parts which it should have, and these parts are so arranged that it functions so as to attain the end for which it was made, it can be called a good and perfect watch. The same is true of anything else that possesses a similar fullness or completeness of being. Perfection follows being, imperfection, lack or want of being. When Our Lord said: "Walk before Me and be perfect," He meant that we should act according to our rational nature, *i.e.*, that we should seek always those physical, intellectual and moral goods which would bring to our faculties their fullest development. And since no created good can fully exhaust the powers of knowing and of loving, it is evident that man cannot reach his perfection as a man unless and until he comes into the possession, by acts of knowledge and of love, of God Himself.

DEGREES OR LEVELS OF PERFECTION. We commonly say that one thing or person is better than another. This very fact implies the recognition on our part of some norm or criterion of relative values, some rule by means of which we can distinguish the good from the bad, the better from the worse. If for example we set

<sup>a</sup> Coppens, *General Metaphysics*, p. 25.

down a series of things, beginning with the least perfect and ending with the most perfect, it will be easier to determine what this rule or criterion may be. The sequence: soil, plant, animal, man, Angel, God, would no doubt be admitted by all as such a series. For the inanimate clod is certainly on a lower scale of perfection than living things, the material lower than the spiritual, and the created lower than the uncreated. But why?

Well, to begin with, an actual being is better or more perfect than a merely possible one. But the only assignable reason is that the former has a higher degree of reality than the latter. In this case then our norm is nothing but reality itself. There is in the actual a greater fullness of being and consequent larger measure of independence of other realities than in the potential.

So too, one may argue, is the relative degree of perfection among actual things determined. For in the series mentioned there is progressively just this greater fullness of being and independence of others. Thus in God, no dependence, no limitation of being; in Angels, fewer limitations than in man and less upon material things; in man, a threefold set of powers, *i.e.*, rational, sentient and vegetative; in animals, only the sentient and vegetative; in plants, only the vegetative; in minerals, no

vital activities at all. It is clear therefore that degrees of perfection are measured by the possession of relatively greater fullness of being (not quantitative, to be sure, but essential), and independence of other things. And this rule is applicable also when there is question of determining the relative degrees of perfection of things within the same species—only in such cases the perfections measured will be only accidental perfections.

KINDS OF GOODNESS. The good, we have said, is reality as desirable. Now the reasons why a thing is desired are not always the same. We want some things because we recognize them as needs of our physical nature (food, exercise, sleep) or of our moral nature (knowledge, virtue, friendship, God). We want these things because it is the right thing to want them. Such things are fitting and proper for us to have. They are both consonant with and necessary to our well-being. They are in conformity with sound reason or the laws that govern our spiritual and bodily life. The good in this sense is called proper or *suitable*, and is subdivided into moral and physical as explained above. We desire other things, not because they may be necessary, but because of the pleasure or enjoyment they will bring us, as, *e.g.*, some particular kind of food or form of literature or enter-



tainment. Hence the term delectable good. Next, since most of what we do is done by means of certain tools or instruments, we desire many things just because of their usefulness to us in attaining some specific end or good. Finally, since, as often happens, we err in our judgment of what is good, it is evident that we must add the distinction of real and apparent good.

All existing things can be objects of desire by some agent. Hence it can be said that whatever is is good. Ontologically therefore goodness is coextensive with reality.

Inasmuch as a thing is good, by that much is it perfect, and in so far as it is perfect it is actual, and in so far as it is actual it possesses reality. Hence a thing is good in so far as it has reality. But every being, in so far as it is a being, has reality or existence. Therefore every being is good, and the terms being and good are convertible.<sup>2</sup>

THE CONCEPT OF EVIL. No discussion of the good would be complete without some explanation of the contradictory attribute, evil. Much is said by ethicists about the attributes of good and evil inasmuch as they affect human actions. Here our inquiry is into the nature of evil, its kinds and causes.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, P. I a. q. 5, a. 1.

The blunt assertion that evil does not exist sounds somewhat like a doctrine of what passes for Christian Science. It strikes one as absurd. For, is the world not "full of evil"? Is man not "prone to evil from his youth"? Do we not all daily strive to avoid evils of various kinds? Is not the whole science of morality implicitly contained in the injunction: "Do good, avoid evil"? How then can it be said not to exist?

Well, blindness, *e.g.*, is an evil; plagues, famines, floods are evils. Murders, thefts, calumnies are evils. All sins, sicknesses, disasters are classified as evils. In a sense, one may conclude that since these undoubtedly exist, therefore evil exists. On the other hand, one may also argue: Sins, diseases, disasters all consist in defects of being or perfection which the normal types of actions and of things do not have. They consist of deviations from the normal, of privations of due integrity and of order. A human action is bad because of its failure to conform to reason and law. It is evil only inasmuch as it falls short of natural integrity. Disease implies a want of natural normal order in the organism. Disasters, whether due to natural or artificial causes, are abnormal events, and, in so far as they may be called evil, they may be ascribed to physical or human defects.

It appears, therefore, that what is called evil can in all cases be reduced to privation, defi-

ciency, lack of due perfection, to negation of the good. But privative being is either wholly or partially non-existent. The conclusion follows therefore that evil as a *thing* has no existence, that there is no evil in the sense of a subject of existence. It exists only as a lack of perfection in something whose nature demands such perfection. It consists in the absence of reality that *ought to be* present in a thing. According as the deficiency attaches itself to a physical or a moral object it is classified as physical or moral evil. There can be no evil in the Divine Being because He is all-perfect by nature and therefore not capable of suffering any privation. He is infinite fullness of being, and hence all-good. Evil, defect, privation, can exist only in those realities which are finite, subject to change, imperfection, privation. As the term good is coextensive with reality, nothing real can in any positive sense be evil. Evil as such is unreal. Evil as a defect of perfection in some positive reality exists merely as a privation in that reality.

THE CAUSE OF EVIL. Inasmuch as evil is considered in itself, as a *thing*, it is non-existent. It has therefore no power to act. It cannot be a cause of anything. Evil therefore cannot be the cause of itself. A cause must be something positive. But only the good is positive reality.

The cause of evil therefore is the good. And yet, since good is contradictory in nature to evil, it cannot cause evil directly, but only indirectly, *i.e.*, by producing a defective good. Finite things are by nature limited. So also their actions can never be more than relatively perfect. By reason of these limitations, defects (evils) creep into the effects produced by them. A renowned musician, for example, may possess the skill to produce excellent music, but if he has rheumatism in his fingers, or if his fiddle be cracked, the result of his effort will be bad, that is, the music will be deprived of its normal perfection; it will be evil. And this similarly is true of human actions. We intend to do good, but owing to the limitations of our intelligence or the weakness of our will, or the influence of passion or prejudice, our actions are faulty, imperfect, more or less morally evil. Thus evil, or defect, imperfection, privation, negation of the good, is inseparable from a finite universe. It cannot be excluded from the economy of such a world. It may therefore indirectly be a source of good, and therein is found both its ultimate explanation and its justification.

SUMMARY. The good is that which satisfies some desire or natural tendency. It is reality as desirable. A thing is good if it fulfills the

end for which it was made, and it does fulfill this end if nothing is lacking to it which its nature demands. It is then perfect. The perfection of finite things is relative perfection. For some of them are more perfect than others, and some, while good for certain agents, are bad for others. God alone is absolutely perfect. Moral goodness (*bonum honestum*) consists in a man's conforming to reason in his conduct. Physical goodness is anything that perfects the nature of a subject. The pleasurable good is what brings satisfaction to appetite. The useful good is what is conducive to the attainment of some end. Good is also true, *i.e.*, genuine, or merely apparent. Whatever is is good; goodness is a transcendental attribute of being.

Evil is the privation of reality in a thing whose nature requires that reality in order to be integral. Evil is either physical or moral. It is non-existent as such; it exists only as a privation in a good thing. It is not a cause, but is caused by positive reality, though indirectly, not directly.

NOTE: A thorough understanding of the nature of evil is necessary for the discussion of the problem of evil and Divine Providence, or Divine Goodness or Omnipotence. A false understanding of the nature of evil underlies the vagaries of Christian Science, and of some of the earlier heresies of the Church

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Whatever is, is good.
2. Nothing is good but desiring makes it so.
3. Perfection is the highest degree of goodness.
4. The relatively perfect is relatively imperfect.
5. To strive to be natural is to strive to become good.
6. Things have value, worth, dignity, in so far as they are good.
7. An elephant is not a higher good than a mouse.
8. Among creatures, man is highest in the scale of perfection.
9. The world is both full of evil and empty of it.
10. Under any circumstances, it is better to be than not to be.

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THOMAS AQUINAS—*In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, vide "bonum."

IDEM—*Summa Theologica*,

Pars. I<sup>a</sup> { q. 5, arts. 1 et 3  
q. 6, " 1 et 2  
q. 16, " 3 et 4  
q. 19, a. 9, c.  
q. 48, a. 1, c.

BAKEWELL—*Source Book in Ancient Philosophy*, Chs. IX, XIII, XVI.

Catholic Encyclopedia—Article: "Good."

DE RÉGNON—*Metaphysique des Causes*, pp. 376-385.



## CHAPTER VIII

### ÆSTHETIC REALITY

THE EXISTENCE OF BEAUTY. We daily attribute beauty to natural objects and works of art. The epithet beautiful or one of its synonyms is predicated of poems, paintings, statues, musical compositions, buildings, vases, theories and thoughts. Charm is also ascribed to human faces, forms and movements, to animal coloring and outlines, to the plumage of birds, to flowers and foliage, to tropical vegetation, to landscapes and seascapes, to mountains, rivers, lakes, to earth, the oceans, the heavens, to lightning and northern lights, to volcanic phenomena, to waterfalls and cataracts, to grottoes and caverns, to the sunset and the moon. Let us analyze the experience which causes us to refer to such a variety of objects as being all beautiful.

THE ÆSTHETIC ATTITUDE. Man frequently finds himself interested in appearances as such. On these occasions he is manifesting appreciation or exercising taste. His frame of mind is neither speculative nor conative but contem-

plative. He is fully occupied in mere apprehension without desiring to possess. He takes immediate satisfaction in the appearance of an object, not in its reality or truth. This is the essence of the æsthetic attitude. The word æsthetics is derived from a Greek term meaning to sense or perceive and it was first used in the eighteenth century by Baumgarten to mean the science of the beautiful.

The æsthetic attitude of enjoyment or admiration consists of an emotion or sentiment and the judgment which it provokes. The judgment is an instinctive spontaneous affair produced by the sense of beauty. This latter faculty embraces the understanding plus the creative imagination and the two higher senses of hearing and seeing. Keats to the contrary, most artists and æstheticians agree with Aquinas that we do not call savors and odors beautiful.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ÆSTHETIC CONSCIOUSNESS. Besides the contemplative, disinterested and communistic features of æsthetic experience mentioned above we must cite the following items as constituting the atmosphere of the salon and the studio, the gallery and the atelier. (1) In both the creation and the enjoyment or appreciation of æsthetic value an objective, impersonal and ecstatic loss of self-consciousness, balance of impulses and unity of

repose is found to obtain. (2) Melancholy and wistfulness color the experience. (3) Illusion, pretense, appearance, make-believe, imitation or imagination predominates. (4) Empathy or active response, that is, an inner imitation and sympathetic feeling of appreciation whereby one feels himself into the object, as it were, by reading between the lines and bringing thereto the wealth of his own associations to fill in—all this is an essential part of the experience. (5) Æsthetic experience is immediate, that is, it is not discursive but intuitive, impulsive or instinctive. (6) Finally, artistic creation and appreciation is cathartic or purgative and compensatory in the Aristotelian and Freudian sense.

CREATIVE IMAGINATION. Both from the point of view of the artist in his work of creation or production and from that of the critic, the connoisseur, the dealer or collector and the amateur in their work of appreciation, evaluation, and enjoyment, the imagination is the æsthetic and artistic faculty *par excellence*. Shelley calls poetry the expression of the imagination and G. B. Shaw says that it is imagination that creates a play. H. B. Tree, the Shakespearean actor, similarly names the imagination "the artistic faculty." (The imagination is that internal sensory cognitive power by which the

mind represents reality or pictures objects in their absence.) It is called creative in so far as it can concoct new images or idealize.)

Taste is the name for this same faculty in its capacity for appreciation or judgment as opposed to creation. The inventive or artistic faculty or judgment or capacity for æsthetic pleasure is also called talent, genius, wit, esprit and originality.

THE ÆSTHETIC SENTIMENTS. G. T. Ladd<sup>1</sup> describes sentiments as the most ideal, refined and spiritual of the forms of developed feeling. They are of three kinds: (1) the intellectual, such as curiosity and wonder, (2) moral, such as shame and pride, and (3) æsthetic or the feeling awakened by the contemplation of beauty and sublimity. These latter, he says, are more sensuous and objective than the intellectual sentiments, and he adds that their object is either produced, grasped or colored by the imagination.

The fact that beauty is partly subjective is due to the active character of æsthetic enjoyment of appreciation. The auditor at a drama, symphony, or opera who seats himself and assumes the passive attitude of being entertained does not derive so much pleasure therefrom as does he who has ability to idealize, to read be-

<sup>1</sup> *Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory.*

tween the lines, to fill in, so to speak, to enter actively into the object, to exercise sympathy.

The richer one's experience is, the more associations does he have. *Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur*. Instinct and habit, heredity and environment, temperament and experience, nature and nurture, innate ability and education—all of these influences will determine the character of one's taste, the ability to grasp the subtleties of an art. A person who has accustomed himself to the best in art will derive from his experience a refined, correct, fastidious, discriminating taste. Furthermore his will be a keener satisfaction. In the words of Scholes, "If you cheer the classics they will cheer you."

Such are the subjective or psychological elements of beauty. There are however objective factors as well as subjective conditions in æsthetic experience. The subjective is the effect of the objective. The ancient Greeks treated beauty as purely as objective quality of things. The majority of modern thinkers go to the other extreme and lay undue emphasis upon the subjective. *In medio stat veritas*. Between Scylla and Charybdis we must go. There is an element of truth in the axiom: "*De gustibus non est disputandum*"; but there are some objects which the wisdom of the ages declares beautiful, and after all, human nature is the

same the world over and always. Hence there are standards.

THE NATURE OF BEAUTY: OBJECTIVE FACTORS. These standards have been formulated by St. Thomas in his description of the objective factors in the beautiful. They are: (1) clarity or splendor; (2) integrity or perfection; and (3) harmony or proportion.

A painting may have integrity and harmony but if it hangs in a dark corner or lacks luster and *éclat* in any way it is not beautiful. It is equally obvious that a part of an object or an incomplete (or immature) entity is not properly deserving of the epithet beautiful. The third characteristic is the most important of all. By harmony and proportion we mean order, concord, rhythm, balance, symmetry and unity in variety. Mere variety or multitude without unity results in chaos. On the other hand monotony prevails when variety is lacking. A row of tenement houses is an example of the second case, while the accumulated materials for the building of a cathedral will illustrate the first. In music, drama and poetry this unity in variety is perhaps even more striking than in the other arts, one subject or theme pervading and dominating the entire composition.

Not only internal order but also harmony



and concord between the object itself and the knowing subject is implied in the above requirements. Certain patterns and lines and colors are beautiful because they accord nicely with the field and organ of vision. Certain sounds have a frequency that pleases the ear, and so forth.

BEAUTY AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL ATTRIBUTES. The description of beauty by St. Thomas as that whose contemplation affords pleasure gives some insight into the relation of beauty to goodness and to truth. The element of pleasure associates it with the good while the fact that it is an object of perception makes it akin to truth. Goodness and truth are transcendental attributes of being. All things, in other words, are good and true. Hence whatever is beautiful is good and true since everything is good and true, but the converse is not so. To call beauty transcendental is to do violence to human experience rather than to explain it. Neither is the beautiful coextensive with logical truth in spite of their identification by Keats, for fiction is often beautiful and simple arithmetical truths need not have any charm.

As to the relation of beauty and goodness, what was said above about the æsthetic attitude will aid in distinguishing between them.

Common table food is good but not lovely. The beautiful is agreeable and pleasing but it is not merely that, nor is everything beautiful that gives pleasure. As for moral goodness, it implies a certain obligation that we do not find attached to beauty.

Beauty and utility are likewise distinct. Most urban residents resent filling-stations in their neighborhood on æsthetic grounds. Tools and utensils generally are useful but not beautiful. On the other hand, poems and paintings are seldom useful. Cathedrals and houses are often both useful and beautiful. Likewise man chooses his raiment with an eye to both beauty and to utility.

Inasmuch as truth affects the intelligence, and good stimulates both intellect and will, while beauty moves these two and sensibility as well, we may regard it as superior to either the true or the good, taken separately, and as a combination of the two. Admiration implies both knowledge and appetite. Thus J. S. Mackenzie<sup>2</sup> holds it to be the supreme value.

THE ÆSTHETIC CATEGORIES. The term beauty has a generic as well as a specific meaning. Taken broadly it embraces the sublime, the pretty, the graceful, the tragic, the comic, the characteristic, the grotesque and all that

<sup>2</sup> Muirhead, *Contemporary British Philosophy*.

is artistically effective. It is treated in its narrow sense above. Sortais lists the pretty, the beautiful, and the sublime, on the one hand, and the ridiculous, the ugly and the horrible, on the other hand, as ascending degrees of order and disorder respectively. This is perhaps the most satisfactory formula available.

THE PRETTY, then, is the beautiful on a small scale, a diminutive beauty or beauty in miniature, as a child or a rosebud. A young girl may be pretty or charming but beauty implies maturity.

THE SUBLIME is the beautiful of unmeasured greatness. Its special characteristic, according to Bradley, is its boundless transcendence, its excessive, overwhelming greatness or infinity. This greatness may be static (immensity) or dynamic (omnipotence). In the apprehension of sublimity there are two phases: the negative sense of being shocked, stupefied, awe-stricken, baffled, and the positive process of self-expansion and uplifting. The somatic resonance that accompanies this emotion, Ladd describes as "uplifting of the eyes, an upheaving of the chest, a deeper inspiration and a quicker circulation." Burke held the distinctive characteristic of the sublime to be its basis on fear, but this seems nearer to the terrible. Kant regarded

"the starry skies above and the moral law within" as sublime. We may also locate in this category the angelic nature, martyrdom, Niagara Falls, interstellar space, a storm at sea or the philosophy of Plato.

THE UGLY, HORRID, HORRIBLE. These are rather the contraries than the contradictories of the beautiful and the sublime. They consist in varying degrees of disorder, disproportion and distortion. A homely face, a monster, dire poverty, insanity, an atrocious crime, a vile disease, a perversion of nature, a pile of débris, or anything broken, rotten, ruined, or deformed is disgusting, repulsive and revolting. Here also we locate the putrid, foul, vile, and sordid.

It should be noted here that modern art (for instance some of the work of Sandburg) does not hesitate to exploit the grotesque or the so-called "characteristic" although these are far from beautiful in the narrow sense of that term.

THE CHARACTERISTIC is the distinctive, the typical or the essential, the significant or the expressive. Some suggestion of its meaning may be derived from Max Beerbohm's definition of caricature as the "exaggeration of a thing's peculiarities at its most characteristic moment." Thus for an actress, playing the rôle of a child, to stick out her tongue is not a

very beautiful action but it may be none the less artistic.

To say that the characteristic is an æsthetic category is simply to say that the ugly is susceptible of artistic treatment. Thus modern music (not jazz) includes discords, and modern painting, poetry, sculpture and even architecture (in the forms of cubism, futurism and the like) handle the fantastic, eccentric, bizarre, barbaric, distorted, incongruous and absurd.

THE LUDICROUS is one æsthetic category whose contents are difficult to determine. What does it mean to be ridiculous, amusing, funny? What is the essence of comedy? What are wit and humor? What is the nature of laughter? "Risibilitas" is exclusively a property of the human species and many thinkers have striven to solve the problem of its character and purpose. Meredith in his *Idea of Comedy* presents a scholarly study of this question. Bergson, too, attempted it. He regarded laughter as a social discipline. McDougall claims that laughter is the antidote to sympathy—we laugh lest we cry, as it were. Similarly comedy has been described as viewing life intellectually whereas tragedy implies taking things emotionally. The Aristotelian idea of tragedy was that it treated grave and serious themes, while comedy handled less lofty topics. Nowadays we classify

as comedies those of Shakespeare's plays that have a happy ending.

The essence of a joke is often the element of unexpectedness, suddenness, or novelty that is in it. The slightly incongruous is always laughable. Exaggeration seems to be the device employed most often by Stephen Leacock. Hobbes conceives the humorous in terms of sudden self-glorification at the expense of others. This theory explains some but not all forms of laughter. Again, release from restraint or relief after tension explains much of the comic effect. It will be seen that there is an element of truth in all of these theories of comedy and laughter but no single one of them seems to be adequate. It is no easy matter to determine the distinctive character of the antics and capers of a Charles Chaplin or to discover the secret formula of a Mark Twain.

THE NATURE OF THE TRAGIC is perhaps too big a problem to attempt in a treatise of this sort. It involves a study of the theory of drama with an analysis of the features of purgation, conflict, fear, pity, and fate. We can do no better than refer the reader to the excellent works of Archer, Clarke, Murray, Matthews, Baker, Hamilton, Chendy and Freytag.

Among the less important æsthetic categories we must at least mention the graceful which is



the beautiful in motion; it pertains especially to deportment, poise, carriage or bearing and signalizes the absence of clumsiness, embarrassment or self-consciousness. Gracefulness implies ease of manner and suppleness of movement. Thus we speak of a good dancer as being graceful.

ART DEFINED.<sup>3</sup> Art is opposed for various reasons to science, to industry and to nature. It is usually said to be related to science as practice is related to theory but this distinction seems to ignore the existence of practical, normative, or applied science. The point is that art may be viewed subjectively or objectively. The definitions<sup>4</sup> of Turner, Mercier, Dubray, Creighton, Croce and St. Thomas treat art as an internal subjective thing and do not adequately differentiate it from practical science which also is distinct from pure, speculative or theoretical science. Art is more than a system of rules.

Aristotle, Genung, Raymond, Lortie, and Tolstoi define art in a more acceptable objec-

<sup>3</sup> The reader should consult the books of synonyms by Crabbe, Soule, Roget and Fernald for study of the proper meanings to be attached to the following: the lovely, the fair, the charming, the fascinating, the attractive, the gracious, the beauteous, the handsome, the picturesque, the idyllic, the comely, good-looking, cute, nice, grand, majestic, pulchritudinous, magnificent, fine, splendid.

<sup>4</sup> Turner, *Lessons In Logic*; Mercier, *Logique*; Dubray, *Introductory Philosophy*; Genung, *Elements of Rhetoric*; Lortie, *Elementa Philosophiæ Christianæ*.

tive way. For Aristotle it is "science employed in production." For Genung it is "knowledge made efficient by skill." Raymond terms it "nature made human"; Lortie calls it the expression of beauty; and Tolstoi understands it to be the deliberate communication of infectious feeling. In Webster's dictionary we have skill, dexterity, adroitness and ingenuity given as equivalents. Raymond also suggests method and design as synonymous with art in its simplest sense.

Art is opposed to industry and the artist to the artisan or craftsman in that whereas the goal of the former is beauty that of the latter is utility. They are the two branches of human transitive activity or behavior. Art is related to nature as its imitation. However by imitation should be meant a representation, revelation, or interpretation, and not a photographic copying. Hence when we oppose the artificial to the natural we should remember "all things are artificial for nature is the art of God."

**THE ART-PROCESS.** The production of beauty involves two stages called respectively conception or design, and production, execution or technique. They are also referred to as vision and presentation, impression and expression, idealization and realization, intuition and externalization. The artist forms an ideal by

selecting phases of his æsthetic experience and by assembling and perfecting them. He then registers his impression outwardly or renders his ideal objective as it were, by clothing it in sensible form, by fixing it on canvas, embodying it in marble or crystallizing it in words.

This work of creation frequently involves a considerable amount of repetition, the one motif or theme being handled in various ways. Again as Gilbert Murray has it "the artist is there to select, to emphasize—even to falsify."

**THE ART-OBJECT.** Analysis of a thing of beauty reveals a twofold aspect commonly called matter and form. The matter is the idea, substance, content, meaning, argument, significance, thought, subject, theme or invention. The form is the manner, medium, style, symbol, mechanism or sensible expression. The former is the *what*, the latter is the *how*. Thus patriotism might be the subject of a poem, a statue or a musical composition. Here the matter would be the same but the medium or form would differ.

Of course the subject or title of a poem may be some general conception, as in the example above, while the poem might express but one concrete instance of patriotism. Thus there would be a distinction between the subject and the real substance of the poem.

In his book on *Form and Style in Poetry*, Ker points out three meanings of the term "form." It may mean the type of poetry such as lyric, epic or dramatic. Secondly it may mean the verse pattern, the metrical mold or mechanical frame as opposed to the prose argument or content or matter. Thirdly it may mean the whole poem, including the content, as a particular mode of expression or way of rendering the expression in question. In this last sense poetry may be said to be all form.

ART AND MORALITY. The relation of ethics to æsthetics is a keen problem. It may be formulated as an interrogation. Can literary composition, a play, a painting, or a dance, have true artistic excellence and remain immoral? Those who reply in the negative do not mean that "the theatre is a pulpit rather than a mirror." It is one thing to refrain from vice, it is quite another thing to become a missionary.

Some people who live "the Bohemian life" talk and act as though the artist's smock exempted them from the moral law. They seem to forget that no man can claim two consciences. The moral law applies to all human acts, and artistic endeavors are no exception. Art and morals are distinct of course, aiming, as they do, at two different goals, beauty and

goodness, but art after all is subordinate to morality.

It should be remembered too that the immoral is the disorderly, representing in this case, the conflict of the sensuous with the spiritual, the animal with the angelic, and of course where there is disorder, there is no beauty. It follows then that art which really clashes with virtue is but pseudo-art. Accordingly censorship is justified, at least in principle.

Since art is neither foreign nor superior to morality and unable to claim independence of the latter, even though it be distinct therefrom, the motto *art for art's sake* must not be interpreted as meaning "the emancipation of the artist from the bonds of morality." For these bonds have a universal scope. Art does not justify and sanctify everything.

When we say that art should respect morals and not injure them we do not mean that it should be content with a respectful neutrality. There is no medium between injuring and aiding. Art should serve morality, for its end, like all other ends, is a means to the ultimate end. Hence art should give positive aid directly or indirectly by perfecting human nature through contact with genuine beauty.

Art can produce good moral effects by detaching the soul from selfish preoccupations and

by elevating it through the communication to it of noble sentiments and lofty ideals. To admire is almost to imitate, writes Sortais,<sup>5</sup> who adds that art lifts us from the spectacle of created beauties to the source of all beauty, the supreme ideal, the ineffable, God. The novelist, the playwright and the composer have unlimited opportunities for the promotion of virtue.

**SCHOOLS OF ART.** Idealism, Realism, Romanticism and Classicism might perhaps be better described as tendencies, points of view, attitudes or movements than as schools. Idealism advocates the treatment of only lofty, noble and spiritual themes and the exclusion of the ugly. Realism on the other hand exploits the crude and rude, and preaches fidelity to nature to the extent of photographic copying of even its sordid aspects. Naturalism is an extreme form of realism which suppresses the spiritual and deals with the sensuous and obscene.

Romanticism sometimes means the handling of sentimental and imaginative material. In this sense it is akin to Idealism. Strictly, it signifies freedom and revolt as opposed to the tradition, convention and restraint of classicism. By classical we usually mean something that is excellent, standard, first-class, authori-

<sup>5</sup> *Manuel de Philosophie.*



tative and immortal. In an opprobrious sense classical means stilted, pedantic, stiff, cold, artificial and rigid. Classicism implies obedience to rules, standards, principles and canons. It is sometimes spoken of as emphasizing form whereas Romanticism emphasizes matter.

CRITICISM. By criticism we mean expert evaluation or judicious appraisal. The critic must ask of a piece of literary art, for instance, whether it meets the requirements of grammatical correctness, of rhetorical adaptation, of logical probability and of moral propriety. Has it unity? Is it interesting? What has the artist tried to do and how well has he done it? These are some of the functions of criticism.

The competent critic or reviewer will inquire as to whether the matter is true, well chosen and worth while; whether the form is pleasing and in conformity with the laws of art; whether its spirit is sincere, attractive, and touched with fine feeling and wholesomeness. He will compare its qualities and features with those of works that have stood the test of time. Will it afford lasting pleasure to the majority of educated people? Is it inspiring or degrading? How should it be classified? Is it convincing, natural, and true to life?

We often forget that criticism is nothing more than judicious appreciation. Nor should

adverse judgments be identified with destructive criticism. As Eric Blom points out in his *Limitations of Music*, "to discover the good (merits) one must distinguish it from the bad (defects). . . . The higher the critic's ideals and the more intent he is on perfection the more will he find fault. Seeing only perfection and impeccability in the beloved is contrary to common sense . . . and of course the critic is fallible."

There has been much criticism of criticism, and Pope and Byron have often been quoted in this connection. The critic is no parasite. He is simply applying the principles and standards of æsthetics to concrete cases.

There are two schools of criticism, the impressionistic or modern or romantic and the scientific or classical. The former holds the function of criticism to be merely the report of one's personal reactions and the description of one's experience and enjoyment. The latter view advocates the method of (more or less) dogmatic judgment and explanation. It aims to interpret as well as to appreciate. It has its code and its criteria or standards. It seeks additional light in the psychological origin or biography of the artist and in the historical setting of him or his work. The new criticism, as formulated by Spingarn, vainly attempts to get along without the use of standards, principles

or formulæ which are termed rubber-stamps and labels.

**THE ARTS CLASSIFIED AND EVALUATED.** The fine arts must be distinguished from the liberal arts or sciences and the mechanical arts or crafts. Beauty, truth and utility are their respective goals. The principal or major fine arts are seven: poetry, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, acting and dancing. Besides these there are auxiliary or minor arts, such as ceramics, jewelry, gardening, interior decorating, et cetera. The arts are also classified as vocal, manual, visual, plastic, space-time, auditory, phonetic, of motion, of repose, imitative, and creative.

In Longfellow's *Michael Angelo* the old master is represented as preferring architecture to sculpture and the latter to painting. The criterion he seems to employ is that of proximity to nature. Accordingly painting is for him "a shadow merely." Sortais, on the other hand, ranking the arts on the basis of their capacity of expression, places poetry first, music second, painting third, and architecture last.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF ART.** The artistic impulse has been defined in terms of both the instinct for imitation and that of self-expression. It has been suggested too that man in-

vented letters to escape mortality. Poe called the poetic principle the human aspiration for supernal beauty, and some hold that man has an æsthetic instinct or innate love of beauty. At all events, after man has taken care of the necessities of life he becomes interested in its luxuries. Hence he takes to ornament and decoration and adornment and ceremony. Schiller and Spencer claim that art arises from man's play-instinct, and serves as a release or safety-valve for surplus energy. Historically considered, much of art took its origin from religion.

### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Art in relation to culture, to civilization, nature, industry, science.
2. Beauty: is it objective or subjective?
3. Keats on the identity of beauty and truth.
4. Cram on the substance of Gothic.
5. The Wisdom of the ages on personal beauty.
6. Florence and Athens; Beethoven and Shakespeare; Da Vinci and Michelangelo.
7. The essence of poetry; the forms of music.
8. The history of painting. Rodin and Phidias.
9. Poetry, prose, verse; melody, harmony, counterpoint; music, sound, noise.

### SUGGESTED READINGS

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BABBITT, IRVING—*The New Laokoön*.  
GORDON, KATE—*Æsthetics*.  
LANFELD, H.—*The Æsthetic Attitude*.

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- MARSHALL, HENRY—*The Beautiful*.  
PUFFER, ETHEL—*The Psychology of Beauty*.  
KNIGHT—*The Philosophy of the Beautiful*.  
PARKER—*The Principles of Æsthetics*.  
DEWULF—*L'Oeuvre d'art et beauté*.  
RAYMOND—*The Essentials of Æsthetics. Art in Theory*.  
FLACCUS—*The Spirit and Substance of Art*.  
CROCE—*Æsthetic*.  
CARRITT—*The Theory of Beauty*.  
RUSKIN—*Modern Painters. Stones of Venice. Seven Lamps of Architecture*.  
ARISTOTLE—*Poetics*.  
SANTAYANA—*The Sense of Beauty*.  
SHELLEY—*Defense of Poetry*.  
PATER—*Appreciations*.  
BRADLEY—*Oxford Lectures on Poetry*.  
MURRAY—*Classical Tradition in Poetry*.  
SCOTT—*The Making of Literature*.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE CATEGORIES OF BEING

NATURE AND NECESSITY OF THE CATEGORIES. Philosophy, as has been said, is the science or knowledge of all things through their ultimate causes. While this does not mean that philosophy pretends to discover the whole truth about everything, it does mean that no reality is excluded from the field of philosophical investigation, and that, so far as its viewpoint permits, philosophy must have something to say about everything. This very universality of scope renders it imperative for the philosopher, if he is to attain clearness and consistency of thought, to reduce the totality of things to certain definite and all-inclusive classes of things. These classes or classifications are known in metaphysics as categories.

In previous chapters Being and certain of its attributes have been considered as transcendental. It was shown that whatever is is Being, and that all Being is one and true and good. Being, unity, truth, goodness cannot be confined to any particular class or group of things.



They defy the limitations of genera and species. They go beyond or transcend all genera and species. But the categories cannot so defy limitation. They are in fact constituted precisely by limiting in various ways the *extension* of the transcendental concept of real Being. In other words, they are the broadest, most inclusive, classes or genera of reality that the mind is able to discover. This limitation aids us in rightly interpreting the nature of reality, and in answering the question: "What are the various modes which characterize real Being?"

ARISTOTLE'S DIVISION. If, as Aristotle tells us, philosophy begins with intelligent curiosity about things, then the philosophical attitude is a questioning attitude. The number of different kinds of questions one can ask about anything is limited. When one asks a question he seeks information about some aspect or other of reality. There will therefore be as many modes of real being, as many categories, as there are possible *different kinds* of questions about reality. According to Aristotle only ten such questions are possible. One can ask about a being, say Socrates: (1) What is he? (2) How much is there of him? (3) What sort of a man is he? (4) How is he related to other beings? (5) How is he clothed (*i.e.*, modified

by some external adornment)? (6) Where is he? (7) At what time is he here or there? (8) What is he doing? (9) What is being done to him? (10) What is his posture? <sup>1</sup> Answers to these questions set reality before the mind respectively in its substantial and accidental modes. They reveal Being first of all as substance, and then this substance as affected by quantity, quality, relation, habit, time, place, action, passion and posture. In other words, there is no reality which cannot be put in one or the other of these ten categories. There is no predicate of any proposition which does not, directly or by way of reduction, fall into one of these ten classes of Being. All knowledge about reality, therefore, has for its object either the substance of the thing itself, or its quantity or quality, or its relations to other things, or its external adornment, or its temporal or spatial or attitudinal aspects. Every science will necessarily occupy itself with one or more of these aspects or modes of reality. Thus metaphysics investigates reality (primarily substance) as such; mathematics, reality as quantitative; physics, reality as active, or subject to physical change; ethics, reality as active, or subject to moral change, and similarly for the other sciences.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ross, *Aristotle: Selections*, p. 1ff.; also *Metaphysics*, VI. 2, 1026a.

COMPLETENESS OF THIS DIVISION. The question is sometimes raised, Are these Aristotelian categories exhaustive? Might there not be more of them, more modes or attributes of real being than those enumerated? The search for modes of Being which could not be placed in one or other of these categories would, no doubt, be fascinating. But we hazard the prediction that, aside from certain attributes of the Divine Being, or certain logical relations, none could be found. It must be remembered that Aristotle is speaking only of the modes of real, substantial, contingent Being, and not of mere logical Being nor of the Infinite Being. But even so, it will be found that these also can be reduced or analogically referred to one or the other of the categories of real Being.

THE KANTIAN CATEGORIES. All systems of philosophic thought are, in varying degrees of completeness, either realistic or idealistic. Obviously, the categories of the one cannot be the same as those of the other system. Now to Kant goes the distinction—if such it be—of having founded modern idealism. It will be instructive therefore to compare briefly his categories with those of the realist, Aristotle.

It would take us too far afield if we attempted here to give a full account of Kant's

categories.\* For it would involve an explanation of his whole theory of knowledge. Here it need only be recalled that one of his primary postulates is that the necessary element in all knowledge is *a priori*, i.e., a natural, congenital endowment of the mind, in the mind prior to and independently of all experience. Thus, while Aristotle bases his division of the categories upon an analysis of Being, Kant bases it on an analysis of thought. Thinking, according to Kant, is tantamount to Judgment, affirming relations between subject and predicate, and that independently of their "empirical and intentional content." Now in his view all thinking resolves itself into judgments of quantity, quality, relation and modality. These are possible because the mind is endowed with the categories or *a priori* forms (1) of unity, plurality and totality, (2) of reality, negation and limitation, (3) of subsistence and inherence, causality and dependence, reciprocity, (4) of possibility-impossibility, existence—non-existence, necessity-contingency.\*

Thus what one is able to say of reality is not determined by his experimental knowledge of real being, but because of the innate and *a priori* forms of the mind. One can say, e.g.,

\* Cf., *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 34ff. (Max Müller's translation).

\* Cf. Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 530ff.

Some men are wise, not because he has come by the knowledge of plurality through experience, but because his mind, prior to and independently of experience, was endowed with the *a priori* form or category of plurality. And similarly with regard to other forms of judgment.

The objection to this method of constructing a system of categories is at bottom the basic objection to idealistic philosophy itself, *i.e.*, the assumption—for it is such—that the mind is congenitally endowed with these *a priori* forms or necessary elements in knowledge. The realist not only rightly disclaims any consciousness of such forms, but also maintains that the necessary element in knowledge is drawn from the data of his experience. In other words the element of necessity in the subject-predicate relation is not one *contributed* by the mind from any native treasury of so-called forms, but rather *discovered* by the mind in the act of apprehending the real objective order of things.

THE UTILITY OF THE CATEGORIES. The usefulness to the philosopher of a table of categories must be evident to anyone who reflects upon the aim and scope of philosophy and the processes of knowledge itself. To know means mentally to apprehend and rightly to interpret reality. Error in either stage of the process easily arises from a failure to distinguish in the



object of knowledge modes of being not identical with one another. Failure, *e.g.*, to distinguish between substance and accident throws one directly into the confusion and relativity of phenomenalism, or worse still, if the psychological aspects of phenomena be not distinguished from the physical, into subjectivism of the most individual type. In short, since the task of the philosopher, as also of the scientist, though in lesser degree, is to comprehend the well-nigh infinite manifold of sense, reduction of this manifold of sense to certain fundamental but all-inclusive categories is an indispensable element of success. But in this work any excess is fatal. As the unbridled urge for unification leads one into the paralysis of monism, so the unrestrained digging for distinctions leads to the suicide of sophistry.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Why does the mind spontaneously seek to unify its cognitions?
2. To know something about everything is to know little about anything. But philosophy seeks an understanding of the sum-total of things. Therefore philosophical knowledge is bound to be superficial.
3. The work of classification should follow upon a knowledge of things, not precede it. The Philosopher needs the classification at the beginning of his work.
4. A category is a thing of the mind.



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FALCKENBERG—*History of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 341-  
383.

## CHAPTER X

### SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT

DEFINITION, DISTINCTION AND COMPARISON. By substance is understood reality which exists in itself. Accident means reality that inheres in another. It is not difficult to distinguish between a thing and its properties, attributes, characteristics, qualities or accidents; between reality and appearance, as it were, or between noumenon and phenomenon. Gold, silver, coal, iron and wood are substances, as also are human souls, angels and God. These things exist in themselves. Shape, color, size, position and movement, however, exist in things or substances. Hence we call them, after Aristotle, accidents. As Saint Thomas has it, accidents are not so much beings as belongings thereof.<sup>1</sup>

The nearest to an equivalent for substance in non-technical language is perhaps the term stuff, and, in the vocabulary of metaphysics, essence, nature, quiddity and constitution are synonymous with it. They are names for the same thing as viewed in different relationships. Thus as opposed to accidents we call it sub-

<sup>1</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I-II<sup>a</sup>, q. LV. a. 4. ad 1<sup>m</sup>.

stance, as the recipient of existence we name it essence, and as a principle of activity we call it nature. The term quiddity, meaning *whatness*, indicates the specific character of essence or nature.

**ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF SUBSTANCE.** Substance should not be understood as the core or kernel of a thing about which the accidents are wrapped. Nor should its etymological definition as "that which stands under" be accepted literally, for substance is not a platform or a support in any local or spatial sense. As a matter of fact we might better describe it as that which undergoes or endures or is subject to this and that modification or determination or accidental change. Just as the states of matter (solid, liquid, gaseous) are distinct from matter itself, so are the modes of being (accidents) distinct from being itself (substance). That the definition of substance as a support for accidents is inadequate is obvious when one considers that the Divine substance has no accidents.

Again, although it is relatively permanent as compared with accidents, permanence is not its essence. If we suppose a being annihilated one instant after its creation, its substance would be no more permanent than its accidents, and still they would be distinct. Finally, substance

is no mere quality-complex or collection of phenomena or sum-total of states or aggregate of processes, for no addition of accidents will ever make a substance.

We may here consider two ambiguous definitions of substance. Descartes defined substance as "that which so exists that it requires nothing else for its existence." He thus unintentionally excluded an efficient cause. Spinoza took him at his word, and perceiving that only the deity enjoyed such independence declared substance to be identical with God, and built his Pantheism around the notion of substance.<sup>a</sup> Likewise unacceptable is the definition of substance by Leibnitz as "being endowed with the power of acting."<sup>b</sup> The enumeration of a being's possessions or endowments does not tell what it is. Moreover, neither action nor the power thereof is substantial.

HOW SUBSTANCE IS KNOWN. The knowableness of substance is easier to deny than its existence. It is likewise harder to explain. Substance is not perceived, but conceived. It is an object of intellect. It lies beyond the scope of the senses. It is metaphysical and supra-sensible. It is sensible only *per accidens*. The senses are too crude to detect it directly. But

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Falckenberg, *Hist. of Mod. Phil.*, p. 119ff.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*, 269ff.

if one accept the axiom, "*nihil in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu*," how can the intellect apprehend substance when its sole contact with reality is through the medium of the senses? The notion of substance is derived by abstraction from the percept or image of a sensible concrete object. The intellect has no direct, innate intuitive insight into the nature of substance, but its existence as that which stands of itself and serves as a support for accidents is conceived spontaneously.

Those who call substance an unknown and unknowable substratum seem to ignore the fact that

to have the idea of substance it is enough to know that there can be no modification without a subject modified. Now the idea of this subject is the idea of substance. . . . It is true that if you strip this subject of its modifications, of its properties, of its effects, you have only the  $x$  remaining; but even then you still have the idea of it, you know the relation which this  $x$  has with its perceived modifications. Such is the knowledge which we have of substance considered in the abstract; nor have we a right to require more, since there is enough in that knowledge to give us the idea in question.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Rosmini, *The Origin of Ideas*, apud Rickaby, *General Metaphysics*, p. 233.

Our knowledge of the specific nature of substance is discursive. We assume that the accidents reveal and do not conceal their underlying basis. We base our inferences upon the principle, "*operatio sequitur esse.*"

PHENOMENALISM'S DENIAL OF SUBSTANCE. David Hume brought the trend of subjectivism, initiated by Descartes and developed by Locke and Berkeley, to its logical culmination. Descartes and Locke had denied the objectivity of the secondary qualities or proper sensibles (color, sound, etc.). Berkeley applied the same line of reasoning to the primary qualities or common sensibles (mass, motion, etc.), and even refused to accept as real, material substance itself. Hume dismissed mind or spiritual substance with equal readiness and left only phenomena—hence the term phenomenalism.

Of course any epistemologist who refuses to acknowledge conceptual as distinct from and superior to perceptual knowledge, or who holds that mind knows nothing other than its own states has no place in his system of thought for the idea of substance. Hence for Empiricists, Sensists, Positivists, Phenomenalists and Agnostics (these terms being practically synonymous) substance does not exist. Accordingly traditional metaphysics collapses, for in



it the notion of substance is central and fundamental. It follows that in this view empirical science covers the field of knowledge exhaustively and needs no philosophical complement.

PROOF OF THE REAL EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANCE. In the first place it would seem that the necessity of the noun or substantive as an essential part of speech in every language is significant. Obviously what we cannot dispense with in words is a necessary requirement of the thought which the words express. No sentence, proposition or judgment is integral without a subject and this latter is roughly equivalent to substance. This is not so much an argument as a consideration that cannot be denied and must not be overlooked.

The *a priori* argument for the reality of substance is indeed apodictic. It may be formulated as follows: Whatever exists does so either in itself or in something else. If it exists in itself it is a substance. If it inheres in another that other must exist in itself or in something else. Regress *ad infinitum* being absurd, it follows that substance exists.

Common sense tells us that there can be no action without an agent acting, no movement without a thing moving, and that any description of mind or matter solely in terms of their

activities, functions, or processes is patently inadequate.

Within ourselves we are conscious of an abiding something that endures and perseveres throughout the fluctuations and vicissitudes of life. The stream of consciousness may be interrupted by sleep or anæsthesia but personal identity continues. As self-consciousness assures us, I am the same person that I was twenty years ago, though all of my accidents have been changed many times in the interim, and even the material part of my substance has been entirely (though gradually) changed every few years. In like manner can one observe, in the things that environ him, a part of their being that persists while the accidents change. Thus I can change the quantity, the shape, the temperature, the color, the motion, the position and the location of a stick of wood without affecting it substantially.

It is for these reasons that the Scholastic, steeped in the Aristotelian tradition, rejects the Dynamistic version of the nature of matter and the Phenomenist's conception of the structure of mind. To have force is not to be a force and the mind or soul is something more than the sum-total of conscious processes. How can there be mental states which are not states of something or psychic activities when there is nothing acting?

KINDS OF SUBSTANCE. Substances are material or spiritual, simple or composite, complete or incomplete, and individual or universal. God, angels, demons and human souls are spiritual or immaterial substances. Men, animals, plants and minerals are material substances, corporeal objects, physical things, or bodies. Besides the thousands of forms or kinds of animals and plants, there are ninety chemical elements, thousands of compounds and thousands of mixtures. Material substances are characterized superficially by their fundamental property of quantity with the consequent spatial and temporal conditions and limitations which it imposes. Spiritual substances are known by us only in a mediate and indirect way.

Even the so-called elements of chemistry are composite metaphysically for they are compounded of matter and form. On the other hand, souls and angels and God are simple essences, having no parts. All bodies are compound essences.

By an incomplete substance is meant one that exists in itself but which in its natural condition, is a partner or complement or coefficient of another similar substance with which it unites to form a substantial unit. Thus matter and form, or body and soul, are two incomplete

substances that unite to form one complete substance, man.

The universal or second substance is the abstract essence or specific nature of a thing, such as man. The individual or first substance is the real concrete being, John Jones. The former is, of course, purely mental though it has a basis in reality.

NATURE OF ACCIDENTS. As stated above, an accident is that which exists in something else or which inheres in a subject. By no means should the relation of accident to substance be construed as that of the contents to their container. It should be noted, too, that an accident may inhere in another accident which in turn exists in substance. Thus habits are usually modifications of faculties. The accident-substance relationship is but another case of the act-potency scheme of reality. The accident is a determination of substance and stands in relation to it as percept to concept or as science to philosophy.

CLASSES OF ACCIDENTS. Accidents are absolute or modal, intrinsic or extrinsic, common or proper, and separable or inseparable.

An *absolute* accident is one that directly affects substance and that confers some new reality upon the substance in which it inheres,

*e.g.*, quantity, heat, vital activities, knowledge, color, energy. *Modal* accidents are ways in which absolute accidents affect substance and do not contribute any real addition to substance, *e.g.*, motion, rest, shape.

Both absolute and modal accidents are *intrinsic* to substance. There are other *extrinsic* denominations (to use Coffey's phrase) such as posture, location and time.

Another basis of division provides a classification of accidents into *proper*, or those which flow necessarily from the very nature of a thing, *e.g.*, intellect and will in man; and *common*, or those which just happen to belong to a substance. Of these latter some are inseparable, like the blackness of a negro, while others are separable, *e.g.*, actions, states, habits, shape, location, color, temperature.

CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS. The efficient cause of proper accidents is the cause of the substance to which they belong while that of common accidents is whatever natural agency or force causes the accidental change in question. The substance in which they inhere is the final cause of accidents and the material cause, in the sense of a subject of inhesion. Accidents have no formal cause. They are formal causes.

THE BLESSED EUCHARIST. The medieval Scholastics were theologians as well as philoso-

phers. They strove to show the reasonableness of their faith. Accordingly, they clearly stipulated, in this connection, that it is not repugnant for absolute accidents to exist without their subject, in virtue of the divine omnipotence. The accidents of course retain their natural aptitude to inhere in substance. Thus according to Catholic dogma we have in the Eucharist, "the body and blood, soul and divinity of Jesus Christ under the appearances of bread and wine." These appearances or species or accidents do not inhere in the divine substance, but this "substance" acquires location by reason of its relation to the accidents.

REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE AND PROPERTIES. The faculty theory was criticized by John Locke who maintained that it was no explanation to say that behind every action is a power of action.<sup>5</sup> He did not seem to know that the Scholastics posit a faculty for every species of activity and not for every individual function.<sup>6</sup> Thus the locomotive faculty discharges our walking and our dancing, while our intellect does our thinking, conceiving, judging and reasoning. Furthermore, a faculty is not a part of the mind, but simply a latent capacity

<sup>5</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Moore, *The General Factor in Intelligence*, Proceedings of Fifth Annual Meeting of the Am. Cath. Phil. Assn., p. 26.



or dormant ability. Unless we admit such things we must conceive the mind as exercising all of its functions constantly. Experience however testifies that this is contrary to fact. For the following reasons we hold that there is a real distinction between the mind and its faculties. (1) A thing cannot be identical with a variety of things that are distinct from one another, as the faculties are from their different objects. (2) The faculties are interdependent; but a thing cannot depend upon itself. (3) If the various powers of mind were identical with one another, the mind could elicit them all simultaneously, but as a matter of fact they interfere with and impede one another. (4) Finally, act and potency essentially related to it belong to the same supreme genus. If one be substance, the other must be essential too. Now existence, which actuates essence, and action, which actuates faculty, are distinct. Therefore action which is an accident is the actualization of something which is distinct from nature or essence.

#### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Need substance (even material) be understood, as it seems to be popularly conceived, as something solid?
2. Discuss Dean Inge's definition of soul-substance as "a permanent unit as a subject of experience."

3. What is the meaning of the statement: "Psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, and finally lost consciousness altogether"?
4. Compare the terms of soul, mind, brain, intellect, entelechy, vital principle, psyche, spirit.
5. Contrast the notion of immortality with that of the indestructibility of matter.
6. What is to be thought of Bertrand Russell's idea that matter and spirit are both derived from a neutral stuff or *tertium quid*? Is the Scholastic opinion not midway between his stand and that of Descartes?
7. Discuss: "I am not thought; I am not action; I am not feeling. I am something that thinks and acts and suffers" (Reid).
8. Why was the hypothesis of the ether invented?
9. What theory is held by de Broglie, the winner of the 1929 Nobel Prize in physics?
10. Are the electron, proton, event, quantum, and ion, substances?
11. What is meant by substantializing accidents?
12. In answer to the objection that there can be no movement without a moving thing, Russell mentions the movement of a musical composition. Discuss.

#### SUGGESTED READINGS

COFFEY—*Ontology*, Ch. VIII.

RICKABY—*General Metaphysics*, Bk. 2, Ch. 1.

MERCIER—*Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy*, Pt. 3, Ch. 1.

URBAN—*The Intelligible World*, pp. 213ff. and 283ff.

BRADLEY—*Appearance and Reality*.

SPAULDING—*The New Rationalism*.

## CHAPTER XI

### PERSONALITY

IN popular parlance personality means character, temperament, disposition, the sum of those perceptible qualities which make up the empirical self or ego. In a technical sense, however, it denotes a metaphysical entity. A person is a complete individual, and personality is that perfection by reason of which he attains to the completeness of individuality. It is that by which a human being becomes subsistent as an individual. It is understood as something substantial, rather than as a collection of external characteristics. What subsistence, or the power to exist by itself, is to non-rational things, that personality is to rational beings.

The term person is probably derived from the Latin *per*, through, and *sonare*, to sound. The name is said to have originally meant the mask worn by the players in the Greek drama. Later it came to designate the actor himself, and finally, any individual, whatever his character. Such also is its present meaning.

In *The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table*,

Holmes distinguishes three personalities in one human being. There are, he says, three Johns: the real John, John's ideal John, and Thomas' ideal John. Similarly, William James says we have as many social selves as we have friends. This social self is what Schopenhauer calls reputation, or how we are regarded by others, and it is interesting to note that he ranks it with property, or what a man has, as inferior to personality, or what a man is.

It is to be noted that when reference is made to dual and multiple personalities it is the empirical self that is understood. The Jekyll and Hyde case in fiction is often duplicated in real life. Saint Paul, in his epistle to the Romans, confessed: "I do not that good which I will; but the evil which I hate, that I do" (Rom. 7-15). The heroic struggle is the conflict between the animal and the angel within us. In a similar vein Ovid wrote: "*Video meliora proboque; deteriora sequor.*" The World War brought to light many cases of amnesia due to cerebral lesions that have been described in terms of double ego and alternating consciousness. Psychic trauma can cause a dissociated or conscious or subconscious stream of mental life to rise to the surface and dominate the ordinary waking consciousness. Such abnormal states are similar to the hypnotic trance and somnambulism.

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY, OR PERSON AND NATURE. The universal as such exists only in the mind, though it has a basis in reality. Only the individual is real. *Man* does not really exist, but men do. Such is the wise teaching of moderate realism. Nor is the question one of merely speculative concern. It has far-reaching implications in economic, political, legal and moral theory and practice.

In the chapter on the transcendental attributes of unity the individual was defined as that which is undivided in itself but divided from all others. Individuality implies incommunicability, distinctiveness, singularity, particularity and speciality. It is not the human creature's lot to be in a class by himself, that is, to be unique. But his unity, such as it is, is instinctively recognized. Consequently our sense of individuality and self-consciousness revolts at monistic pantheism, at Plato's gratuitous universal shadow theory, at the personification of the group-mind and public opinion, and at Butler's notion of a super-person. There is no such thing in the objective world as a rational animal, purely and simply. What actually obtains is a rational animal or a human nature individuated by quantified matter and characterized by individuating notes, idiosyncrasies and peculiarities. Coleridge rightly complains

of the "multitudinous public shaped into personal unity by the magic of abstraction."

Personality adds to individuality, independence, autonomy, and self-possession. Credit, merit, imputability and responsibility belong to an individual as a result of his personality. As we predicate adjectives and verbs of a grammatical or logical subject, so we attribute or ascribe to the real individual whatever actions he performs through this or that power or faculty, various and multiple though these actions and faculties be. Hence the Scholastic axiom: *operationes sunt suppositi*, or *actiones sunt personarum*. We do not amputate and imprison the robber's arm which stole the watch, nor do we cut off the tongue of the perjurer.

PERSONALITY AND SUBSISTENCE. The autonomy and independence which man enjoys as the result of his personality are not peculiar to him. It is true of course that because of his free will he has a further kind or degree of self-possession which entitles him to special terminological consideration. But apart from this power of self-determination, the brute animal, the organic plant and even the inorganic atom are none the less autonomous agents. In their case we use the term subsistence to denote what personality means in the case of man, and in



the concrete the word *suppositum* or *supposit* is the subhuman equivalent of person.

If it were not for our revealed knowledge of the hypostatic union, the distinction between nature and person would probably never have occurred to the Scholastic metaphysicians. The mystery of the Incarnation is the central theme of Christianity. It implies that the redemption of mankind involved the assumption of a human nature by the second person of the Blessed Trinity, the Son of God, the Divine Word. The human nature in our Lord then is not of itself a person. There are in Christ two natures and one person. The Divine personality gets credit, as it were, for what the human nature does.

**PERSON DEFINED.** A person is a complete, individual, rational, autonomous substance or nature. Each of the five terms in this definition is essential and its presence eliminates some being or beings from the category of personality. The various stipulations exclude the following: (1) essential and integral parts, such as the soul alone or the body alone or a finger or the torso are not complete substances, and so are not persons. (2) The abstract (possible) essence or second substance, such as human nature, humanity or manhood, is specific or universal, while the person must be individual. (3) Animals, plants and minerals, being devoid

of intelligence, are merely supposita, not persons. (4) The human nature in the Savior is the sole entity known to be excluded by this requirement. Autonomy then or independence is the quintessence of personality. (5) The last term rejects all conceptions of personality viewed as activities or states or qualities or collections of these latter.

NATURE OR MEANING OF PERSONALITY. The self-sufficiency that is signified by personality does not mean independence of efficient causality. Thus we say that substance exists *in se*, that persons exist *per se*, but that only the infinite and uncaused God exists *a se*. Personality is simply that perfection or substantial mode whereby a complete individual human nature is rendered independent or autonomous.

There are four views as to the ontological character of this perfection. Cardinal Cajetan, the celebrated commentator on Saint Thomas, holds that subsistence is a substantial mode, somewhat like the last point of a line, which unifies the various quidditative elements (specific nature, principle of individuation and accidents) before they are made an entity by a single act of existence. This is perhaps the common view of theologians. Suarez, who does not admit a real distinction between essence and existence, gives to subsistence the same

rôle of crowning unification. Cardinal Billot contends that subsistence and existence (*esse proprium*) are identical, while Duns Scotus, the subtle doctor, maintains that subsistence is merely the negation of any assumption by a higher being, rather than a positive perfection.<sup>1</sup>

THOMISTIC THEORY OF MAN. In the *Summa Theologica* the following sentences occur: "*Ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas naturæ et personæ. . . . Idem ipse homo est qui percipit se intelligere et sentire. . . . Una operatio cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam.*" These propositions form the nucleus of a doctrine of human nature. The human being is a compound substance made up of body and soul. These two incomplete substances unite to form a complete substance, man. The soul is the substantial form of the body from the chemico-physical point of view; it is the vital principle of the organism conceived biologically, and it is the principle of consciousness or mind on the psychological level. Man is thus a microcosm embracing in his being the mineral, the vegetative and the sentient orders. Over and above these levels there are to be found in him the distinctively human powers of intellect and will in the soul or mind which is the principle of being, of specification,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Coffey, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX.

of activity and of finality. The soul is a single, simple, substantial, spiritual and immortal entity.

Some difficulty arises from this conception of man as a twofold substance. Since the days of Descartes, who regarded matter and spirit as diametric opposites, the gulf between soul and body has been an obstacle in the path of modern philosophers. Some of them have obviated the difficulty by denying one of the two principles—whence Materialism and Ultra-Spiritualism. Others have devised such compromising but unsatisfactory devices as Psycho-physical Parallelism and the Double-Aspect Theory. How can matter act on spirit, or spirit on matter? The facts of interactions are there, but how are they to be explained? Suggestion, which is mental, affects the body, making it blush or tremble, while ether, which is physical, interferes with the mind. The point is that the causality involved is not efficient but formal. Outside of scholastic circles the concept of formal cause is unknown. Hence, the confusion.

The theory of man in terms of matter and form (see Chapter XVIII) does not lend itself to experimental verification, but it offers the best available explanation of the facts. One cannot analyze the soul in a test-tube nor examine it under the microscope.

Man has many functions. His mind performs

a variety of operations and attains to a diversity of objects. Still, we ascribe all these activities to the same subject or source. In this connection we do not discriminate between the mental and the physical. We say: I think; I see; I walk; I fall down. We do not say: My intellect thinks; my eyes see; my legs walk; my body falls. Thus the testimony of consciousness is a proof of that unity and individuality. The human being is therefore a compound unit, not a collection or group of entities. Further confirmation of this view of man is derived from a consideration of the subordination, harmony, correlation, coördination and interdependence of man's different functions.

**ERRONEOUS DEFINITIONS OF PERSONALITY.** John Locke, in his celebrated *Essay*, conceived person as constituted of memory and consciousness. As stated above, this is a common but an incorrect notion, for personality remains when these are absent, as in sleep or under the influence of ether or the like. Accidents reveal but do not constitute the personal substance. On the other hand he distinguishes between personal and substantial identity. In this, too, he is wrong, for when the latter is destroyed the former vanishes. It is true that man undergoes material change as a result of metabolism during his lifetime, but this is not substantial



change, for the substantial form or soul persists in being and supplies the personal continuity. Descartes commits the same error in defining person in terms of its thinking function.

False conceptions of personality are of two kinds, namely, those that ignore the spiritual element in man, defining him in terms of the body, brain or organism, and those that neglect his substantial portion and regard the human person as but a collection of states or functions. Allport describes these latter as rag-bag theories.\* The first is the Materialistic, the second the Phenomenistic fallacy. The Materialists forget the universal and abstract character of the concept or idea, which knows material things in a spiritual way by transcending the limitations of time and space, thus proving itself immaterial. They disregard also man's power of reflection and his ability to know spiritual things. The phenomenists seem to think that there can be a self-consciousness without a self to be conscious of. Thus David Hume in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, speaking of personal identity, said: "I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." It is almost pathetic to see a man looking for himself. The "I" which is doing the

\* *Psych. Bull.*, Vol. 18, 1921, Article, *Personality and Character*.



looking is what we are talking about. These considerations should render obvious the unsatisfactory character of the following views.

Ribot states, in the *Diseases of Personality*, that "the organism and brain, as its highest representation, constitute the real personality." Watson, the Behaviorist, holds personality to be the individual's entire reaction mass, or the sum-total of his responses to his environment. Other Behaviorists define personality and mind in terms of behavior patterns and integrations of neurograms.

William McDougall, an outstanding philosopher and psychologist, regards the ego as a unitary system, synthesis, hierarchy or integration wherein the affective dispositions or sentiments are organized under the dominating and harmonizing influence of the sentimental or self-regard. The integration of personality or development of character results from the formation of this dominant purpose, the adoption of this goal, of being an efficient autonomous personality or free lance. He thus subscribes to the Humean tradition. As in Locke's case, the cart is put before the horse. The sentiment of self-regard presupposes personality or self. We want to *act* as individuals because we *are* individuals.

William James identifies the empirical self or "me" with the sum-total of all a man can call his own. Its constituents are: (1) material such

as one's body, clothes, family, house and property; (2) social, namely, the various aspects known to others (as stated above); and (3) spiritual. The last element includes the "entire collection of states of consciousness, psychic faculties and dispositions taken concretely. The central core or nucleus of self is the internal sense of activity, which is often held to be a direct revelation of the soul."

**PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE.** It is generally held that loss of individuality is one of the ill effects of this mechanical or Western civilization, with its standardization and mass-production. It is regrettable that there is, in the course of development, a universal tendency to conform to a common denominator. It is fitting, therefore, that we remind ourselves from time to time of our individuality, a live sense of which makes one revolt at the thought of subscribing to monistic pantheism. As a reaction against extreme socialization and standardization a group of philosophers have recently formed a school or movement called Personalism, a purpose of which is to emphasize individuality.

Considerable importance has been attached by psychologists to the study of personal traits, individual differences, the personal equation, and so forth. Jung's *Psychological Types* and Adler's *Individual Psychology* are standard.

## 172 INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Define the terms originality, distinctiveness, individuality, idiosyncrasy, unicity, peculiarity, specificity, unity, simplicity.
2. What relation has the Blessed Trinity to the doctrine of personality?
3. What is meant by the "personal equation"; by impersonation; by personification; by a legal person?
4. Explain the terms impersonal, super-personal, and sub-personal.
5. Compare the Thomistic notions of *actus hominis* and *actus humanus*.
6. How does McDougall distinguish between mood, disposition, temper and temperament?
7. What are the four traditional temperaments?
8. What does Jung mean by the introvert and extrovert types?
9. Describe Bergson's, Kant's, Spencer's, and Condillac's conception of the ego.

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- Problems of Personality*—Studies in honor of Dr. Morton Prince.
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## CHAPTER XII

### THE ACCIDENT OF QUALITY

**GENERAL DESCRIPTION.** Answer the questions, What kind of? What sort of? and some quality or qualities are named. We qualify things as good, bad, round, white, sweet, heavy, strong, vicious, virtuous, and so on. By affirming one or more of these predicates about a subject we make known, not what it is, nor how much there may be of it, but what sort of a thing it is. Loosely speaking, anything that is predicated of another, even though this be a substance, provided it shows what kind of a thing it is, is a quality. In this sense also, any accident may be predicated as a quality. But it is more exact to describe a quality as an accident that modifies substance either as a thing or as an agent. It affects a substance in a beneficial or a harmful manner; it facilitates or impedes its operations. Thus health and virtue are called good, sickness and vice bad, qualities. Qualities therefore are accidental modes of being that complete the existence of substance and influence its causal activity.

SOME SUB-CLASSES OF QUALITIES. It is evident that there are an enormous number of different qualities. Some conception of this number can be gained by calling to mind adjectives, that largest of all groups of terms in language. Each of these expresses a quality. It will be necessary accordingly to treat only of certain of their more important classes. Among these are dispositions and habits; faculties or powers of action, capacities, aptitudes; emotions and passion; form and figure. There are of course many other classes of qualities, such as colors, tastes, odors, temperatures; but as these, from the viewpoint of their effect upon substance, are relatively unimportant we shall not consider them here.

DISPOSITION. The French saying, *C'est le premier pas qui coûte*, implies that the first time anything is done greater difficulty is experienced and more energy is required than in subsequent repetitions. Reflection will show that this is as true in the moral as in the physical order. The reason lies in the fact that, as we say, we are not used to it, which means, of course, that we are used only to something else. Now one is used to some form of action only after he has performed this action several times. It is then only that the all-important

factor of coördination of sense and muscle and will begins to function smoothly. In other words, each has then acquired a certain bent or inclination or suppleness which at once facilitates its action and makes it more pleasant and perfect. Each has acquired a disposition or mode of being which enables it to "fit in" more easily with all the other factors in the activity or process in question. In this sense also a bed, or a new shoe, or suit of clothes, a tool or a machine, after considerable use, acquires a disposition or orderliness by reason of which its usefulness is increased. Lacking this particular determination or penchant, a thing or a person is said to be badly disposed with regard to a given kind of action or for the attainment of a given end. There are therefore bad as well as good dispositions. As a good disposition implies that a thing or a person is well ordered for the attaining of a given end, so a bad disposition implies that it is not so well ordered.

**HABIT.** The term habit is properly predicated only of persons, of free agents. When so predicated, it means a permanent disposition. It is a quality whereby a person is well or ill disposed in himself or in his actions. Chronic ill health or permanent good health are examples of stable modes of being, or qualities, which affect



the very substance of a person. So also do sanity and insanity. These are here called *entitative* habits, though in common parlance they are not considered to be habits at all. Habits, in the stricter sense of the term, are those modes of being, such as science, skill, cleverness, dexterity, which facilitate the performance of work. These are classified as *operative* habits, and are the result of frequently repeated acts.

A distinction must also be made between supernatural habits, or those infused into the soul by God over and above the powers of human nature, *i.e.*, the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, and the natural virtues, or those which we acquire by the repeated and orderly actions of our natural powers, *i.e.*, the moral virtues. Virtues are good habits, vices, evil ones.

The importance of habit, or more exactly, the development of good habits, for the successful management of our lives can hardly be exaggerated. The immediate effects of habit are to make an action easier, more pleasant and more perfect. Hence habits have sometimes been called second nature, that is, principles of activity. Education is little else than a process whereby good habits, intellectual and moral, are built up. From this viewpoint, they are given extended treatment in both ethics and psychology.

POWERS, FACULTIES, FORCES, CAPACITIES. One sometimes hears the expressions, "in full possession of his faculties," "the forces of character," "extraordinary mental powers," and others of a similar tenor. All of these expressions connote a possessor and a possessed, an agent and certain instrumentalities of agency. Thus a man, a person, imagines, thinks, reasons, wills. If we ask why he does so, the answer is that it is his nature to do so. As a thing is in itself, in its essence, species, nature, so it acts. Nature therefore is the radical or ultimate principle of activity. But this nature acts, seeks the ends proper to it, by means of certain powers or faculties or capacities which it possesses. In the case of man, we do not say the soul thinks or wills, but *I* think or will. But *I* think and will by means of my intellect and my will, and in this sense intellect and will are proximate principles of action. And when we say, *e.g.*, that such or such a person is a man of fine qualities, we mean that he is a person in whom these native powers or faculties have reached a relatively high degree of cultivation. We imply that they are really distinct, though of course not separate, from the soul of which they are powers. In them we find verified the concept of quality or of modes of being that immediately modify a substance (spiritual or material) both in itself and in its operations.

PASSION AND PASSIVE QUALITIES. Things act, but they are also acted upon; they are affected by other things. The resultant modifications are either of a transitory or stable character. Thus apprehension in wrongdoing brings a blush to the cheek of the malefactor. His visage undergoes a transient modification, a suffering, a passion. The blush is transitory. It yields quickly to the habitual and normal complexion, which is a relatively permanent modification or resultant of healthy or unhealthy condition of the body. The latter state is an example of a passive quality.

In psychology, the term passion implies an intense urge or inclination of some sensible power toward an appropriate sensible good. This appetitive disturbance is accompanied by sensible changes in the organism, but as it is of slight duration it is classed with the passions, rather than with passive qualities. Should uncontrolled passion, however, produce a permanent mental derangement we should have an example of passive quality. The *passiones* "embrace whatever is the immediate cause or the immediate result of the sense modification involved in any act or process of sense consciousness."<sup>1</sup>

FORM AND FIGURE. Quantified reality is ex-

<sup>1</sup> P. Coffey, *Ontology*, p. 291.

tended. The surface termination of this extension constitutes the form or figure of such realities. Form and figure are therefore qualities grounded in quantity. Though it is true that material substance is never without quantity, it cannot be said that quantity is more than an accident or property of matter. It is really distinct from substance. The same may be said of form and figure. Though no quantified thing, in the natural order at least, can ever exist without them, still they are rather emanations from the essence than an integral part of the essence itself. They mark off the limits of extension, and thus modify a thing by completing it in its existence and by accidentally affecting its operations. They add to or diminish the natural perfection of a thing. Both a giant and a dwarf are handicapped in many ways. Between the two there is no more than a formal difference. Form seems to be the more generic of the two, for it is predicated of all extended realities, while figure is customarily restricted to living beings, and especially to persons.

CHARACTERISTICS OF QUALITIES. The effort to analyze and to understand reality is facilitated not only by making necessary distinctions among the various modes of being, but also by way of contrasting one with another. This is particularly true of the study of qualities. Qual-

ities go in pairs. One is contrary to the other. Though perhaps not always strictly correlative one to another, still the one is always more thoroughly understood as a result of being compared with its opposite. Thus, virtue by being compared with vice, knowledge with ignorance, health with sickness. If one is present in a subject, the other is necessarily excluded, and in proportion as the one is introduced the other is withdrawn. All created reality is therefore subjected to an ebb and flow of qualitative change. Qualities make up the surface variables of reality. They are the doors that give access to the inner natures of things. More often than not, they determine the value of things for us, and enter into our æsthetic judgments of things. Being variables, they are always capable of increase and decrease, of becoming more or less intense. Finally, they are the basis of likeness and difference among things. They furnish the reason for calling them similar or dissimilar.

QUALITY COMPARED WITH QUANTITY. In the writings of certain of the advocates of the new physics one finds the attempt to reduce all qualities to quantity, all so-called qualitative changes to quantitative changes. In this view, things differ, are similar or dissimilar, only by reason of the difference in the grouping of the quantitative elements which are said exclusively



to constitute reality. We are not convinced that this view is tenable. But even if for the sake of argument it be admitted, qualities could not be wholly reduced to quantities. For either the quantitative elements would have extension or be without any extension. If the latter, then since the other qualities of material substances are capable of being perceived only on a background of extension, they would be purely subjective illusions, and illusions for which no rational account could be given. If the former, then at least there would exist the qualities of form and figure, the necessary resultants of terminated surfaces. Moreover, with extension granted, it is difficult to see how such qualities as color, resistance, temperature and the like could be ruled out. The fact is that the categories of quantity and quality are irreducible. "It is not possible to speak of them with mathematical rigor, as one may of quantitative abstractions, by comparing one with another as one does with numbers. For these abstract concepts separate in the mind characters which, being inseparable in reality, inter-compenetrate and mutually modify one another." \*

SUMMARY. Qualities are accidents. They indicate of what sort a thing is. They modify substance immediately in itself, they influence

\* G. Sortais, *Traite de Philosophie*, Vol. II, p. 483.



it in its activities. They furnish the materials for the description of things. The more important classes are habits and dispositions, powers, emotions, passions, forms and figures. Dispositions are transient modifications of substances and powers of operation, while habits are permanent dispositions. Both render action easier, pleasanter and more perfect. Entitative habits affect the very substance of an agent, operative affect the powers of operation. In the natural order, both result from action frequently repeated. The cultivation of good habits and dispositions is essential to personal culture. Every nature has certain powers or capacities of action by which it attains its natural ends. These are really distinct from the substance, and are proximate principles of activity. On their proper development depends the perfection of the individual physically, intellectually and morally. All qualities have contraries, are capable of decrease and increase, and serve as the basis for resemblance and difference. Quality cannot be reduced to quantity, for quantified things necessarily have certain attributes not expressible in mathematical terms.

#### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. List the qualities of (a) Hamlet's soliloquy, (b) a Beethoven sonata, (c) a mountain, (d) a lion, (e) a good dinner.

2. Why have automobile manufacturers annually varied the form of their cars?
3. Differentiate between a graceful and a homely figure.
4. What significance attaches to the form of a building?
5. Why has man been called "a bundle of habits"?
6. What is meant by a bad habit, a good disposition?
7. What is meant by "faculty psychology"?
8. Why may a thing not be defined in terms of action only?
9. Discuss the metaphysical implications of the threshold of sensation.
10. Discuss: All changes are quantitative changes.

## CHAPTER XIII

### QUANTITY, SPACE, AND TIME

DESCRIPTION. Quantity is the most obvious and fundamental property of matter. A body is recognized as a body primarily because it has weight and occupies space, not because it is colored, or heated or electrically charged. Mathematics, including arithmetic, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, and calculus, deal with the relations and properties of quantity in the abstract. Physical science, too, expresses its knowledge of natural phenomena in terms of measurements. Eddington, speaking of the New Physics, which is largely mathematical, tells us that exact science is concerned with merely the metrical aspects of entities and only with those entities which have such aspects.<sup>1</sup>

Because quantity is such a fundamental category it is very difficult to define. But this difficulty is purely formal, since the concept itself is a familiar one. Among its various synonyms are such common terms as size, weight, capacity, mass, volume, extent, amount, degree, bulk,

<sup>1</sup> *The Nature of the Physical World*, p. 105.

number. Similarly small, tiny, little, big, great, colossal, huge, stupendous, tremendous, gigantic, etc., are all quantitative words. We may say then that whatever is susceptible of calculation, computation, increase or decrease is quantitative.

**KINDS OF QUANTITY.** A distinction may be made between quantity proper and extension. The former is known as internal, radical or potential *quantity* and corresponds to what is known in science as mass. The latter, external quantity, is called local, spatial or actual *extension* and corresponds to the scientific conception of volume.

In the abstract we may distinguish between linear, square, and cubic extension, that is, distance, area or surface, and volume. In the concrete, however, any quantum is at least tri-dimensional. Viewed thus extension may be discrete, contiguous, or continuous.

Discrete quantity is multitude or plurality. Its parts are discontinuous, though they are connected by some intermediate substance, or are grouped in some way, *e.g.*, a string of beads, a pile of stones, a group of people or a number. Contiguous quantity is that whose parts are conjoined by contact only, *e.g.*, a wooden table. Continuous quantity is magnitude. It may be successive or permanent, *i.e.*, simultaneous.

Time and motion are instances of successive quantity. Here the parts do not coexist but succeed one another so that each preceding part ceases to be just as its successor commences. Thus the sixty minutes in an hour do not constitute a physical unity. In the cases of an ordinary simultaneous continuum the several parts coexist, occupy different portions of space and constitute a physical unity. Such continuity may be perfect or imperfect depending upon whether or not it has interstices. In all cases of continuity there is an uninterrupted connection of parts wherein the beginning of one is the end of another.

THE NATURE OF QUANTITY. Aristotle listed quantity among his ten categories of things and of thoughts. It was the first of the accidents, sometimes spoken of as the absolute accident. The Scholastics referred to it as a common sensible, and Locke as a primary quality. Descartes, unduly influenced by his love of mathematical concepts, had identified quantity with corporeal substance itself. Neo-Scholastics however have pointed out the fallacious character of this view.<sup>2</sup> Quantity does not exist *in se*. It inheres in matter. It is an accident and is really distinct from substance. This is obvious when we consider that the water in a raindrop

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Mercier, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 84ff.

and in a rain barrel are chemically or substantially the same, but quantitatively different. The water in the tiny drop and in the full barrel differs merely in amount, not in kind. Neither addition nor subtraction of various quantities of the same substances affect its nature. Corporeal substance is indifferent to larger or smaller quantity or extension.

The formal nature or essence of quantity according to the Scholastics is the possession of integral composition. This is the primary and basic character of quantity. The other effects such as (1) the distribution of these parts or the occupation of space, (2) divisibility, (3) measurability, (4) impenetrability, etc., are all derivative and secondary.

**MEANING OF PLACE.** Place is synonymous with region, locus, position, or zone. It is the category "where" of Aristotle and is an accident of bodies. In the concrete workaday world it is included in the subject-matter of the science of geography, while geometry deals with the more abstract topic of space. It may be regarded as a portion of space, the two ideas being always intimately associated.

Every body by reason of its volume or extension must occupy a place, though it is indifferent as to which place contains it. Local motion is the name we give to its displacement. When



moved a body does not suffer change as to substance or size or color but only as to the property we know as its *internal* place. By contrast, place, in the sense of environment, surroundings, or whereabouts, we term *external* place. The latter may be *proper* or *common*. Thus in the case of a glass of water in a room, the room is the common place, the glass is the external or proper place of the water, and the outer surface the limits, boundaries, periphery, or circumference of the water itself considered as a receptacle enclosing its content or volume, is its internal place. This last is thought of as fixed or immovable, and of course immediate.

MODES OF LOCATION, PRESENCE, OR UBICATION. There are several ways in which a thing may be in place: (1) The ordinary or proper manner of occupying a place is called local or circumscriptive. This condition obtains when, by quantitative contact, the parts of material objects fill and are circumscribed by corresponding areas of another body. (2) The human soul which animates and permeates the entire body is a simple spirit which is entire in the entire body and entire in every part of it. Its mode of being present is distinguished by the terms definitive or informative. (3) Pure spirits, though they themselves have no dimensions, are capable on occasion of functioning in definite

places. They are in or at the place at which they act. Hence they are said to be in place operatively. (4) The Supreme Spirit, God, is ubiquitous or omnipresent as well as immense. He is not limited or confined to any particular spot, but is everywhere and is said on that account to occupy space *incircumscriptively*.<sup>\*</sup>

SPACE. As a common term expressive of ordinary experience, space has reference to distance, interval, roominess and empty capacity. It may be described as the sum-total of all places. If we consult experience we will find that by means of our senses of sight and touch we perceive such phenomena as surface, dimension, direction, relative situation, interval, size, distance, position, change of place, and concrete extension. Surface extension is immediately or intuitively perceived in the act of vision, while motor sensations or degrees of tension or strain in the ocular muscles are associated with various distances and magnitudes. This latter activity is a mediate, secondary type of cognition. In the words of modern psychology, it is not a sensation but an interpretation of sensation,

<sup>\*</sup> Faith teaches us that there is another kind of presence called *Sacramental*. In the Blessed Eucharist the body and blood of Our Divine Savior exist under the species or appearances of bread and wine. The Divine Substance, separated from its natural extension, acquired location merely by reason of the relation it bears to the miraculously preserved accidents of the bread and wine.

that is, a perception. From these sensory data we derive by abstraction our idea of abstract extension. This is what we mean by conceptual, mathematical or scientific space.

The Scholastics view space as something ideal, but with a basis in reality, namely, the real extension of natural bodies. They regard it accordingly as something accidental. It is, for them, finite and divisible *ad infinitum*. This is also the view of Einstein. The total extension of all the bodies in the entire physical universe, considered without or apart from those bodies as a sort of a receptacle in which they are contained, expresses their understanding of real, actual or physical space. It is obvious of course that if there were no bodies there would be no space, and that without the extension abstracted from these bodies, space is nothing. In other words, space does not exist as an independent receptacle. It is an idea formed when, by abstraction, we conceive the extension of bodies and prescind from the bodies themselves.

Ideal, absolute, possible or pure space is that which exists beyond the limits of the physical universe. It may be described as that sphere which exists now beyond creation and existed everywhere before creation. This conception is equivalent to the total extension of all possible bodies. It is an abstract, unoccupied receptacle of inexhaustible capacity. Like all

other possibilities it is eternal, indestructible, and limitless, that is, indefinite or potentially infinite. Possible space is actually nothing. It is homogeneous and continuous. It has its foundation in God's omnipotence. Its contemplation brings one to the outskirts of the actually infinite. Associated with the above concept is a concomitant phantasm which we call *imaginary space*. It is a vast, indefinite, unmeasurable emptiness or vacuum, a sort of phantom substance perfectly permeable and extending indefinitely in all directions.

Kant regarded space as an arbitrary fiction of the mind with no objective content or reference. It has no basis in reality but is an *a priori*, subjective, mental form or groove. It is anterior to experience and not derived from it. It is not discovered by the mind in reality but imposed or conferred by the mind on reality. It is attached to the phenomenon, the thing as we know it and is not a property of the noumenon or thing-in-itself. Our external senses represent their objects as extended in space and our internal senses represent our conscious states as succeeding each other in time. This subjectivistic view is refuted by the valid assumptions of astronomy and astrophysics whose contrary assumptions are the basis of predictions which are being daily verified. On the other hand space is not an objective ocean of ether. It has

no boundaries. A vacuum is nothing, and if it were an extended substance it would need space to contain it. This against Epicurus. Finally, Newton and Clarke identified space with the immensity of God. But God has no extension, and further the Divine attributes are identical with His essence. Bodies would then occupy the Divine Essence. They confuse real space which is finite, imaginary space which is indefinite, and God Who is Infinite.

The hypothetical or so-called luminiferous ether of space fills or is omnipresent throughout what we popularly call empty space, *i.e.*, the regions beyond our atmosphere. It also pervades all bodies and the air itself. It explains light (diffraction and interference established the vibratory nature or undulatory character of light) and accounts for the transfer of causal activity from a distance, such as gravitation and the radiation of solar energy. It serves as a medium and preserves continuity. It is exceedingly dense, frictionless and incompressible. Its existence is a mere working hypothesis and involves grave difficulties but is generally accepted. Einstein claims to have disproved its existence.

**TIME.** Chronologically conceived reality involves mind and motion. For time, says Aristotle, is "the measurement of the succession in-



volved in change." If there were no revolving and rotating earth or if there were no conscious minds upon the earth there would be no time. Mother Nature and Father Time are united in metaphysical wedlock and we are their children—all subjects of the clock and of the calendar.

Time is concocted of events and occasions and these are divided into past, present and future. The past belongs to memory and to history, to tradition, convention, habit and custom, to retrospect and experience. The future belongs to the prophets and posterity, to ambition, hope, desire, prospect and expectation, to novelty and immortality. The principle of the past inspires the classicist, the humanist, the conservative and the fundamentalist, while the liberal, the romanticist, the modernist cherish the spirit of the future. Only that part of the past which has survived in fact or in record is actual or real, and of course the future is only possible or ideal, or at best only potentially real. As we read in the *Timæus*: " . . . we say that he 'was,' he 'is,' he 'will be,' but the truth is that 'is' alone is properly attributed to him. . . ." In another sense we may say that the past is actual, the future potential and the present an admixture of the two. At all events the present is ours but its value is largely to be computed in terms of its contribution to the



future since most action has a future reference or, in other words, natural behavior is teleological.

We may well agree with St. Augustine that a definition of time is difficult to give, however familiar we may be with its reality. Time is evidently connected with motion for the standard by which we measure duration is the earth's rotation. Then too, when one reflects that during a period of intense mental concentration when the attention is totally absorbed in some occupation, consciousness of movements around us and hence also our sense of time are lost; and in retrospect if we wish to estimate the time that has elapsed, we must recall the events that were experienced in the interval. However, time is not merely movement, for it is continuous. It stops for no man. Moreover, it is uniform, neither quick nor slow. Movement on the other hand is interrupted and suffers variations in velocity. It does not constitute time but occurs therein. Just as the basis or real objective content of the static notion of space is the extension of bodies, so the basis of time, a dynamic concept which involves succession and duration, is the totality of motion or the succession of events.

Wyndham Lewis contends that Western man is the victim of time to a much greater extent than is the dweller of the Orient. The reason

for this is probably psychological and results from one's environment. Certainly our measurement of change which is our sense of time is only approximate and relative. Thus an interesting present seems short, an interesting past seems long, and an uninteresting present seems long. "Pleasure and action make the hours seem short." Similarly as one grows old time passes quickly. It has been suggested that the mind has an uncanny subconscious estimation of time, for in post-hypnotic phenomena the subject without reference to an artificial timepiece seems to know when his time arrives. Perhaps the subconscious mind measures the heartbeats.

**TIME AND ETERNITY.** Time is one species of duration and eternity is another. Duration means continuity or persistence in being or perseverance in existence. Accordingly the nature of a thing's existence will determine the nature of or characterize its duration. Eternity is an attribute of God. It is the permanent duration of the immutable being and it involves no beginning, no end, and no change. It has been defined by Boethius as the "interminable and perfect possession of life as a simultaneous whole." Such is the absolute and necessary eternity of God. Perpetual being, everlasting life and existence in *saecula saeculorum* is His exclusive pre-

rogative. Abstract possible essences are said to have a negative eternity because they prescind from duration of any kind. A hypothetical, relative, participated eternity or æviternity involving only accidental discrete change constitutes the duration of such contingent immortal beings as souls and angels.

Time is the successive duration of mutable beings, the successive continuity or duration of change or motion considered as a measure thereof, the successive duration of continuous motion considered as coexisting with and measuring that motion. This measurement is effected by the successive application to change of a standard quantitative unit—the analysis of magnitude into multitude.

**OTHER VIEWS.** In the light of the foregoing exposition the unsatisfactory character of the following conceptions will be patent: Kant for instance regarded time as an *a priori* form which molded our sense consciousness. Newton, Clarke and the French Eclectics identified time with God's eternity, forgetting that he is immutable. Others describe time as an incorporeal entity apart from the things that endure.

**SPACE-TIME.** Einstein's Theory of Relativity constitutes a radical departure from the Euclid-

can geometry and the Newtonian physics. According to this view velocity, time, distance, direction, size, and space are not absolute or standard but relative or subjective, that is, dependent upon and varying with the observer. Time and space are inseparable and interdependent. The universe is a finite fourfold continuum with time as its fourth dimension. Space is curved. Gravitation is not a force but a peculiar quality of space-time.

This view has been introduced into philosophy by Alexander and Whitehead. In the traditional and classical view, space and time were figuratively conceived as the two media or receptacles in which the material universe is contained. Instead of empty forms however these factors are now understood by the above-mentioned thinkers as constituting the matrix whence matter itself is evolved. The property thus becomes the owner. Moreover the inhabitants of this newly conceived universe are not substances, entities or things, but events. The notion of substance is thus dealt another blow. Hobson, Eddington, and Poincaré contend that the theory of relativity is merely a conceptual scheme of symbols that has value in science but is without philosophical implications. Lodge and Whitehead however treat it as a philosophy.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Time and motion.
2. Time and eternity.
3. Is time reversible?
4. Mass, weight and inertia.
5. Some of the units of measurement in science.
6. The branches of mathematics and their several subject-matters.
7. The question of continuity and infinite divisibility.
8. Lodge and Russell on continuity.
9. The paradoxes of Zeno.
10. The forms of quantity.
11. The distinction between corporeal substance and quantity; between quantity and extension.
12. Is space subjective or objective; finite or infinite; substantial or accidental?
13. Real and ideal space.
14. Descartes and Spinoza on quantity.
15. Discuss the view of Hans Driesch that the mathematical physics of Einstein is not a complete philosophy because existence has other than merely quantitative aspects.
16. Has the New Physics any implication for philosophy? Hobson, Poincaré, Eddington and Sheen claim not; while Whitehead, Lodge and Russell seem to think otherwise.
17. Nys on the Atomist's reduction of quality to quantity.
18. The Quantum Theory.
19. Dynamism and extension.
20. Stellar distances.

SUGGESTED READINGS

- BURTT—*Metaphysical Foundations of Physics.*  
 POINCARÉ—*The Foundations of Science.*  
 EDDINGTON—*The Nature of the Physical World.*  
 HOBSON—*The Domain of Natural Science.*  
 WEYL—*Space—Time—Matter.*  
 WHITEHEAD—*Science and the Modern World.*  
                   —*Process and Reality.*  
 HAAS—*The New Physics.*  
 McWILLIAMS—*Cosmology.*  
 RUSSELL—*The Analysis of Matter.*  
                   —*Our Knowledge of the External World.*  
 LEWIS, W.—*Time and Western Man.*  
 ALEXANDER—*Space, Time, and Deity.*  
 MANN, THOMAS—*The Magic Mountain.*



## CHAPTER XIV

### RELATION: THE RELATIVE AND THE ABSOLUTE

RELATION is an elusive kind of thing. On first thought it does not seem to be a thing at all, but rather an attitude of mind toward things. Yet it can be said that nothing created is unrelated. The universe is a unit, yet made up of many parts. It is a system manifesting law, order, design, purpose, a multitude of agents and of activities which are so coördinated and subordinated to one another that chaos, if not conflict, is ever held in abeyance. Nothing stands out in isolation from the rest. It is a part of the whole; in a sense, of many wholes. Each thing may or may not have many relationships to other things. Bring two things into existence, and they will necessarily be somehow related. Multiply the things and you necessarily multiply relations. Knowledge involves a relation of mind to objects. Truth is a relation of conformity. Error is the opposite kind of relation. A family or a society is a system of related persons. A factory exhibits a system of

related machines. A living organism contains a number of related parts and of functions. Mathematics is wholly taken up with the task of establishing a true set of quantitative relations among measurable things. Whichever way we turn we are met with relations of one kind or another. The very effort of the mind in thinking consists in establishing relations of inclusion or exclusion among its ideas. It is easier, however, to visualize the things that are related than the relation that exists between them.

THE CONCEPT OF RELATION. Our daily conversation is replete with terms that express relations. We call one thing larger, longer, heavier, sweeter, better, worse than another. It is higher, lower, wider, more valuable, knowable, and so on. It is like, unlike, similar to or different from other things. The first characteristic of relation would seem to be that it somehow unites things in our minds in such a way that the one helps us to understand the other. Thus in arithmetic if we understand the relations  $2:4::4:8$ , we come to know more about each of these figures because of our knowledge of its relations to the others. Two is related to four as four is to eight, but the relation is neither two nor four nor eight. It is rather the *reference of the one to the other* as half or twice or a quarter of it. This is more clearly seen in

such terms as father and son. Each implies the other. Each naturally has a reference to the other. Son is referred to father as effect is to cause. There exists a causal relation between them. The son is *of* the father; he is understood by reference *to* the father. The Scholastic writers spoke of accident in general as having *esse in alio*, but they qualified the mode of existence of relation as an *esse ad alia*, that is, its existence consists precisely in this reference or ordination of one thing to others. Hence they sometimes called it an accident of an accident, because in itself it is not so much a "something" as an aspect of something else, or rather of other things. Duality is essential to the existence of relations. "We conceive," says Aristotle, "as relations those things whose very entity itself we regard as being somehow *of* other things or *to* other things."<sup>1</sup>

If we take the mutual relation of paternity on the one hand and of filiation on the other between father and son, we have two terms and a relation. The son is referred to the father as to his origin or cause. The son therefore is the subject of reference, the father the term or goal of the reference. The reason he is referred is because he is an effect produced by the father. The elements of the relation—and this is true also of other relations—are a subject, or that

<sup>1</sup> *Apud* P. Coffey, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

which is referred, a term, or that to which the subject is referred, and a foundation, or the reason why it is so referred. The earmarks of relation then are to-otherness, reciprocalness, correlativity.

**THE EXISTENCE OF REAL RELATIONS.** By a real relation is understood one that does not depend upon the mind for its existence. Independently of the mind's consideration, there is a real reference of one thing to another, as, *e.g.*, a relation of similitude. One star resembles another star, even though no mind takes cognizance of such resemblance. A great many things in the extra-mental world are similar to one another, and such similarity exists independently of any observing mind. The only reason for raising the question as to their existence is that it has been denied by Nominalistic and Idealistic philosophers. In their view, all relations are logical relations, that is, arbitrary references which the mind sets up either between its own concepts or between extra-mental things. Thus the subject-predicate relation, or sign relations, as between a flag and a definite region, or three balls and a pawnshop would be logical relations, for they are dependent upon acts of the mind. The contrary view is that, in addition to logical relations, there exist relations that in no way depend upon this

arbitrary linking of one thing to another by the mind, or that real relations exist. The reason for this is not far to seek. For, as we have said, there obviously exist in things genuine grounds for being referred to one another as related things. The apple, for instance, is objectively referable to the apple tree as to its cause. The reason or grounds of this reference are not furnished by the mind, but are found in the very nature of the apple and its parent tree. The causal relation between them is therefore a real relation, which the mind discovers and expresses, but which it does not create. This instance of the apple and the tree is merely typical of all cases of real generation or production. In the real order there are causes operating independently of the mind. Hence there are effects produced independently of the mind. But real qualities are produced by things and by reason of these qualities they are similar to one another, or bear the relation of similarity to one another.

OTHER KINDS OF RELATION. As all reality is either real or logical so also in that sense are relations. Regarded from other angles, however, further classifications are possible. Take the expressions: Man is a creature; specifically all men are equal; every individual is distinct from other individuals; murder, suicide, blas-

phemy are essentially wrong; twice two is everywhere four. All of these imply relations that cannot be otherwise than they are. They are necessary, universally the same, unchangeable, they transcend circumstances of time and place and person and thing. Hence they are called transcendental relations.

These relations enter deeply into questions of theodicy and ethics and epistemology. For if creatures are not essentially related to the Creator as effects to cause, and therefore really distinct from Him, then one would have to admit either that certain contingent things could be independent of the Creator or that all are identical with him, that is, one would be forced into either Deism or Pantheism. Similarly, if one does not admit that there is a necessary, objective and immutable relation existing between his natural powers and their proper objects, he could not show that there is any moral principle that is not essentially relative. Finally, if there is no essential or transcendental relation between man's cognitive powers and their proper objects, then is there no necessary truth, but only relative truths.

A much larger troupe of relations than the former are devoid of this attribute of necessity. They are in no way essential to the related subject. They are contingent upon some accidental state of the subject or upon some fortuitous cir-



cumstance in which it may at present be placed. Thus two men that are equal in physical strength to-day may not be so a year from to-day. The similarities or dissimilarities now existing among things, and by reason of which they are related, are subject to constant change and variation. Such relations are known as accidental or predicamental relations.

Looking at relations from the viewpoint of their terms and subjects, grounds are found for distinguishing them into mutual, and non-mutual or mixed. A mutual relation is one that is reciprocal, that is, the relation is on both sides either real or logical, *e.g.*, as the father-son or subject-predicate relation. On the other hand, though the Creator is the efficient cause of the world, He is an absolutely simple being, and cannot be the subject of a real relation, or of any other accidental mode of being. He is therefore related to creatures by a logical relation, while creatures are related to Him by a real relation. For there exists in them a real foundation for such a relation, *i.e.*, their contingent nature.

**ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE.** The terms absolute and relative are correlative terms. The one implies the other. But there are also degrees of absoluteness, and there are limits to relativity. What is absolute without qualification is under-

stood to be the all-perfect, the completely independent and unconditioned. In this sense, there is and can be only one unqualifiedly absolute being, that is, God. Passing from Him to the consideration of the various modes in which contingent being is realized it is clear that substance, or that which exists *per se*, has a relatively higher degree of absoluteness than the qualities which manifest it to our senses. Substance presents a more perfect degree of independence than does accident. Finally, even among accidents themselves, quantity, which is a property of material substance, enjoys a lesser degree of dependence than does the quantitative relation on which it is founded.

Modern philosophy commonly teaches that we can know only the relative. For all practical purposes then it must hold that only the relative exists. For a thing which cannot be known to exist is as though it were non-existent. A further implication would be that nothing is *necessarily* what it is, but only with respect to something else; that there is no necessary truth, no necessary right or wrong, no inherent or natural rights, no stable reality and no stable truth of any kind. In the field of physics, this conviction of universal relativity has already obtained a considerable footing. One can of course say that all knowledge is relative in the sense that every cognitive act involves a rela-

tion of mind to object, or that all morality is relative in the sense that every moral act involves a relation of the will to a given good, but surely it is false to say that we cannot by reflection arrive at a concept of reality as absolute. For obviously if everything were relative, relativity itself would have no meaning. The term has meaning only with reference to the absolute. At any rate, it may be said that if it is true that everything is relative, then at least that proposition is an absolute proposition.

**SUMMARY.** Relations are universal. All things stand in certain relations to one another, whether real or logical. Relations are accidental modes of being which set things off against one another or refer things to one another. The reason for this reference is sometimes found in the very natures or essences of things, sometimes in non-essential attributes. A perceived relation between two things aids the mind in understanding both. No relation exists *per se*, or as a thing, but only as an aspect of or reference of one thing to another. The elements of relation are a subject, the foundation or reason for its being referred to another, and the term or being to which it is referred. If this foundation is present in the essence of the related subject the relation is called transcendental; if in a non-essential attribute, a predicamental rela-

tion. Mutual relations are reciprocal, mixed relations are real on one side and logical on the other. Real relations exist because there exist in the real order foundations for relations. The importance of transcendental relations is clearly seen in the problems of theodicy, epistemology and ethics. There exists only one strictly absolute being. Created realities possess varying degrees of absoluteness. The claim that everything is relative involves a solecism.

#### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. Draw up a list of as many varieties of relation as you can think of.
2. Draw up a list of terms which imply relatedness.
3. Compare quantitative with qualitative relations.
4. Discuss the logically unitive characteristic of relation.
5. Explain: A relation is an accident of an accident.
6. Give an illustration (a) of the elements in a mutual relation, (b) in a mixed relation.
7. Give an example of a real relation, and prove that it has extra-mental existence.
8. Show the implications of a denial of the existence of transcendental relations.
9. Discuss the various meanings of absolute and relative.
10. Prove: Relativity is not a transcendental category.

## 210 INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS

### SUGGESTED READINGS

COFFEY—*Ontology*, p. 332ff.

RICKABY—*General Metaphysics*, p. 322ff.

MERCIER—*Manual of Neo-Scholastic Philosophy*, p. 300ff.

HOLT (and others)—*The New Realism*, *passim*.

## CHAPTER XV

### CAUSALITY: CLASSIFICATION OF CAUSES

THE concept of causes brings us back again to a consideration of the universe as dynamic, as changing, as subject to a continuous and universal world-process of transformation, of beginnings, developments, decay and disintegration. It emphasizes the dual aspect of things, the plural and manifold character of experience, and tries to give some account of the objective bonds which bind this manifold into an orderly unity.

CONCEPT OF CAUSE. To the question, Why? Why did this take place? Why did you say or do this? The answer invariably involves a "because," *i.e.*, by reason of, on account of this or that cause. All scientific and philosophical knowledge, not purely descriptive, is an attempt to set forth the causes of things. Thus smoke because of fire, skill because of practice, death because of illness or old age, peace because of justice.

But what precisely does the term cause imply? To cause anything evidently implies doing something. A cause is an agent, a person or



thing which exercises some positive influence on the being or the state or mode of being of something else. In other words, such influence is exercised that a result, an effect, an entity is produced which previously did not actually exist. A cause therefore is that upon which anything depends for its existence either in the real or ideal order. It is that from which something proceeds, *e.g.*, conclusion from premises, a sound from a bell, an accident from a substance, a tree from a seed.

Now that from which something proceeds is called a principle, and the principle is prior to that which proceeds from it. This priority may be one of order (point-line), or of time (dawn-day), or of nature (sun-light), or of consequence (premiss-conclusion), or of dignity (ruler-subject). A cause is prior to the effect; the effect proceeds from the cause. Hence a cause belongs to the genus of principle. How then is it distinguished from other principles? The relation between the two can be shown thus:

PRINCIPLE	CAUSE
<i>Genus</i>	<i>Species</i>
Logical distinction between principle and consequent sufficient.	Real distinction between cause and effect.
Implies no dependence of consequent.	Implies dependence of effect.
Logical priority suffices.	Prior to effect at least by priority of nature.

Thus three things are necessary to a cause: (1) real distinction between it and effect; (2) a relation of dependence of effect on cause; and (3) a priority, at least of nature, of cause to effect. There is a real, ontological bond or nexus between causes and effects. And for this reason causes are often called real principles, *i.e.*, principles not merely whence things proceed, but by which things are produced.

The correlative of cause is effect, or that which is produced by a cause. It is something *of* and *from* the cause. Whatever is in it must also be in the cause, though of course not with the same mode of being. Effects therefore show with certainty the existence of causes and something also of their nature. Knowledge of the effect provides the only key to the inner nature of a cause.

Careful distinction must be made between cause and condition, cause and occasion. A contract will be entered into on condition certain terms are inserted or omitted. The cause of the contract is the consent of the parties, but the consent will not be given, the cause will not operate, unless the condition is fulfilled. Again, one may say, I shall build you a house on condition you allow me to employ no union laborers. A condition therefore exercises no direct or positive influence on the effect produced. It is merely a circumstance which must be present

or absent in order that the cause may operate. An occasion is a circumstance or set of circumstances favorable to the operation of the cause. It is never intrinsically connected with the production of an effect. Thus it is said that it is the occasion that makes the orator.

**PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.** A principle is a general truth, and also a basic or irreducible truth. It is accordingly one which is presupposed in the organizing of more special and concrete propositions. It is something axiomatic, unproved and unprovable, because self-evident. Of such a character is the principle of causality, which may be variously stated: whatever begins to be must have a cause; whatever is contingent must have a cause; whatever happens must have a cause; nothing occurs without a cause; every effect has a cause. This principle is and must be taken for granted in all processes of thought, and its truth is borne in on us by our universal experience. As here stated, it refers particularly to extrinsic causes, *i.e.*, final and efficient causes.

**ATTACKS ON THIS PRINCIPLE.** It is significant that those who have attacked this principle have always previously expressed doubt about the very power of the intellect to know the natures or essences of things, *i.e.*, the Em-

piricists. Among these, Hume and Kant deserve special mention. Hume, following the lead of Descartes and Berkeley, reduced all reality to phenomena. Substance, whether material or spiritual, he held, did not exist, or at the least could not be known. The infra-sensible and the supra-sensible were alike shut out of the field of certain knowledge. And as he considered causal action non-empirical, it could not be known. The causal relation was reduced to one of sequence. Thus fire is perceived as an antecedent and smoke as a consequent or rather subsequent phenomenon. The ontological nexus between the two, essential to the idea of cause, could never be known.<sup>1</sup>

Kant's attack likewise grew out of his epistemological theories. Kant did not deny the existence of substance, or of the noumenon as he called it. He merely claimed that it was unknowable by the speculative intellect. Further, he held that the necessary and universal element in knowledge was not derived from an analysis of things, but furnished by the mind prior to and independently of experience. Thus he concluded that, while the principle of causality was valid in the subjective, it was not demonstrably valid in the objective, order.<sup>2</sup>

As an adequate criticism of these views would

<sup>1</sup> C. W. Hendel, *Hume Selections*, p. 43ff.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kant, *Prologmena* (Mahaffy's trans.).

involve a refutation of the entire Humean and Kantian Epistemology we can do no better than refer the student to standard Scholastic treatises on epistemology.\*

Briefly, however, it may be said that both these views are characterized by their sharp conflict with common sense and the universal assumption of science. Imagine anyone seriously putting forth the claim that he could see no necessary connection between the action of a railway locomotive and the movement of the train it draws; or between a seed that is planted and the plant that grows from it. Moreover, how, it may be asked, is it possible not to recognize the agent in the action, since action (phenomenon) without an agent (noumenon) is itself quite unthinkable.

ARISTOTLE'S FOURFOLD DIVISION OF ULTIMATE CAUSES. This is in no sense an *enumeration* of all the different kinds of particular causes, but a classification or reduction of causes to four specific kinds. We owe this classification to Aristotle, who derived it from an analysis of substantial and accidental change and the evident orderliness of cosmic processes. In substantial change, for example the combination of hydrogen and oxygen to form water, these two substances lose their specific determinant

\* Cf. P. Coffey, *Epistemology*, Vol. II.

or form, by reason of which they are the particular things they are, and take on a new form or determination by reason of which they are said to constitute a new substance. Analysis of this process clearly reveals the presence of two distinct modes of reality, a substratum capable of receiving successively different determinations, and these determinations or forms themselves. In the process of change or transformation, one may not say that the forms which are displaced are annihilated and a new one created in their place, for the compound may be broken up and the previous forms restored. But if they remain there must obviously be something persisting throughout the change in which they may retain their existence, *i.e.*, a substratum capable of undergoing substantial modification. Both the subject or prime matter (substratum) then and the form really and jointly concur in the production of the new substance. Hence Aristotle called them respectively the material and formal cause.

Where the change is only accidental, the same phenomena are present, except that instead of a new substance emerging, the same substance emerges, but with such a different form that it may rightly be called a different thing, as, *e.g.*, lumber made over into a table.

Now in every work of art there is an agent who by his physical activity on selected mate-



rial produces a specifically determined effect. Moreover, he produces this effect on account of or for the sake of something. He acts with a motive. The effect depends upon both agent and motive. Both are causes of the effect produced. The agent is known as the efficient cause, while the motive or end or purpose he has in view, and which induces him to act and guides him all along in his action, is called the final cause.

This whole classification can be nicely illustrated by the following example: The production of a statue required some material (bronze); the bronze must be given some specific determination (the figure of Lincoln); this determination or form must be conceived of and executed by some agent (the artist); and this agent must have some motive (say a prize of five thousand dollars). In this case the bronze is the material cause, the figure of Lincoln the formal cause, the artist the efficient cause, and the five thousand dollars the final cause.

These causes are called ultimate causes inasmuch as every other cause can be reduced to one or other of these four. Of any created thing we can ask: By whom (or what) was it made? Of (or out of) what was it made? What specific determination was given to it? For what

reason was it made? Answering these questions we assign respectively the efficient, the material, the formal, and the final cause.

SOME AXIOMS CONCERNING CAUSATION. (1) Whatever perfection is in the effect is previously contained in its cause. For the effect owes its total existence to the cause. The product of a causal act, therefore, or the terminus of change, can never be a *novelty* in the sense of a thing beginning to be which in no way existed before. Novelties, *i.e.*, completely new beings, result only from the divine creative act. Created causes can do no more than effect a transformation of preëxisting materials. Emergent Evolutionists to the contrary notwithstanding, they can merely shuffle the existing deck of cards, but not produce totally a new pack.

(2) A knowledge of the effect leads with certainty to the knowledge of the existence of the cause, and to at least a partial knowledge of its nature. For if there can be nothing in the effect which was not somehow also in the cause, to understand the attributes and perfections in the effect is to understand also the attributes and perfections of the cause. This is especially true of the effects of univocal causes, or causes belonging to the same genus as the effect, as father and son. Where the cause is equivocal,

as God in relation to creatures, though an analysis of the created universe shows us with certainty God's existence, yet it does not lead us to an adequate comprehension of the Creator, for it is characteristic of equivocal causes to produce effects of a different nature from themselves. Predication of attributes of the terms of this cause-effect relation must therefore be analogous.

This axiom merely states in different terms the necessary assumption of science that the only key to the nature of a thing is its qualities or manifestations. For qualities, actions, properties are effects produced by the substance or nature, and their efficacy in unlocking the secrets lies precisely in the conviction that the character of effect reveals the character of its cause. Hence the additional axioms: As a thing is, so it acts; effects are proportionate to their causes; activity is consequent to existence.

(3) The cause of a cause is also the cause of the effect produced by it. In other words, since there is order in the universe it follows that there is a subordination and coördination among causes. Effects therefore are due not to one cause only, but to a series of causes. In a given series of contingent agents the proximate cause of the effect is itself an effect of a more remote cause, and that an effect of a still more

remote cause, and so on until that cause is reached which contains in itself the sufficient reason for its existence, and therefore the only satisfactory explanation for the existence of the whole series. Each and every finite cause therefore is but a link in a chain reaching backward to the Infinite Cause whence the chain proceeds. No effect finds its ultimate explanation except in the nature of this First Cause.

The presence of evil in the world is not, as some have thought, evidence contrary to this conclusion. For evil, as has already been pointed out, consists not in positive but negative or privative being. Subordinate causes are of the nature of instruments, and as every instrument, subordinated to a principal agent, exercises a causality of its own, the defect or evil in the result or effect, in the case of a finite agent, may be, and in the case of the Perfect Agent must be, attributed to it.

COÖRDINATION OF CAUSES. If in the finite order of things nothing can be exclusively ascribed to a single cause, but must be regarded as the result of a number of them coöperating, the question naturally arises: In what order do they operate? What relations of dependence obtain among them? What is first, which last, which most, which least important?

It may be said at once that if the universe be

regarded as non-rational, not the product of a creative act, then there can be no final causes at all. For then things that are always were, and no reason or purpose may be assigned for their activities. As they *just are*, so they *just act*, and there is an end to the matter. But if the world be regarded as the product of creation, then obviously just as the whole is directed toward a supreme or final end, so also each and every agent has its own particular end or purpose subordinated to the end of the whole. In that case, nothing could be said to happen without a reason, an intelligent purpose, or, in other words, a final cause. Final causes therefore in a sense control other causes. The final cause is the reason why the efficient cause acts. In other words, agents need motives in order to act. Final causes stir efficient causes into activity. Efficient causes, not being creative, but limited in their efficacy to transforming some already existing material, the cause next in order is the material cause which, under the influence of the efficient cause, is rendered capable of receiving the form or formal cause. All depend upon the final cause, the material and formal depend upon the efficient. One may therefore call the final cause the most important and the material the least important of the four.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The relation of causality to change; to order.
2. The difference between a cause and an invariable antecedent; causal nexus and sequence of phenomena.
3. A cause is a species of principle.
4. Hume's theory of causation.
5. We have no experience of causality; but knowledge is limited to experience.
6. The extent and implications of anti-intellectualism in modern philosophy.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

RYAN—*Introduction to Philosophy*, Chs. II and III.

WARD—*Philosophy of Theism*, *passim*.

COFFEY—*Ontology*, Chs. XIII, XIV, XV.

HICKEY—*Summula Phil. Christ.*, Vol. I, pp. 451-466.

RICKABY—*General Metaphysics*, Bk. 2, Ch. II.



## CHAPTER XVI

### MATERIAL AND FORMAL CAUSE

It is not too much to say that a clear understanding of the terms material and formal cause is indispensable to anyone who would fully enter into the whole body of Scholastic thought. Scholastic philosophy, as is well known, is classified as realistic dualism. With monism of any kind it presents thoroughgoing disagreement. It is as uncompromisingly opposed to pantheism and pan-psychism as it is to crass materialism and pan-phenomenalism. And this opposition, this diametrically opposite view, rests ultimately upon its analysis, intellectual analysis to be sure, of the facts of objective experience. And since thought is conditioned by the character of its objects, this dualistic terminology is carried over analogously into the realms of ideal and moral philosophy. This explains the frequent use made by Scholastic writers of such pairs of terms as finite-infinite, actual-potential, substance-accident, essence-existence, matter-form, species-genus, subject-predicate, and the like. Though this all-pervading dualism might be shown by an adequate consideration

of any one of these pairs of terms, it is more easily recognized in the matter-form relation.

GENESIS AND MEANING OF CONCEPTS OF MATTER AND FORM. The predecessors of Aristotle, in their consideration of the phenomenon of change, had arrived at contradictory conclusions. The early Ionians, at one extreme, held that by way of real change all bodies were generated from one underlying universal element. The Eleatics, swinging to the opposite extreme, had denied the possibility of any change whatever, while the Atomists limited all change to mere mechanical union of atoms. Their theory of reality admitted only of being and non-being. Either a thing actually existed or it actually did not exist. Nothing could come into existence, they thought, because "from nothing nothing comes." Between actual being and total non-being they saw no medium. Quite otherwise thought Aristotle. His acute mind was able to solve this difficulty by a distinction. "Between absolute non-being and actual being," he explains, "there is a medium, a middle ground or third mode of being, that is, reality which is only relatively non-being, or in other words, between total nothingness and actual being one must admit an intermediate level of reality, *i.e.*, potential being."<sup>1</sup> Change cannot be regarded

<sup>1</sup> *Apud. Schaaf, De Cosmologia*, p. 276.

as a sudden leap across the infinitely wide span from absolute non-being to complete actuality, but rather a transition from a less perfect to a more perfect mode of reality. This less perfect (and real) mode of being Aristotle called potential or possible being, the mode perfected by the change he called actual being. To potency and act or potential and actual correspond, when there is question of composite quantitative things, the terms material and formal.

Now change is twofold, accidental and substantial. When a material thing undergoes a change of color, its nature remains what it was; the change is accidental, *i.e.*, some non-essential attribute has been lost and a new one acquired. The material object, from being potentially modifiable, became actually modified. The new color preëxisted potentially in it. Under the influence of the chemical agent, the efficient cause of the change, the new color, or accidental form, was produced from the matter and in the matter. The matter then was the material cause of the change. But it should be noted that the term matter in this connection signifies "second" matter, or material substance already actuated by some specific form, that is, it means an actually existing, complete, individual thing.

If, instead of accidental, a substantial change

be considered, then, though the relation of the formal to the material element is analogous, there is this difference that the permanent element in the process, that which undergoes the transformation or receives the new form, emerges not merely as the same individual with a different quality, but as a nature or essence *specifically different* from what it was before the change. In accidental change the two terms are the same individual or complete substance; in substantial change one complete or incomplete substance unites with another to form an individual differing in kind from either of the two substances that entered the compound. Thus in the combination of sodium and chlorine (two complete substances) the result is neither the one nor the other, but salt, a substance *specifically different* from either of the component elements. Clearly, what has taken place is that the determining principles by reason of which the component elements were respectively sodium and chlorine have been displaced, driven off, reduced to a passive or potential status, and that the determining principle by reason of which the new substance, salt, was produced, being latent in the components, has been educed from a state of passivity to one of activity. Now the active determining principles which respectively disappear and emerge in the substantial change are substantial forms, that into which

they respectively disappear and from which they are educed is prime matter.

After this concrete illustration the reader will be prepared to grasp Aristotle's definitions of prime matter. "Prime matter," he says, "is that which considered in itself is not any definite thing (*i.e.*, not a complete substance) nor quantity nor anything else by which reality gets definite determination."<sup>2</sup> This negative description appears at first sight to reduce prime matter to non-being. But, as is clear from the context, when he says that it is no *definite thing* he means only to exclude an actual, not a potential, thing. For, speaking of it from the viewpoint of causality he describes it positively as "that reality from which and in which something comes into being."<sup>3</sup> That is, it is the subject, the potential stuff as it were, out of which things are made. Or as Schaaf puts it, it is "a principle intrinsically entering into a thing made out of it, in opposition to privation by which a thing ceases to be."<sup>4</sup>

A still clearer and more elaborate account of this fundamental concept of realistic dualism is the following:

*Of itself* it is nothing, can do nothing; it has no essence, no existence, no independ-

<sup>2</sup> *Apud* Schaaf, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

<sup>3</sup> *Vide*, De Regnon, *La Métaphysique des Causes*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

ence. It is intangible, invisible, it eludes every attempt of the senses to grasp it. It may indeed be imagined as a kind of elastic stuff spread through the universe, a material out of which everything is made. But . . . it is the mind alone that may properly conceive primary matter as being the basis of all physical nature, the substratum of all the changes that are constantly taking place around us. We understand it to be an indefinable something which underlies those changes from one state of being to another, which itself remaining the same, is perpetually putting on and casting off a form in some part or other of the material world. . . . For every thing it is or has, it is indebted to its form. For union with the latter it has a natural craving; it seeks an alliance and, having obtained it, settles down in a fixed habitation. If considered apart from its form, it must be regarded somewhat as a wanderer, undetermined what to be or what to do.\*

The complement, the indispensable ally of matter, is form. The first caution to the student in trying to understand the meaning of substantial form is to exclude from his mind the several colloquial uses of the term. It is not to be confounded with form in the sense of figure,

\* T. J. Deely, O.P., *Irish Eccl. Record*, Vol. VIII, p. 619.



outline, shape; nor has it the connotation of the terms "mere formality," "merely formal," for the "sake of form." Its real meaning is indeed quite the opposite of these. For while these imply something superficial, unessential, arbitrary, trivial, imperfect even, substantial form connotes something indispensable, essential, the ultimate reason of a thing's existence, perfection and specific nature. In the remarkably clear words of Dr. Deely:

It is that inherent part which bestows on anything its specific perfection, supplies it with its essential requisites, and marks it off from everything of a different species. It gives a special complexion and character to the constitution of a being, and to all its operations. It is like the mainspring of a piece of machinery, imparting gracefulness and energy to all its evolutions.\*

The term form connotes an active, determining, specifying, perfective principle, in contrast to matter, which is a passive, determinable, limiting principle. The two are complementary. The whole is the result of a union or alliance of both. Form is called substantial in order to distinguish it from all accidental modes (forms) of reality.

\* L.c., p. 917.

PROPERTIES OF PRIME MATTER AND OF SUBSTANTIAL FORM. It is clear that prime matter, since with substantial form it constitutes a complete substance, must itself be an incomplete substance, *i.e.*, a reality incapable either of existence or of operation except in union with its connatural coefficient. Again, and by reason of its substantial incompleteness, it is not perceptible to the senses, not an object of sensation, but of the understanding; it is something indeterminate and infinite, inasmuch as it becomes *this* thing, among an indefinite number of possible other things, only by reason of the determination it receives from the form. It is indefinitely determinable through its capacity to receive successively any number of forms. Finally, it is the basis of the quantity and extension of a body.

It is the function of substantial form (1) to confer actual existence, and (2) a specific nature to a thing, and (3) to serve as the radical principle of all its activities. The first it does by completing prime matter in the line of essence; the second by so determining it as to differentiate it from all other things; and the third by uniting with the matter so as to bring into existence a complete individual.

One must not, however, think of substantial form as the efficient cause of prime matter, nor as being the exclusive source of activity. For it

is neither creative nor is its causality extrinsic to the effect; and while it is the agent, the complete individual, which is and acts, the form is that principle by which ultimately the agent is able to exist and act.

PRIME MATTER AND SUBSTANTIAL FORM AS CAUSES. Ordinarily when the term cause is employed one has in mind efficient cause, that is, some physical agent external to the effect and by whose action the effect has been produced. Scholastic writers, however, employ the term in a much wider sense. They predicate the term cause of everything which in some way accounts for the existence and nature of a thing. Thus they speak not only of extrinsic but also of intrinsic causes. To this latter class belong prime matter and substantial form. They are causes, for they are necessary to account for the existence of the total effect; and they are intrinsic causes for the reason that they constitute a complete substance, or individual composite thing.

This fact indicates the mode of their causality. For, as Rickaby says:

*Material and formal causes are such that each contributes itself as a constituent of the whole, which results from a union of the two. Not by a mere mutual interaction, but by a mutual self-communication, they combine to*

produce the total effect. . . . No mere presence in space or dynamic interaction will suffice for such union; the two causes are constituent, not efficient. Nevertheless, not all constituents are straightway to be ranked as matter or form in relation to one another; but only such as stand to one another as recipient, determinable subject, and determination received.\*

Matter then exerts causal influence by its reception of the form to which it is properly disposed, and secondly by uniting with form to constitute the whole. Form, on the other hand, perfects the substance by conferring upon it existence and specific nature, and by uniting with the matter to constitute the compound.

ALTERNATIVE THEORIES. Prime matter and substantial form constitute, in the Scholastic view, the two intrinsic and ultimate component elements or causes of composite things. The theory springs directly from an intellectual analysis of substantial change. Indeed it is claimed that no other theory can give an adequate or even a satisfactory account of substantial change by which new substances make their appearances and existing ones disappear from the scene of actual being. The two rival

\* *Op. cit.*, p. 301.

theories—and the only two conceivable—are Atomism and Dynamism.

If the ultimate component elements or intrinsic causes of things are atoms or minute bodies, complete substances, then obviously composition could mean nothing but mixture and change nothing but rearrangement. All bodies would be homogeneous and *de facto* substantially unchangeable. All so-called change would be nothing but quantitative or accidental change. Hence the new qualities that appear would have to be ascribed to illusion or left totally unexplained. Moreover no adequate principle of unity is provided for existing compounds.

If these ultimate elements or intrinsic causes be considered mere points of force, centers of energy, then, since these forces are not continuous, one would have a force exerting itself upon nothing. In that case not only would there be no unitive principle for the compound, but most sense qualities would necessarily be illusory.

A briefer way of expressing the inadequacy of either atoms or monads as ultimate causes of things is the following dilemma: The ultimate component intrinsic elements or causes of compound things are either extended or unextended. If the former, then, since they are divisible, they are not ultimate; if the latter,

then, since things obviously appear to the senses as extended, their extension would have to be set down as illusion. In neither case would there be any real explanation of the intrinsic nature of things, nor any adequate account of the phenomenon of substantial change.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The concepts of matter and form are deeply imbedded in all literatures.
2. Monism paralyzes thought and renders change illusory.
3. The difference in meaning of the terms "material" and "formal" in common and philosophical usage.
4. The matter-form, potency-act relation is essential to the understanding of causality.
5. Prime matter is not non-being.

## SUGGESTED READINGS

DE REGNON—*La Metaphysique des Causes*.

HARPER—*Metaphysics of the Schools*.

HOERNLE—*Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*.

COFFEY—*Ontology*, Ch. XIII.

MCWILLIAMS—*Cosmology*, Pts. III and IV.

ROSS—*Aristotle: Selections*, pp. 53-81.

OLGIATI—*Key to the Study of St. Thomas, passim*.

GILSON—*The Philosophy of St. Thomas*, p. 186ff.



## CHAPTER XVII

### EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

IN a previous chapter it was stated that the Aristotelian ætiology enumerates four fundamental kinds of causes. The efficient and final causes are extrinsic to the effect while the material and formal are intrinsic or constitutive. The man on the street understands by cause what philosophers call an efficient cause, namely, that by which anything occurs. It is the active extrinsic principle which generates change or production. The Stagirite treats the process of generation or efficiency under the categories of Action and Passion. Source, origin and genesis are common names for the efficient cause.

MISCONCEPTIONS AND OPPOSING VIEWS. Reference was made above to David Hume's attempt to reduce causality to sequence. Causation of course is an object of intellect and not a datum of sense. Hence there is not room for it in the system of any thinker who does not recognize conceptual (as opposed to percep-

tual) knowledge. There may be causation without sequence as when the exercise of causality and the reception of the effect are simultaneous. There may also be sequence without causation for *post hoc ergo propter hoc* is a fallacy. Regardless however of the sequence involved, the important thing in causation is the positive influence exercised by the cause upon the effect and the dependence of the latter upon the former.

It is also incorrect to interpret causality as a transference of motion. There is no visible pocket of force or energy "handed over" by one billiard ball to another when they collide. The whole process can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of the Aristotelian theory of potency and act. The ball which receives an impulse from the other was potentially in motion and the impact or collision actualizes its potentiality.

Another current confusion associates causation with prediction and determinism in opposition to freedom. Thus Eddington in his exposition of the "Principle of Indeterminacy" maintains that the support of free-will by physical science is one of the implications of the Quantum Theory. Free activity is however not causeless activity and in the second place physical effects that cannot be predicted are not psychologically free on that account.

Hobson very carefully points out that the concept of efficient cause is foreign to the domain of natural science. Accordingly it is not the business of science to explain but to describe. Common sense insists however that in certain sequences of phenomena some events are determined by others. Hence consideration of the notions of cause and effect devolves upon the philosopher.

Occasionalists such as Malebranche deny the existence of created efficient causes. For them God is the sole cause; mundane agents are merely the occasions or instruments of His efficiency. This view which had a Cartesian basis is incompatible with the testimony of consciousness to personal causality in the exercise of volition and self-control. Secondly, it makes the adaptation of organ to function a piece of futility. Thirdly, it renders the variety and multiplicity of creatures meaningless since God does everything Himself. Fourthly, it gratuitously and extravagantly assumes an infinity of miracles. Finally, it is repugnant to our conviction that external objects are the causes of our sensations.

ORIGIN AND VALIDITY OF OUR IDEA OF EFFICIENCY. Our knowledge of efficient causality begins at home, so to speak. It is grounded in experience. In the first place, we are conscious

of ourselves as the capable and responsible causes of our own thoughts and actions. We intuitively ascribe many effects to ourselves as causes. Then we infer by analogy that other people who behave similarly are also efficient causes. Finally, by a similar logic we give to corporeal objects credit for certain effects which common sense dictates they have produced. So convinced are we of the validity of our reasoning that common sense labels the charge of anthropomorphism as absurd.

To use Joyce's example, when we watch the "potter mould the yielding clay" we know that over and above the sequence, if there be any, there is interaction involved and that the indentation is the effect produced by and dependent upon his impression.

**TYPES OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY.** (1) First cause and second cause: God is always spoken of as the First Cause, while creatures are referred to as second causes. (2) Immanent and transitive causes: The immanent cause is that which is productive of no external effect or that whose action is consummated in and by the agent. Immanent causality is proper to living things. In grammar the notion of an intransitive verb corresponds to this philosophical concept. The causality of inorganic bodies is transitive, one of them acting not upon itself but

upon another. (3) Free and necessary causes: Minerals, plants and animals are spoken of as necessary causes because they are the victims of determinism, while the human agent has his liberty. (4) Physical and moral causes: the actual murderer is the physical cause of a homicide while he who commands it is the moral cause. (5) Partial and total causes: one of a team of horses pulling a wagon would be a partial cause of its motion. (6) Proximate and remote causes: the immediate destruction of a wooden table would be proximately caused by the flames in the neighborhood while the upset lamp on the floor below would be the remote cause. (7) Direct and indirect causes, or *per se* and *per accidens*: one man may be the direct cause of another man's fractured skull and indirectly of his death. (8) *Principium* and *quo*: the person or *suppositum* is the agent who performs the function, while the nature or the faculty is the means (*quo*) that it employs. (9) Principal and instrumental causes: the writer and his pen. The principal efficient functions by its own virtuality, while the instrumental efficient cause functions by reason of a communicated energy. In such cases it should be noted (a) that the principal and instrumental causes produce a unique effect, in other words, they act as one (b) that the influence of the principal cause upon the instrument is but transient;

and (c) that the virtue or energy proper to the instrument as such is communicated.

**PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.** It is usually taken for a self-evident proposition or axiom that nothing occurs without a cause or that every effect demands a proportionate cause. This truth is sometimes referred to as the law of sufficient reason. It would be incorrect to say that everything demands a cause, for the Infinite and Necessary Being is of course uncaused.

**THE QUESTION OF ORIGINS.** The thought of the past century has been, thanks to the notion of Evolution, dominated by genetic considerations. Whence came the universe? How did the solar system originate? Where did the earth come from? Did life begin by spontaneous generation? How were the various species of life derived? How did consciousness arise? What is the source of intelligence? These questions properly pertain to the departments of special metaphysics rather than to ontology and to the former only in so far as one is dealing with ultimate or remote origins. Thus cosmogony—that hybrid offspring of astronomy and geology—traces the physical universe back to a primitive parental nebula as a proximate cause. As to the first and ultimate origin of



matter, however, no scientist need pretend to know.

Three philosophical answers have been given to the question of the origin of the physical universe. They are Materialism, Pantheism, and Creationism, and they are treated in detail in cosmology. The first of these gratuitously assumes the self-sufficiency of matter so that the universe remains virtually uncaused. Such a theory is of course utterly incompatible with the fact of the patent contingency of matter. Pantheism identifies the universe with God and thus, ostensibly, renders a cause unnecessary. The truth is, however, that such an identification involves a contradiction for the Deity is immutable, infinite, eternal, and necessary, while the cosmos is mutable, finite, temporal and contingent. Furthermore, the Divine Simplicity is inconsistent with the complexity and composition of the material world as well as with the idea of its *emanation* from Him. Finally, the theory of Creationism or Theism or Dualism recognizes the world as a detached product of a supreme personal creative spirit. It finds the material universe to be a moved, caused, conditioned, and dependent system from the examination of which it rises by inference to the existence of an unmoved mover, a first uncaused cause, an absolute, independent, immutable and infinite Being.

With the first theory we associate the names of Hobbes, Buchner, Vogt, Moleschott, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. To the second view Bradley, Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Erigena, Bruno, the Stoics, and the Hindu Brahmanists subscribed. The third doctrine is that upheld by Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas.

Some form of the Doctrine of Descent, that is, the theory of Transformism or Organic Evolution as opposed to the view of special creation, would seem to be the more probable explanation of the origin of species. It matters not to philosophy whether Darwin's version, which is usually entitled "Natural Selection through the Survival of the Fittest in the Struggle for Existence," or some other hypothesis be accepted.

As to the origin of life itself, the consensus of scientific opinion favors Vitalism. Haldane, Driesch, Thomson and Johnstone confirm Pasteur's dictum. In other words, life does not take its origin from inorganic sources. It should be noted that Aquinas found no repugnance in spontaneous generation on metaphysical grounds so that our reasons for this stand are purely empirical.

The origin of the human soul has been explained in various ways. Evolutionism, Pantheism, Traducianism, and Creationism are the

standard answers to the question. Against the pantheistic position one may urge the point that *emanation* of any kind from God is impossible as He is utterly simple. In a similar way it may be objected that the soul cannot be handed over or generated by the parents, as the Traducianists claim, for their souls have no parts to be given away. Again the principle of causality is jeopardized by any theory in which the spiritual soul of man would be derived by evolution from the animal or any other lower source. The greater simply cannot come from the less. We arrive consequently by way of elimination at the only plausible explanation which is that each and every human soul is the result of a special creative act on God's part.

CREATIVITY AND EMERGENCE. Henri Bergson is responsible for a widespread category of contemporary thought, namely, the notion of creative evolution. Not only is reality *in flux* but it is a flux as Heraclitus of old declared. Moreover this cosmic process is becoming more and more perfect of itself, veritably creating itself over and over and bigger and better. He is thus deriving the greater from the less because he fails to recognize behind the urge and impulse and *elan vital* of his hylozoistic world, a first mover, an alpha and omega who is both push-

ing and pulling. This piece of sophistry reminds one of the illogically evolving Ideal of Hegel. Whitehead commits the same error in his Process where "creativity" is presented as fundamental.

*Deism* is the view of those who, like the Theists, admit the existence of God but unlike the latter deny anything like concurrence, conservation, providence, or interference of any kind. After creating the universe He is supposed to have left it alone. In natural or rational theology the inadequacy of this doctrine is demonstrated. The same logic which leads one to infer a cause for the beginning of matter also forces one to conclude that its continuance in being requires a cause.

#### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The concept of efficient cause in relation to natural science.
2. The bearing of epistemology upon the idea of cause.
3. Qualities as proximate principles of activity.
4. Kant inconsistently uses causality to derive the phenomenon from the noumenon.
5. The greater error: Phenomenism or Occasionalism?
6. The ancestry of these two views.
7. Is human freedom compatible with real causality?
8. What is the meaning of "anemic turnips"?

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### SUGGESTED READINGS

CONGER—*New Views of Evolution.*

JEANS—*The Universe Around Us.*

A COLLECTIVE WORK—*Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge.*

WINDLE—*The Church and Science.*

MCDUGALL—*Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution.*

*Essays in Honor of John Dewey.*

GERARD—*The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer.*

WHITTAKER—*The Metaphysics of Evolution.*

GUIBERT—*In the Beginning.*

ZAHM—*Evolution and Dogma.*

DORLODOT—*Darwinism and Catholic Theology.*

COFFEY—*Ontology.*

MERCIEB—*Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy.*

HARPER—*Metaphysics of the School.*

## CHAPTER XVIII

### FINAL CAUSES

MEANING OF FINALITY. Can the world of our experience be accounted for in terms of the efficient, material, and formal causes whose existence we have established? According to Scholastic cosmology this is not enough. We must also assume the existence of final causes which efficient causes tend to realize. The final cause is the "why" or "whither" of a thing or an event. Aristotle defined it as that for the sake of which or on account of which something is done. There are of course thinkers who refuse to admit any real basis for this conception. They cannot see any influence exercised upon mundane affairs by purpose, design or aim. Such thinkers are called Mechanists and the name of the theory which they oppose is teleology. Mechanists declare that natural phenomena merely happen. They occur at random or by chance.

Let us endeavor to determine whether or not the universe is a rational scheme. Has it a whither or a why? Are there such things as purpose, order and design outside of the human



mind? Corresponding to the intentions that dominate and guide human affairs is there any direction involved in mundane events? What if any is the method in this madness?

CERTAIN FACTS. Is there evidence of law and order in nature? To ask the question is to answer it. (1) The sciences of chemistry and physics are simply collections of laws of nature, and these latter are nothing more than man-made formulæ expressing the regular behavior of natural agents, mere statements of the constant and uniform mode of activity of physical objects. The course of nature is merely the invariable sequence of physical phenomena. Even the New Physics has further enhanced the teleological view with its description of the structure of the atom, the military behavior of whose electrons calls for an intrinsic principle of finality. Valence and affinity are inexplicable unless there be a purposive urge or drive within the atom. The fact that crystals of different chemical constitutions have different crystalline forms is another sign of regularity. The exact mixture of atmospheric gases is nicely adjusted by nature in order to make life possible. (2) In astronomy nothing is more striking than the orderly movement of the celestial bodies. So regular is their motion that astronomers predict astral and planetary occur-

rences years in advance. The equilibrium of forces which accounts for the relative positions of the sun and the earth secures conditions favorable for the sustenance of organic life.

(3) On the biological level the evidence of teleology is most striking. Life itself can hardly be defined without the use of the word adaptation. The organism as a whole adjusts itself to its environment and its several organs are suited to their functions. The human eye is a classical example of this finality. Janet in his *Final Causes* capably describes the relation of the eye structure to the act of vision and shows how it exhibits "the marvelous industry of nature."

The adaptation of the ear to hearing, of the bird's wing to flying, and of the mammary glands to nourishing the young are also cases in point. These are instances of dynamic finality or the ordination of means to end. One is likewise impressed by instances of static finality or the adaptation of the part to the whole, of symmetry or plan of structure. The hierarchy, interdependence and coöperation of living species and indeed of the different grades of being display a still wider order in nature. (4) Animal instincts, like life, are incapable of adequate description without the use of the word purposive, adaptive or teleological. (5) The extrinsic finality of things, that is, their utility with reference to man is another fact which

cannot be denied and which must not be overlooked. (6) Finally we come to the fact of æsthetic finality. Consider the beauty of nature in the sky and the ocean, the desert, the tropics, and the icebound regions, which surpasses that of art. From the standpoint of form, think of the outline of trees, and of flowers, the configuration of the leaves. In sounds, imagine the songs of birds. There are also, in nature, rare cases of intense beauty, of special ornament and variety as for instance the humming bird.

THE IMPLICATIONS. One of the most important functions of science is to classify phenomena, but this would be impossible in a world where only chaos reigned. The above facts would seem to imply that the world is a cosmos in the etymological sense of that word. Now order is defined by St. Thomas as the due adaptation of means to ends, and by St. Augustine as the arrangement of many things like and unlike, according each its proper place. It will be readily seen that the universe is orderly, for we find in it harmony, arrangement, subordination, coördination, ordination, adaptation, system, and scheme. Moreover, since order implies the arrangement of many factors by intelligence for some purpose, we are led to infer the existence of a director behind the scenes as it were. This supreme architect or engineer is of course

God Himself. He is the Omega as well as the Alpha of reality. Thus in the *Summa Theologica* the *Quinta Via* of proving God's existence is the teleological argument. For Aquinas as for Browne and Young, "nature is the art of God." Alexander Pope expressed the same view in his "Essay on Man" in the closing six lines of the first epistle. An identical strain is sung by Dante in the first canto of his *Paradiso*.

Inductive logic recognizes as valid the scientific assumption of the constant, invariable and uniform character of natural processes. Perhaps the legitimacy of this assumption is ingrained in human nature. Thus Frazer, in *The Golden Bough*, lists among the principles of magic (the mother of science) the regular recurring events of nature's cycle. Whitehead, too, claims, in *Science and the Modern World*,<sup>1</sup> that the essence of Greek tragedy "resides in the solemnity of the remorseless working of things," the inevitableness of destiny, fate, or the order of nature.

**MAN'S DESTINY.** The problem of the ultimate end of human existence is dealt with *ex professo* in ethics.<sup>2</sup> Pleasure, honor, wealth and

<sup>1</sup> P. 15.

<sup>2</sup> The student should consult hereon: Cronin, *Science of Ethics*; Miltner, *Elements of Ethics*; Ross, *Christian Ethics*; Hill, *Ethics, General and Special*; Leibell, *Readings in Ethics*.

other desiderata are there examined by moral philosophers from the point of view of their adequacy (or otherwise) to serve as the goal of life. The desire for happiness is ingrained in man's very nature. With respect to the good in general he is not free, although he is free to choose among the various means for its attainment. Error here may jeopardize his happiness. This deception however is due to his own ignorance and frailty. Once he knows where his happiness lies he is led to it by inevitable necessity. This happiness or *summum bonum* is found to be realized only in mental communion with or cognitive possession of God in the next life.

THE CHARACTER OF FINAL CAUSALITY. It is the business of an end to solicit, stimulate, induce, or attract the efficient cause. Thus payment is the motive that moves the sculptor to carve or chisel the statue, and the end or motive is a real cause because it truly influences the effect. Only the good can have the character of an end and it is its goodness which moves the agent to act by the desire or love which it excites.

The Scholastics call the end the "cause of causes" because of its influence upon the efficient cause. They further say that it is the "first in intention and the last in execution," in

order to express the fact that the end as such exists only in the mind by anticipation, as it were. The word end came to be used as synonymous with objective, aim or motive since the latter coincides or synchronizes with the issue, result or outcome of a process. Anything that is desired or good is such because it conforms with or perfects some nature. The end is the good toward which creatures bend their efforts. Agencies drive toward whatever is conducive to their natural welfare. Finality consists then in solicitation or attraction exercised by a final cause upon an efficient cause.

ELECTION, APPREHENSION AND EXECUTION. There are many philosophers to-day who will agree with Driesch that biology cannot be reduced to chemistry because on the organic level one encounters internal causation. St. Thomas and the Scholastics, generally, go much farther. For them all grades of being are dominated by ends. *Omne agens agit propter finem*. Otherwise they would not produce determined effects. Of course the different levels of existence are governed by different modes of finality. Thus man with his endowment of intellect and will is able to act freely, that is, to choose his ends and his means and to perceive the relationship between them. He is said, consequently, to tend toward his end *by election*.



Brute animals are guided unconsciously by their instincts to their ends. Of them we say that they tend toward their ends by apprehension for they know what they want but they do not know why they want it. Still less perfect is teleological behavior of plants and minerals who reach their goals *by execution*. With them it is a non-conscious and automatic drive. Every clod feels an "instinct within it that reaches and towers."

NATURAL APPETITE. The persistence of a cosmic order despite the constant flux of things would be one of the so-called enigmas of experience were it not for the teleological view of the universe. The universal and enduring character of order, the perpetual recurrence of phenomena, or in other words, the constant and uniform mode of activity, the going in one direction or making for an end manifested by natural agencies and the permanence of specific types in the mineral and vegetable kingdom imply the convergence of native forces to one single purpose. This tendency toward an end is merely the fulfillment of an agent's normal functions, the playing of its rôle in the cosmic drama, the doing of its share in the scheme of things. Every agent seeks its own natural development and self-perfection.

There is in the very depths of every individ-

ual thing an internal orientation and disposition toward whatever is suitable, desirable or perfective to them, a tendency which draws them to their end and directs thereto the exercise of their forces. This immanent, inherent, intrinsic drive or basic urge we call a thing's nature, natural appetite, affinity, or form. Conscious beings as was said above have besides this basic unconscious drive a spontaneous appetite or conscious libido which is a reaction to knowledge and rational beings have a free appetite or will. But they all seek their own good. They are motivated by whatever conforms to their nature. *Quamlibet formam sequitur aliqua inclinatio*. Hence the form is the principle of finality as well as existence and action.

NATURE, FATE, FORTUNE AND CHANCE. The word Nature, used in a universal sense, means the sum-total of particular natures. The internal principle of direction, orientation and activity of a thing is called its nature. It is merely the dynamic aspect of substance or essence. Mother Nature is merely the collection of particular natures on earth, personified. Whatever is not natural may be supernatural, preternatural, violent, miraculous, artificial, or merely accidental. We call accidental the unforeseen meeting of several causes which are *per se* nat-

ural, the mere concurrence of circumstances as, *e.g.*, an accidental death in opposition to one caused by old age. Again an unexpected occurrence among agents that are (1) physical we call chance, (2) rational we call fortune. Finally to insuperable necessity we give the name fate or doom or destiny. Nemesis and kismet are names for the same force. If by fate we merely mean the divine providence or preordination the conception is valid, but the ancient idea of the Fate Sisters is a pure myth.

Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius of old were mechanical atomists. They believed that the universe resulted from the "fortuitous concurrence of atoms." Darwin relied upon the same capricious factor in his theory of natural selection wherein fortuitous variations were supposed to account largely for the evolution of species. However the order in the universe cannot be explained by chance. Artists cannot duplicate the beautiful order of nature. Still no one would presume to attribute the masterpieces of art to the causal coincidence of atoms. Chance is blind and indifferent and is not an adequate cause of the admirable order and harmony of the universe with its uniform and constant laws. The explanation of universal order requires purposive finality and intelligent de-

sign. "The cosmic pattern bears the earmarks of intelligence." Purpose is a thread running through the entire fabric of creation.

**THE PURPOSE OF CREATION.** Since God is intelligent He must operate with reference to an end. The only conceivable object that He can have in view is the manifestation of His excellence or perfection. Containing as He does all goodness, He does not profit in any way by creation. It is an act of sheer gratuity. *Bonum est diffusivum sui*. In other words God's glory is the supreme and ultimate end of the universe. It is almost needless to remark that egoism in His case is impossible.

God's internal objective glory is His own excellence or perfection; His internal formal glory is His self-consciousness or awareness thereof; His external objective glory is creation which manifests His excellence; and His external formal glory is man's appreciation thereof. It will be easily seen then that the proximate, direct, and immediate goal of existence of any natural agent is its own perfection; that the secondary or intermediate aim is the cosmic order, and that this is subordinated to a transcendental end which is the exhibition of "the beauty of His house and the place where His glory dwelleth."

CLASSIFICATION OF FINAL CAUSES. (1) When ends or purposes are considered serially the first is called proximate, the last, ultimate, and the other (or others) intermediate. Thus the immediate or proximate end, *e.g.*, of a student is study; the intermediate end is the passing of examinations, and the ultimate end is education. (2) The end of the action, or its natural effect, and end of the agent, *i.e.*, his intention, is illustrated as follows: the amelioration of the conditions of the poor is the end of the action of charity; the end of the agent may be vain-glory. This distinction is of importance in the field of ethics. (3) Intrinsic and extrinsic ends: A thing's own perfection is its intrinsic end, while its service or utility to others is its extrinsic end. (4) Objective and subjective ends: The objective end is the good thing itself; and subjective or formal end is the agent's possession of the object. (5) Real and personal ends: The real end is the object desired; the personal end is the person for whom the object is wanted. This distinction is akin to that in grammar between the direct and indirect object.

PHILOSOPHY OF VALUE. Intimately related with the science of teleology is a rather new study entitled axiology or the theory of values. The notion of value may be described as what ought to be rather than what is. It is thus op-

posed to fact. The conception is also used by many philosophers who have neglected the distinction between percept and concept and who are thus at a loss to include the ideas of meaning, significance and importance in their systems. Perry interprets value in terms of interest and concern and perhaps the notion of the good taken in its widest sense is the nearest equivalent to the concept of value. Thus while good in the narrow sense is the object of appetite, truth the object of intellect and beauty the object of taste, truth and beauty may in the broader sense both be called good, since they are desired by their respective faculties. We may thus distinguish religious, moral, social, political, economic, psychological, logical or theoretical and æsthetic or artistic values. The philosophy of value emphasizes the truth that science for the most part treats reality from only the cognitive point of view and that this is a narrow perspective for man has a heart as well as a head. At all events the writings of Laird, Perry and Urban would seem to indicate that a percentage at least of contemporary thinkers are dissatisfied with the present dearth of standards and ideals.\*

\* Cf. Ward, L. R., *The Philosophy of Value*.



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### TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

1. The meaning of the phrase "to tend toward an end."
2. The relation of appetite, good, and end.
3. The meaning and implications of order.
4. The concept of nature.
5. Natural law and laws of nature.
6. The question of miracles.
7. Synonyms for final cause.
8. The proximate, intermediate, and ultimate ends of each and every agency in nature.
9. Teleology and axiology.
10. The seventh book of Milton's *Paradise Lost*.
11. Striking instances of adaptation in the human organism.
12. Pessimism, or the philosophy of "What's the Use?" "The Futilitarians."
13. Outside of the imagination is there any blind force compelling each and every agent by inevitable necessity to produce definite effects?

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